Gambling risk perception and decision making by Spurrier, Michael
Copyright and use of this thesis
This thesis must be used in accordance with the 
provisions of the Copyright Act 1968.
Reproduction of material protected by copyright 
may be an infringement of copyright and 
copyright owners may be entitled to take 
legal action against persons who infringe their 
copyright.
Section 51 (2) of the Copyright Act permits 
an authorized officer of a university library or 
archives to provide a copy (by communication 
or otherwise) of an unpublished thesis kept in 
the library or archives, to a person who satisfies 
the authorized officer that he or she requires 
the reproduction for the purposes of research 
or study. 
The Copyright Act grants the creator of a work 
a number of moral rights, specifically the right of 
attribution, the right against false attribution and 
the right of integrity. 
You may infringe the author’s moral rights if you:
-  fail to acknowledge the author of this thesis if 
you quote sections from the work 
- attribute this thesis to another author 
-  subject this thesis to derogatory treatment 
which may prejudice the author’s reputation
For further information contact the University’s 
Director of Copyright Services
sydney.edu.au/copyright
 
 
 
 
Gambling Risk Perception and Decision Making 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Michael Richard Edward Spurrier 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Clinical 
Psychology/Doctor of Philosophy 
 
School of Psychology 
Faculty of Science 
University of Sydney 
New South Wales, Australia 
2014 
2 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................................................................................ 2 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................................................................................................ 8 
CERTIFICATION BY CANDIDATE ........................................................................................................................................ 10 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ......................................................................................................................................................... 11 
ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................................................................................. 12 
CHAPTER 1: GENERAL INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 16 
BACKGROUND ........................................................................................................................................................................................ 17 
GAMBLING RELATED HARM ................................................................................................................................................................. 18 
PREVALENCE OF GAMBLING PROBLEMS AND DISORDERED GAMBLING ........................................................................................ 20 
DIAGNOSTIC CRITERIA FOR DISORDERED GAMBLING ...................................................................................................................... 22 
CHAPTER 2: RISK PERCEPTION AND RISKY CHOICE IN THE GAMBLING LITERATURE ................................. 27 
GAMBLING DISORDER MODELS ........................................................................................................................................................... 28 
BIOPSYCHOLOGICAL MODELS OF GAMBLING DECISION MAKING .................................................................................................... 28 
COGNITIVE MODELS OF GAMBLING DECISION MAKING .................................................................................................................... 36 
CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................................................................................................................................ 45 
CHAPTER 3: ALTERNATIVE THEORIES OF RISKY DECISION MAKING ................................................................. 47 
DECISION MAKING MODELS ................................................................................................................................................................. 48 
MENTAL MODELS OF RISK PERCEPTION ............................................................................................................................................ 49 
DRUG AND ALCOHOL MODELS OF RISKY CHOICE .............................................................................................................................. 52 
ADDRESSING THE GAP IN THE GAMBLING LITERATURE .................................................................................................................. 54 
CHAPTER 4: RISK PERCEPTION IN GAMBLING: A SYSTEMATIC REVIEW ........................................................... 58 
INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................................................................... 59 
3 
 
RISK PERCEPTION, DECISION-MAKING AND GAMBLING BEHAVIOUR ............................................................................................. 59 
RISK AND POSITIVE PERCEPTION OF GAMBLING ............................................................................................................................... 60 
METHOD ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 63 
RESULTS ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 64 
GENERAL LIMITATIONS OF THE GAMBLING RISK PERCEPTION LITERATURE ............................................................................... 71 
CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................................................................................................................... 87 
CHAPTER 5: AN EXPERT MAP OF GAMBLING RISK PERCEPTION .......................................................................... 89 
INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................................................................... 90 
METHOD ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 92 
PARTICIPANTS ....................................................................................................................................................................................... 92 
MEASURES .............................................................................................................................................................................................. 93 
PROCEDURE ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 94 
DATA ANALYSIS ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 95 
CONTROLLING FOR BIAS ....................................................................................................................................................................... 95 
RESULTS ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 96 
EXPERTS’ MODEL OF RISK PERCEPTION ............................................................................................................................................. 96 
FUNCTIONAL COMPONENTS OF GAMBLER RISK PERCEPTION ...................................................................................................... 101 
FACTORS MEDIATING OR MODERATING RISK PERCEPTION.......................................................................................................... 106 
DISCUSSION ............................................................................................................................................................................ 113 
CHAPTER 6: GAMBLER RISK PERCEPTION: A MENTAL MODEL AND GROUNDED THEORY ANALYSIS . 116 
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................................................... 117 
METHOD .................................................................................................................................................................................. 118 
PARTICIPANTS .................................................................................................................................................................................... 118 
MEASURES ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 121 
4 
 
PROCEDURE ........................................................................................................................................................................................ 122 
DATA ANALYSIS .................................................................................................................................................................................. 123 
CONTROLLING FOR BIAS .................................................................................................................................................................... 123 
RESULTS .................................................................................................................................................................................. 124 
OVERVIEW OF LAY GAMBLER PERSPECTIVES ON RISK PERCEPTION........................................................................................... 124 
NON-PROBLEM/LOW PROBLEM GAMBLERS ................................................................................................................................. 129 
MODERATE RISK GAMBLERS ............................................................................................................................................................. 132 
PROBLEM GAMBLERS ......................................................................................................................................................................... 135 
DISCUSSION ............................................................................................................................................................................ 140 
POSITIVE VERSUS NEGATIVE RISK PERCEPTIONS .......................................................................................................................... 140 
IDIOSYNCRATIC GAMBLER PROFILING ............................................................................................................................................. 142 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS ......................................................................................................................................... 144 
CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................................................................................... 145 
CHAPTER 7: DEVELOPMENT OF THE GAMBLING RISK DECISIONS QUESTIONNAIRE AND A RISK 
DECISION MODEL OF GAMBLING DISORDER ............................................................................................................. 146 
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................................................... 147 
METHOD .................................................................................................................................................................................. 149 
PARTICIPANTS .................................................................................................................................................................................... 149 
MEASURES ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 152 
PROCEDURE ........................................................................................................................................................................................ 155 
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS ....................................................................................................................................... 156 
PART 1: FACTOR ANALYSIS REFINEMENT OF DECISION MAKING CONTENT AND PROCESS ITEMS IN THE 181-ITEM GRDQ
 ....................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 156 
EXPLORATORY FACTOR ANALYSES .................................................................................................................................................. 156 
CONFIRMATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS ................................................................................................................................................. 159 
5 
 
PART 2: DEVELOPMENT OF A GAMBLING RISK DECISION MODEL ............................................................................................... 165 
DATA ANALYSIS .................................................................................................................................................................................. 165 
SIGNIFICANT PREDICTORS OF GAMBLING CONSEQUENCES .......................................................................................................... 167 
MEDIATION ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 171 
TEST-RETEST RELIABILITY OF THE REVISED 48-ITEM GRDQ ................................................................................................... 172 
DISCUSSION ............................................................................................................................................................................ 176 
PERCEPTIONS OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF NEGATIVE OUTCOMES AND THE IMMEDIACY OF POSITIVE OUTCOMES ................... 176 
BELIEF IN LUCK AND PERSONAL CONTROL OF GAMBLING OUTCOMES ....................................................................................... 177 
MOTIVATION TO GAMBLE AND LACK OF BEHAVIOURAL CONTROL ............................................................................................. 178 
POOR INSIGHT REGARDING PROBLEMS AND SPENDING................................................................................................................ 179 
CUE SENSITIVITY AND VARIANCE ACROSS CONTEXTS ................................................................................................................... 180 
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY ............................................................................................................................................................ 180 
PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS .................................................................................................................. 181 
CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................................................................................... 182 
CHAPTER 8: DISCUSSION ................................................................................................................................................... 184 
SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS ........................................................................................................................................................ 185 
LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH ..................................................................................................................................................... 188 
PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS AND STRENGTHS OF THE RESEARCH ................................................................................................ 191 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS ......................................................................................................................................... 196 
REFERENCES .......................................................................................................................................................................... 199 
APPENDICES ........................................................................................................................................................................... 227 
 
 
 
  
6 
 
 LIST OF TABLES  
Table 1 Diagnostic criteria for DSM 5 Gambling Disorder 312.31 (F63.0), relating 
to gambling related harms, maladaptive decision making style, and 
maladaptive motivation  
24 
Table 2 List of publications or manuscripts under consideration presented within 
the thesis 
56 
Table 3 Summary of articles reviewed 65 
Table 4 Experts’ professional experience 93 
Table 5 Vulnerability and protection factors associated with specific individual 
and environmental domains related to gambling risk perception 
100 
Table 6 Lay gambler descriptive and demographic information 120 
Table 7 Participant vulnerability and protection factors 125 
Table 8 Participant demographic data by group  151 
Table 9 
 
Factor analysis solutions for seven decision making content and process 
domains 
157 
Table 10 
 
Communalities, factor loadings, and reliability of factors by domain for 
five confirmatory factor analyses addressing decision making content 
using Principal Axis Factoring with Promax rotation  
161 
Table 11 
 
Communalities, factor loadings, and reliability of factors by domain for 
two confirmatory factor analyses addressing decision making ‘processes’ 
using Principal Axis Factoring with Promax rotation 
162 
Table 12 
 
Factor extractions, rotations, Variance accounted for, fit indices, 
reliability, communalities, factor loadings, and factor descriptions by 
decision making domain for seven confirmatory factor analyses 
163 
Table 13 Inter-correlations between factors 163 
Table 14 Normative data for decision making and risk factor scales for gambler 
and non-gambler subgroups  
169 
Table 15 
 
Indirect effect size estimates, including 95% confidence interval bias 
correction, for significant mediators between gambling factor 
relationships  
174 
7 
 
 LIST OF FIGURES  
Figure 1 Expert map of gambling risk perception, decision making, and behaviour 98 
Figure 2 Model of gambling risk decisions with standardized path coefficients, 
with model fit indices 
175 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
8 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
AGFI: Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index  
APA: American Psychiatric Association  
ATGS: Attitude Towards Gambling Scale  
CAGES: Chinese Adolescent Gambling Expectancy Scale  
CBT: Cognitive Behavioural Therapy 
CFA: Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
CFI: Comparative Fit Index  
CI: Confidence Interval 
CPGI: Canadian Problem Gambling Index 
DBC: Gamblers’ Beliefs about Chance Inventory 
DBS: Drake Beliefs Scale 
DF: degrees of freedom 
DOSPERT: Domain Specific Risk Taking Scale  
DSM: Diagnostic and Statistical Manual  
EFA: Exploratory Factor Analysis 
EGAQ: Effects of Gambling Advertising Questionnaire  
EGM: Electronic Gaming Machine 
GABA: Gamma-Amino Butyric Acid  
GABS: Gambling Attitudes and Beliefs Scale 
GRCS: Gambling Related Cognitions Scale 
GEQ: Gambling Expectancy Questionnaire  
9 
 
GFI: Goodness of Fit Index  
GMAB: Gambling Motives, Attitudes and Behaviour 
GRDQ: Gambling Risk Decisions Questionnaire 
GT: Grounded Theory 
MM: Mental Models 
MSA: Measure of Sampling Adequacy 
PCA: Principal Components Analysis 
PGSI: Problem Gambling Severity Index 
RIA: Relative Importance Analysis 
RMSEA: Root-Mean-Square Error of Approximation  
SD: Standard Deviation 
SOGS: South Oaks Gambling Screen 
URL: Uniform Resource Locator 
VGS: Victorian Gambling Screen  
 
 
 
10 
 
  
Certification by candidate 
This thesis is submitted to the University of Sydney in fulfilment of the requirements for the 
Degree of Doctor of Clinical Psychology / Doctor of Philosophy. The work presented in this 
thesis is my own and to the best of my knowledge original, except where acknowledged in the 
text. The work contained in this thesis has not been submitted for a higher degree to any other 
university or institution. All of the material contained in this thesis was carried out during my 
PhD candidature at the University of Sydney under the supervision of Alex Blaszczynski and Paul 
Rhodes. 
 
 
Michael Spurrier       Date: 16th September, 2014 
  
11 
 
Acknowledgements 
Thanks to Alex Blaszczynski for his considerable support and guidance throughout the many 
stages of this research project. His valuable feedback, patience and editing were very much 
appreciated and a major reason for the success of this project. 
Thanks also to my associate supervisor, Paul Rhodes, for his qualitative methodological 
advice, and feedback on publications and presentations. 
I am also grateful to Carolyn MacCann for her statistical advice, feedback, and assistance 
with publications. 
This research would not have been possible without the participation of a number of 
gambling researchers and clinicians, friends, colleagues, and University of Sydney students, who 
generously shared their time and expertise to help develop this project. Thanks must also go to 
others who have helped with recruitment, data collection, professional, theoretical (and 
emotional) support, and not insignificantly for loans and employment during the period of my 
candidature critical to me having the opportunity to engage with this project. In no particular 
order (and to name only a few of these people) thanks go to Kristof Mikes-Liu, Kyrill Fayn, Owen 
Spears, Ali Cheatham, Chris Bell, Ed Spurrier, Richard Spurrier, Marina Ishak, Sandra Slade, 
Sophie Burgess, Milena Gandy, Donna Tsakonakos, Lucia Holzner, Matt Frize, Alex Russell and to 
the National Association of Gambling Studies. 
Finally, thanks to Leah for her considerable patience and support over the past few 
years. 
 
  
12 
 
Abstract 
Cognitive and biopsychological research has identified a significant relationship between 
perception, decision making and the negative consequences associated with sustained 
gambling. Drug and alcohol research suggests that how individuals navigate decisions involving 
motivating but risky activities involves several important, distinct but interrelated aspects of 
cognition. Nevertheless, risk perception and decision making has received little attention in the 
gambling literature. The aim of the current thesis therefore was to investigate risk perception in 
gambling, and to develop a model of gambling decision making mindful of risk perception 
concepts.  
The project applied the Mental Models methodology – a common approach to 
evaluating decision making in hazardous scenarios. First, risks associated with a specified hazard 
are identified, along with factors controlling exposure to risk, then user concepts of risk are 
measured to identify gaps or errors in need of intervention.  
The thesis included: a literature review, a qualitative study evaluating expert opinions 
regarding gambling risk decision making, a second qualitative study evaluating lay gambler 
mental models of risk, and a quantitative evaluation of risk perception and decision making 
concepts via a self-report questionnaire. Data from all phases of the project were used to 
develop an assessment tool and theoretical model of gambling risk decision making. 
It was anticipated that understanding the processes by which risk perception 
predisposes an individual to maintain gambling despite adverse consequences would act as an 
invaluable guide for preventative educational campaigns, clinical treatment, and social policy 
interventions.  
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Study one involved systematic review of the literature on risk perception in gambling. 
The review aimed to identify evidence about perception of risk in gambling, and to examine the 
relationship between risk perceptions and behaviour. Sixteen studies met inclusion criteria, 
providing evidence that disordered gamblers hold both more optimistic overall perceptions of 
risk, and a mixture of more positive and more negative specific outcome expectations. Further, 
evidence suggested a range of contextual and individual differences influence the relationship 
between risk perception and decision-making, such as differences in insight, perception of the 
significance or impact of outcomes, and sensitivity to decision making cues.  
Study two aimed to further explore the role played by risk perception and risk decision-
making in gambling behaviour and Gambling Disorder. The study recruited eleven gambling 
expert clinicians and researchers, completing semi-structured interviews based in Mental 
Models and Grounded Theory methodologies. Expert interview data was used to construct a 
comprehensive expert mental model ‘map’ detailing risk-perception, and related factors 
contributing to harmful or safe gambling. Findings indicated experts considered idiosyncratic 
beliefs among disordered gamblers to result in: underestimation of risk and loss, insufficient 
prioritization of needs, and underutilization of risk management strategies. In addition, experts 
identified a number of factors that influenced the way that individuals used risk data, including: 
(1) reinforcement and learning experiences; (2) sensitivity to mental states and environmental 
triggers to gambling; (3) responses to perceived consequences leading to rationalization or 
biased interpretation of future events; (4) and socio-cultural and biological individual 
differences influencing instantiation of beliefs and cognitive processes affecting decision 
making.  
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 Study three aimed to expand and test earlier findings among a lay gambler sample. 
Fifteen regular lay gamblers completed semi-structured interviews according to Mental Models 
and Grounded Theory methodologies. Gambler interview data was compared against the expert 
‘map’ of risk-perception developed in study two, to identify comparative gaps or differences 
associated with harmful or safe gambling. Gambler accounts supported the presence of expert 
conceptual constructs, and to some degree the role of risk perception in vulnerability to harm 
and disordered gambling. Overall, disordered gambling appeared heavily influenced by relative 
underestimation of risk and overvaluation of gambling, based on explicit and implicit analysis, 
and deliberate, innate, contextual, and learned processing evaluations and biases.  
 Study four aimed to test gambling decision making, using data to develop a self-report 
questionnaire and model of gambling risk decision making. Data collection and analysis again 
followed the Mental Models methodology. Questionnaire items targeted important themes and 
concepts identified in the systematic literature review (study one) and qualitative interview 
studies (studies two and three). Validity evidence and other data gathered by questionnaires 
were used to develop a path model of gambling risk decision making. Results indicated 
gamblers’ decision making was influenced by several important factors, with vulnerability to 
disordered gambling associated with: expectations and interpretations of outcomes and 
causality; greater sensitivity to contextual cues, processing biases, and urges; inaccurate self-
monitoring; and inconsistency in decision making. Gambling decision making predicted a 
substantial proportion of negative behavioural outcomes, including unique variance and 
variance shared with gambling involvement. Decision making fully or partially mediated the 
influence of several well-established gambling risk factors.  
15 
 
Taken together, results of the four studies confirm the importance of relationships 
between decision making, behaviour, consequences, and disorder, with disorder largely 
predictable based on several core decision making factors, despite individual variation in clinical 
presentation.  
 
 
 
  
16 
 
CHAPTER 1: General introduction 
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Background 
Gambling involves wagering something (usually money) on the outcome of an 
uncertain event determined by chance (Walker, 1998). By definition, gambling involves 
engagement with risk, with the potential for harmful outcomes, since wagers may potentially 
result in loss of stakes. Common commercially available forms of gambling in Australia have 
typically been designed so that individuals do not win over long term play, except in unusual 
circumstances (Walker, 1998). As a result, the majority of non-professional gamblers tend to 
experience net losses over the long term (Arnold, 1978; Stewart, 1989). Individuals therefore 
leave themselves vulnerable to financial and related harms if they repeatedly engage in 
gambling without due attention to sustainable investment, or accurate models of causality, 
probability, and expectancy. Research suggests that a range of individuals in the community are 
exposed to gambling related monetary loss and related problems (Productivity Commission, 
2010). Further, a proportion develop a gambling disorder, characterized by persistent, recurrent 
maladaptive gambling choices resulting in losses, impairment, and distress (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013). For this disordered subgroup of gamblers there appears to be a 
disconnection between positive expectations (e.g., Toneatto, Blitz-Miller, Calderwood, 
Dragonetti, & Tsasnos, 1997) and experience of negative outcomes (Productivity Commission, 
2010). This disconnection implies risk perception and risky decision making are at the centre of 
gambling disorder. Despite the obvious significance of risk perception in this process, risk 
perception is an under-researched area in the gambling literature. 
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The main objectives of the research in this thesis were to investigate the nature of 
gambling risk perception, outline the role of risk perception in gambling, and propose a model 
of gambling that includes concepts of risk perception and risky decision making.  
The thesis commences with a summary of existing literature addressing the nature of 
harmful and disordered gambling (chapter 1), decision making in gambling contributing to 
disordered gambling (chapter 2), and decision making in risky activities not related to gambling 
(chapter 3). The thesis then outlines research conducted to address gaps in literature via 
systematic review of the gambling risk perception literature (chapter 4), followed by three 
empirical chapters based on qualitative and quantitative methods investigating the role of risk 
perception in gambling risk decisions and behaviour concluding with a model of gambling 
decision making (chapter 5-7) and discussion of theoretical and clinical implications of the 
research findings (chapter 8).  
The following sections address the nature and prevalence of potential harms 
associated with gambling, before examining diagnostic criteria for disordered gambling – 
concluding that gambling disorder is by definition a disorder of risky decision making, with 
implications for theoretical models.  
 
Gambling related harm 
Gambling is a popular recreational activity in Australia. However, not all gamblers 
gamble at a benign level. While, presence of environmental stressors and individual 
characteristics have been shown to increase harmful gambling (e.g., availability of gambling, 
alcohol dependence) (Hodgins, Schopflocher, Martin, el-Guebaly, Casey, Currie, Smith, & 
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Williams, 2012; Dussault, Brendgen, Vitaro, Wanner, & Tremblay, 2011), exposure to gambling 
and its excessive involvement has been shown to contribute to a number of significant 
psychological and life problems related to: finances, mental or physical wellbeing, relationships, 
employment, or legal status (Dickerson & O’Connor, 2006; Ministerial Council on Gambling, 
2005; Johannson, Grant, Kim, Odlaug, & Gotestam, 2009).  
Gambling engagement has been causally linked to a number of signifiers of 
problematic spending and financial difficulty, including: relative proportion of income spent on 
gambling (Grant, Kim, Odlaug, Buchanan, & Potenza, 2009), level of personal debt (Tang, Wu, & 
Tang, 2007), rates of bankruptcy (Breen & Zimmerman, 2002; Grant, Schreiber, Odlaug, & Kim, 
2010), and relative property and investment losses (Grant, et al., 2009; Tang, et al., 2007). 
Disordered gambling and gambling related problems has also been shown to 
contribute to problematic health outcomes, increasing strain on health care services (Gerstein, 
Murphy, Toce, Hoffmann, Palmer, Johnson, Larison, Chuchro, Bard, Engelman, Hill, Buie, 
Volberg, Harwood, Tucker, Christiansen, Cummings, & Sinclair, 1999). For example, difficulty 
managing gambling involvement and problems related to gambling contribute to increased risk 
of a range of physical and psychological health problems, including: stress (Myrseth, Litlerè, 
Støylen, & Pallesen, 2009), depression (Dussault, et al., 2011; Delfabbro & LeCouteur, 2009), 
anxiety (Tang, et al., 2007, Bakken, Gotestam, Grawe, Wenzel, & Oren, 2009), drug and alcohol 
issues (Penfold, Hatcher, Sullivan, & Collins, 2006b), self-harm and suicidality (Penfold, et al., 
2006a; Rodda & Cowie, 2005; Tang, et al., 2007). 
 Similarly, problem and disordered gambling is associated with a range of poor 
employment and legal outcomes with negative implications for well-being and functioning of 
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individuals, families, and the community. Disordered gamblers are more likely to take time off 
work (Delfabbro & LeCouteur, 2009), give up work to gamble (Delfabbro & LeCouteur, 2009), 
lose jobs due to gambling (Gerstein, et al., 1999), commit crimes to fund gambling (Potenza, et 
al., 2001; Grant, et al., 2009; Abbott, 2001), and commit crimes through their place of work 
(Delfabbro & LeCouteur, 2009).  
Evidence suggests that gambling and related problems may negatively affect the 
relationships of problem and disordered gamblers, with flow on effects for family members, 
friends, and colleagues (Productivity Commission, 2010). Disordered gambling may affect 
relationships through imposition of debt, maladaptive coping styles, or deception (Howard, 
McMillen, Nower, Elze, Edmond, & Bricout, 2002). For example, relationship conflict and the 
secretiveness of disordered gamblers often mean that family finances are depleted before 
family members have an opportunity to intervene. Difficulties within the families of disordered 
gamblers have been indexed via various measures of interpersonal problems, such as higher 
rates of child and partner abuse (Afifi, Brownridge, MacMillan, & Sareen, 2010; Petry & 
Steinburg, 2005) and divorce (Dielman, 1979; Lorenz & Yaffee, 1986).  
 
Prevalence of gambling problems and disordered gambling  
Population surveys conducted since the 1990s show that approximately 65% to 80% of 
Australian adults gamble at least once a year (Delfabbro & King, 2012; Gainsbury, Russell, Hing, 
Wood, Lubman, Blaszczynski, 2013). A large number of recreational gamblers experience some 
kind of occasional gambling related problems, e.g., problems controlling self-imposed spending 
limits, losing track of time, or adverse health impacts (Ministerial Council on Gambling, 2005; 
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ACT Gambling and Racing Commission, 2012). The significance of gambling related problems 
rises with both frequency of gambling sessions and spending on gambling (Hodgins, et al., 
2012). A significant minority of gamblers also meets criteria for diagnosis of gambling disorder 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013).  
Recent surveys of gambling in Australia (Gainsbury, et al., 2014; Productivity 
Commission, 2010) estimated that between 0.5 and 1.0 per cent of Australian adults suffer 
significant problems from their gambling. In addition, a further 1.4 to 3.7 per cent of adults 
experience moderate problems or are at risk of progressing to more severe problems or 
disordered gambling (Gainsbury, et al., 2014; Productivity Commission, 2010). Precise 
prevalence statistics for clinically significant gambling disorder are difficult to estimate due to 
lack of a clear ‘gold standard’ measurement. However, prevalence estimates derived from 
surveys undertaken at different times, and with different methodologies, measures and sample 
sizes show prevalence of disordered gambling between 0.4-1.8 per cent in Australia (ACT 
Gambling and Racing Commission, 2012; Ministerial Council on Gambling, 2005; Walker & 
Dickerson, 1996; Stucki & Rihs-Middel, 2007). When reduced to the approximately twelve per 
cent of people gambling regularly (once a week or more), and excluding forms of gambling 
generally shown to pose little risk of harm due to low typical financial investment (e.g., 
lotteries), problem and disordered gambling rates are much higher (around 8 per cent problem 
and disordered gamblers, or 22 per cent if moderate-risk gamblers are also included) 
(Productivity Commission, 2010). That is, gambling related problems and psychopathology is 
even more pronounced among those who gamble regularly.  
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Gambling in Australia therefore imparts significant costs and harms to a subset of 
individuals within the community that gamble at unsustainable levels, as well as to the 
community through costs imposed on family members and colleagues of problem gamblers, 
and costs to welfare and social support systems. 
 
Diagnostic criteria for disordered gambling 
Diagnosis of disordered gambling requires that individuals present with a cluster of 
“persistent and recurrent” symptoms usually including gambling related negative outcomes 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994, 2013). The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders is the commonly used text in Australia for describing and classifying mental illness and 
disorder. Therefore, the latest iteration, the DSM 5 (American Psychiatric Association, 2013), is 
referred to within this thesis in defining clinically significant problem gambling (Productivity 
Commission, 2010).  
The recent publication of the DSM 5 has resulted in several changes to clinically 
significant gambling diagnostic criteria, in response to research over the decades since release 
of the previous edition, DSM IV, including: label change from “pathological gambling” to the less 
pejorative “gambling disorder”, along with changes in diagnostic criteria and requirements, and 
categorization of the disorder (American Psychiatric Association, 1994, 2013). The term 
problem gambler is also used, but has broader application, covering those who meet criteria for 
disorder and those who experience harm. The DSM 5 requires that a cluster of four, or more, 
criteria be met that include description of gambling specific distress or impairment resulting 
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from: maladaptive decision making, poor behavioural control, and gambling related harms 
(outlined in table 1 below) (American Psychiatric Association, 2013).  
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Table 1  
Diagnostic criteria for DSM 5 Gambling Disorder 312.31 (F63.0), relating to gambling related harms, maladaptive decision 
making style, and maladaptive motivation  
Aspect of decision making Relevant diagnostic criteria Examples of supporting evidence 
Maladaptive decision 
making 
Criteria 1: needs to gamble with increasing 
amounts of money in order to achieve the 
desired excitement 
(Blaszczynski, Walker, Sharpe, & Nower, 
2008) 
 Criteria 5: often gambles when feeling distressed 
(e.g., helpless, guilty, anxious, depressed)  
*Criteria 5 in DSM IV: gambles as a way of 
escaping from problems or of relieving a 
dysphoric mood (e.g., feelings of helplessness, 
guilt, anxiety, depression) 
(Farrelly, French, Ogeil, & Phillips, 2007; 
Thomas, Allen, Phillips, & Karantzas, 2011; 
Reid, Li, Lopez, Collard, Parhami, Karim, & 
Fong, 2011) 
 Criteria 6: after losing money gambling, often 
returns another day to get even ("chasing" one's 
losses) 
(Campbell-Meiklejohn, Woolrich, 
Passingham, & Rogers, 2008) 
Motivation Criteria 4: is often preoccupied with gambling 
(e.g., having persistent thoughts of reliving past 
gambling experiences, handicapping or planning 
the next venture, thinking of ways to get money 
with which to gamble) 
(Hwang, Shin, Lim, Park, Shin, & Jang, 2006; 
Potenza, 2007; Tavares & Gentil, 2007) 
 Criteria 3: has repeated unsuccessful efforts to 
cut down or stop gambling 
(Hwang, et al.; Potenza, 2007; Tavares & 
Gentil, 2007) 
Gambling related harms Criteria 4: is often preoccupied with gambling 
(e.g., having persistent thoughts of reliving past 
gambling experiences, handicapping or planning 
the next venture, thinking of ways to get money 
with which to gamble) 
(Potenza, 2007; Tavares & Gentil, 2007) 
  
 
 Criteria 2: is restless or irritable when attempting 
to cut down or stop gambling 
(Daughters, Lejuez, Strong, Brown, Breen, & 
Lesieur, 2005) 
 
 Criteria 7: lies to conceal the extent of 
involvement with gambling 
(Afifi, Brownridge, MacMillan, & Sareen, 
2010; Productivity Commission, 2010; 
Dielman, 1979) 
 *Criteria 8 in DSM IV: has committed illegal acts 
such as forgery, fraud, theft, or embezzlement to 
finance gambling 
(Potenza, et al., 2001; Grant, et al., 2009; 
Abbott 2001; Delfabbro & LeCouteur, 2009) 
 Criteria 8: has jeopardized or lost a significant 
relationship, job, or educational or career 
opportunity because of gambling 
(Delfabbro & LeCouteur, 2009; Lorenz & 
Yaffee, 1986). 
 Criteria 9: relies on others to provide money to 
relieve a desperate financial situations caused by 
gambling 
(Chabra, 2009; Nariakira, 2008) 
Table adapted from American Psychiatric Association (1994) and American Psychiatric Association (2013) 
*DSM IV criterion 5 wording substantially changed, and criterion 8 removed as part of changes to diagnostic criteria in 
Gambling Disorder (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). The “illegal acts” criterion eliminated due to poor discrimination 
of clinically significant gambling problems (American Psychiatric Association, 2010).  
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A number of diagnostic criteria describe cognitive or behavioural features of 
maladaptive decision making, in that evidence suggests these decision making strategies lead to 
poor risk outcomes. Several studies indicate that play strategies that include chasing losses 
(criterion 6) (Campbell-Meiklejohn, et al., 2008), and increasing wager size (criterion 1) 
(Blaszczynski, et al., 2008) typically leads to poorer financial outcomes, and the compounding of 
gambling debts and related problems. Similarly, gambling during times of distress (criterion 5, 
reworded substantially in DSM 5) typically indicates use of gambling as an avoidant coping 
strategy, also shown to exacerbate gambling debts and distress (Farrelly, et al., 2007; Thomas, 
et al., 2011; Reid, et al., 2011).  
Other diagnostic criteria describe behavioural indicators of impaired motivation 
including difficulty reducing gambling involvement (criterion 3) (Potenza, 2007; Tavares & 
Gentil, 2007), or controlling thoughts about gambling (criterion 4) (Hwang, et al., 2006; 
Potenza, 2007; Tavares & Gentil, 2007).  
Finally, a number of criteria describe problematic or distressing outcomes resulting from 
previous or ongoing gambling. Gamblers may experience distress related to obsessional or 
uncontrollable thinking about gambling (criterion 4) (Potenza, 2007; Tavares & Gentil, 2007) 
that may manifest as restlessness or irritability during attempts to reduce problematic gambling 
(criterion 2) (Daughters, et al., 2005). Further, gambling may lead to acts that are distressing, or 
result in financial, interpersonal or other problems, such as increased deceptiveness (criterion 
7) (Afifi, Brownridge, MacMillan, & Sareen, 2010; Productivity Commission, 2010; Dielman, 
1979), indebtedness to others (criterion 9) (Chhabra, 2009; Nariakira, 2008), or law breaking 
(previously criterion 8 in DSM IV) (Potenza, et al., 2001; Grant, et al., 2009; Abbott 2001; 
Delfabbro & LeCouteur, 2009). Such behaviours may be associated with guilt, interpersonal 
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conflict, employment, legal or other problems, and lost opportunities (criterion 8) (Delfabbro & 
LeCouteur, 2009; Lorenz & Yaffee, 1986).  
Therefore, gambling is an activity centrally focused on risk decisions and their outcomes. 
Disordered gambling is centrally defined by chronic maladaptive decision making, manifested 
as harmful navigation or enacting of risk decisions, along with the consequences of those 
decisions (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Disordered gambling as presented in the 
DSM 5 may therefore be considered a disorder of risky decision making – occurring due to 
repeated, poorly considered and managed responses to perceived risks weighed against 
perceived benefits. In considering the central question of this thesis, the role of risk perception 
and in gambling decision making, the next phase of investigation focuses on what the 
contemporary gambling and related literatures tell us about why gamblers choose to endure 
engagement in uncontrolled, self-destructive behaviour, despite its negative consequences. The 
following chapters therefore focus on research illuminating decision making in gambling and 
gaps in this literature, followed by discussion of related areas of research within implications 
for valuable future gambling research. 
  
27 
 
CHAPTER 2: Risk perception and risky choice in the gambling literature 
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Gambling Disorder models 
A range of theoretical paradigms or models have been applied in attempts to explain 
harmful gambling, including: psychodynamic (Rosenthal, 1987; Bergler, 1957), medical or 
biological-physiological (Blanco, et al., 2000), biological-psychological (Blaszczynski, Winter, & 
McConaghy, 1986), behavioural and learning-based (Anderson & Brown, 1984, Brown, 1987, 
McConaghy, 1980), cognitive or cognitive-behavioural (Sharpe & Tarrier, 1993), sociological 
(Ocean & Smith, 1993), personality (Zuckerman, 1999), addiction-based (Lesieur & Rosenthal 
1991, Jacobs, 1986), and dual processing (Redish, Jensen, & Johnson, 2008). Other models and 
theories have attempted to integrate a combination of theoretical approaches (Sharpe, 2002; 
Blaszczynski & Nower, 2002; Redish, et al., 2008). Models explain disordered gambling 
behaviour and its consequences according to various environmental and individual variables, 
e.g., as expression of underlying pre-genital psychosexual neuroses (Rosenthal, 1987), or 
uncontrollable urges resulting from pathological neural change (Blume, 1987; West, 2005). 
Within well-supported contemporary theories and models, two dominant explanatory 
approaches are relevant to explanations specific to gambling decision making: (1) the 
biopsychological approach, and (2) the cognitive approach. The following sections describe 
each of these approaches, limitations of these approaches, and ways research may be 
integrated or expanded in order to more effectively model decision making.  
 
Biopsychological models of gambling decision making 
A number of researchers have applied biopsychological evidence in attempts to explain 
maladaptive gambling, arguing that gambling problems result from dysregulation of brain 
regions that play a role in decision making. Gambling disorder is manifest in maladaptive 
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regulation of gambling behaviour, displayed when gamblers do not or are not able to inhibit 
urges, shift to less destructive behaviours, or assess and respond accurately to feedback. 
Deficits displayed behaviorally in gambling disorder have their basis in structural and functional 
brain abnormalities involved in decision making, identified through comparison between 
disordered gamblers and healthy controls. Evidence comes from a range of areas including 
research in: neuroimaging, neurophysiology, neuropsychology, neurochemistry, and genetics 
(Clark, 2010; Goudriaan, Oosterlaan, de Beurs, & Van den Brink, 2004).  
Accordingly, review of available research posits that disordered gambling results from a 
number of processing biases leading to maladaptive approach-avoidance behaviour 
(Nussbaum, Honarmand, Govoni, Kalahani-Bargis, Bass, Ni, & LaForge, 2011), including for 
example: heightened sensitivity for reward (Blum, Braverman, Holder, Lubar, Monastra, Miller, 
Lubar, Chen, & Comings, 2000), abnormal arousal levels (Lowman, Hunt, Litten, & Drummond, 
2000), and executive dysfunction during gambling (Goldstein & Volkow, 2002; Rogers & 
Robbins, 2001).  
Neurobiological evidence suggests neurotransmitter regulation may be abnormal in the 
‘reward pathways’ of disordered gamblers (Goldstein & Volkow, 2002). Mesolimbic abnormality 
for example has been shown in other addictive disorders to play a role in withdrawal and 
craving (Ebert, et al., 2002). Similarly in gambling disorder, evidence shows dysregulation of 
dopamine, an important neurotransmitter in the mesolimbic system (Blum, Braverman, Holder, 
Lubar, Monastra, Miller, Lubar, Chen, & Comings, 2000). Such dysregulation of reward 
processes may result in hypersensitivity to reward, loss, or both, providing disproportionate 
feedback likely to sustain engagement despite normatively harmful outcomes.  
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Dysregulation of limbic structures involved in arousal regulation has also been 
suggested as a possible source of dysfunctional gambling decision making. Abnormalities in 
mesolimbic brain structures may also contribute to abnormal arousal regulation observed in 
disordered gambling (Ibanez, Blanco, de Castro, Fernandez-Piqueras, & Saiz-Ruiz, 2003; 
Lowman, et al., 2000). Prolonged play may therefore result from insufficient arousal when 
losses are experienced, or chronically low arousal leading gamblers to ‘thrill seek’, leading to 
behavioural disinhibition.  
Executive functioning impairment in gambling disorder has also been compared to 
deficits observed in substance dependency, providing an additional possible pathway for 
maladaptive decision making. Substance addiction research has identified abnormalities in 
prefrontal cortical regions, and subcortico-cortical networks projecting to the frontal cortex 
(Rogers & Robbins, 2001) - areas that play an important role in executive functioning (Goldstein 
& Volkow, 2002). Executive functions such as planning, inhibition and response modulation play 
important roles in planning, responding to feedback, and other aspects of decision making 
(Lyvers, 2000). It is therefore probable that behavioural similarities between gambling and 
substance disorders may stem from related neurophysiologically-based executive deficits 
contributing to maladaptive decision making in this group of disorders.  
A number of other processes have also been hypothesized to contribute to maladaptive 
gambling decision making, such as dysregulation of dopamine, testosterone, and endogenous 
opioids resulting in dysfunctional regulation of reward seeking (Comings, 1998; Kreek, et al., 
2005), and GABA dysfunction resulting in impaired inhibition of impulsive behaviour (Brebner, 
Childress, & Roberts, 2002). Nussbaum and colleagues (2011) have attempted to integrate 
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biopsychological findings, and reduce gambling decision making to dysregulation of approach-
avoidance behaviours applying to the immediate rewards available in gambling.  
While biopsychological evidence represents a significant and rapidly growing area of 
research, providing valuable insights into maladaptive decision making, several issues confound 
attempts to explain gambling decision making entirely in terms of biopsychological evidence 
(Nussbaum, et al., 2011). Accordingly, the following section evaluates criticisms applied to the 
biopsychological theoretical approach, proposing that an integrative approach is of value to 
incorporating findings across the multidisciplinary gambling literature.  
 
Issues in developing a biopsychological model of decision making 
An important criticism applied to biopsychological models of gambling decision making 
(e.g., Nussbaum, et al., 2011) relates to the level of functional reduction required for such 
models to be consistent (Moscrop, 2011). In reducing decision making to regulation of 
approach-avoidance behaviour, or some other functional equivalent, results in an explanatory 
gap regarding how individuals develop meanings and motivation specific to gambling - 
meanings that arguably cannot be entirely explained by purely bottom-up neural accounts of 
decision making. How, for example, can such models explain common low levels of gambling 
problems in individuals without significant brain dysregulation problems, or presence of 
substance disorder without gambling problems?  
Perhaps unsurprisingly then we find that other theoretical paradigms have contributed 
to explanation of variance in gambling decision making, behaviour and harms, according to 
variables indirectly related, or entirely unrelated to neural functioning (e.g., changes in 
gambling social policy) (Moscrop, 2011; Sharpe, 2002). In fact, well-established risk factors for 
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gambling disorder come from a range of research paradigms, often with limited relevance to 
biopsychological functioning. For example, higher risk of disordered gambling is well 
established among people with particular static (age, gender, ethnicity) and dynamic 
demographic features (involvement in delinquency and illegal acts) (Hodgins, et al., 2012; 
Brunelle, Leclerc, Cousineau, Dufour, Gendron, & Martin, 2012), and comorbid or concurrent 
mental health symptoms (e.g., Obsessive Compulsive Disorder, anxiety, depression, bipolar 
disorder, alcohol and substance dependence or abuse) (Potenza, 2007; Van holst, Van Den 
Brink, Veltman, & Goudriaan 2010; Johannson, et al., 2009) that may influence emotion 
regulation, perception, and responses to feedback. Similarly, disordered gambling has well 
established associations with various environmental factors, including availability and exposure 
to gambling environments (Johannson, et al., 2009), and the features of preferred games (e.g., 
payout intervals, sensory characteristics, rates of play) (Gilovich, 1983; Hodgins, et al., 2012; 
Brunelle, et al., 2012).  
Therefore, while a growing body of evidence supports the utility of brain research in 
theoretical explanations and interventions for disordered gambling, biopsychological evidence 
does not and cannot provide a complete, successful model of gambling decision making. That 
is, gambling disorder is not only a disorder of brain regulation, it is also brought about by the 
interaction between individuals and their environments, through exposure to culture and 
gambling experiences resulting in gambling-specific beliefs, meanings, and values. A further line 
of evidence supporting a multidisciplinary, integrative approach to gambling decision making is 
found in assertions that gambling disorder may originate from multiple underlying causes, at 
times inclusive of, but not necessarily limited to neurological dysfunction. 
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Subtyping as evidence of multiple pathways to gambling disorder 
Evidence suggests that recreational and disordered gamblers are varied (Milosevic & 
Ledgerwood, 2010; Blaszczynski & Nower, 2002), and that specific individual, demographic, and 
environmental characteristics may leave particular individuals more or less vulnerable to 
harmful and disordered gambling decision making (Johannson, et al., 2009). Examples of risk 
factors include high impulsivity or antisocial personality traits (Brunelle, et al., 2012; Van holst, 
et al., 2010), strong erroneous beliefs (Van holst, et al., 2010; Hodgins, et al., 2012), or exposure 
to gambling environments (Johannson, et al., 2009). Considerable heterogeneity has 
nevertheless been identified in the clinical presentation of disordered gamblers (Milosevic & 
Ledgerwood, 2010). Blaszczynski and Nower (2002) suggested in their Pathways Model for 
example, that there are various different routes to disordered gambling. In a review of the 
subtyping literature Milosevic and colleagues (2010) found evidence supporting this assertion, 
noting that three relatively distinct subtypes consistently emerged from the data, differentiable 
based on motivation for gambling, and the personality, psychopathological and physiological 
presentations underpinning these motivations.  
The first “emotionally vulnerable” subtype of disordered gamblers demonstrate high 
levels of anxiety, depression (or both), along with low impulsivity, sensation seeking (or both), 
with gambling commonly used to regulate dysphoric feelings (Ledgerwood & Petry, 2006; 
Turner, Jain, Spence, & Zangeneh, 2008). A second “antisocial impulsive” subtype consistently 
emerging in the literature, shows elevated antisocial traits, marked impulsivity, and the 
tendency to gamble in order to increase arousal or relieve boredom (Vachon & Bagby, 2009; 
Turner et al., 2008; Stewart, Zack, Collins, Klein, & Fragopoulos, 2008). Milosevic and 
Ledgerwood (2010) also posit a third subtype of “behaviourally conditioned” disordered 
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gambler, that does not show serious psychopathology or maladaptive personality traits, 
gambles due to social influence and erroneous expectations, and develops disordered gambling 
due to behavioural conditioning (Vachon & Bagby, 2009; Stewart, et al., 2008). Disordered 
gamblers are therefore somewhat heterogenous but may fall into particular subtypes according 
to personal attributes.  
Clinical presentation of gamblers therefore demonstrates that certain individuals are 
more likely to develop gambling disorder, but not necessarily for the same reasons, nor 
consistently (LaPlante, Nelson, LaBrie, & Shaffer, 2008). That is, the diagnostic criteria refer to a 
disordered pattern of behaviour and consequences, but not necessarily a single, consistent 
subgroup in the population.  
Evidence supporting subtyping is also found in biopsychological approach. A 
neuropsychological study by Grant and colleagues (2000), for example, found evidence that 
different subgroups of drug abusers presented different types of maladaptive decision making. 
Approximately one third of drug abusers demonstrated no systematic impairment in reasoning. 
Approximately 25 per cent, in contrast, made decisions consistent with patients with frontal 
lobe damage or executive functioning deficits, consistently choosing higher immediate rewards 
despite awareness that the strategy was unprofitable in the long term. The remaining 40 
percent of participants appeared highly sensitive to potential reward, regardless of whether it 
was immediate or long term (Grant, Contoreggi, & London, 2000). That is, various types of 
neurophysiological dysfunction supported by biopsychological research (Goudriaan, et al., 
2004) appear present to differing degrees across subgroups in the study. While research 
integrating biopsychological findings with other decision making models in gambling is scarce, 
these findings are consistent with evidence suggesting motivational subtypes and different 
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pathways to disordered gambling (Milosevic & Ledgerwood, 2010; Binde, 2009). That is, 
different types of brain dysregulation may contribute to different functional decision making 
problems responsible for disordered gambling. Also consistent with this are findings that 
suggest probable bidirectional causation in biopsychological dysfunction underpinning 
maladaptive gambling decision making.  For example, neural abnormality and dysfunction has 
been shown to predispose individuals to gambling disorder (Sher & Trull, 1994) in addition to 
evidence that prolonged exposure to gambling reinforcement schedules may lead to harmful 
changes in brain functioning (Goudriaan, et al., 2004). 
Critical problems for purely biopsychological explanations of maladaptive gambling 
decision making are that some individuals develop gambling disorder for reasons other than or 
in addition to neural dysregulation (Clark, 2010), while individuals with neural dysregulation 
may manifest non-gambling disorders, or no disorder at all (Goudriaan, Oosterlaan, de Beurs, & 
Van den Brink, 2004). It is putting the cart before the horse to propose a biopsychological 
solution without attending to the way we formulate description of the problem. That is, a 
description of the reason for a problem must incorporate the perspective consistent with the 
description of the problem, based in a coherent phenomenological approach (Searle, 1992). An 
eclectic, integrative approach to the modelling of gambling decision making centered around 
maladaptive decision making is a more practical approach to explaining disordered gambling, 
with biopsychosocial, cognitive, or other contributors reframed as idiosyncratically expressed 
risk factors for disorder.  
  
36 
 
Cognitive models of gambling decision making 
 Cognitive gambling theories argue that disordered gambling develops and is maintained 
by maladaptive decision making cognitions (e.g., Walker, 1992a). Specifically, erroneous beliefs 
and distorted interpretation lead to overly optimistic evaluations that maintain motivation to 
gamble, regardless of negative outcomes (Clark, 2010). Cognition is a significant research area 
in the gambling literature, and a dominant framework in clinical interventions for gambling 
disorder (Gooding & Tarrier, 2009; Ladouceur, Sylvain, Boutin, Lachance, Doucet, & Leblond, 
2003). Some researchers have consequently proposed that exaggerated expectation of winning 
is the predominant factor underlying maladaptive gambling decision making and behaviour 
(Walker, 1992b; Ladouceur & Walker, 1996).  
 Cognitive studies indicate that ‘irrationality’ may be common in human decision making 
about gambling (Griffiths, 1995; Ladouceur, Gaboury, Dumont, & Rochette, 1988; Wagenaar, 
1988; Walker, 1992a). For example, in so called ‘think aloud’ studies, in which gamblers 
verbalise their thoughts during real gambling sessions, over 70% of gamblers’ statements were 
found to be irrational (Griffiths, 1994; Coventry & Norman, 1998; Delfabbro & Winefield, 2000; 
Griffiths, 1994; Walker,1992b), with gamblers frequently misinterpreting odds and 
demonstrating false attributions of cause and effect (Gaboury & Ladouceur, 1988). Research 
also indicates that regular or disordered gamblers are significantly more likely to make 
erroneous verbalisations while gambling, than irregular or recreational gamblers (Coulombe, 
Ladouceur, Desharnais, & Jobin, 1992; Griffiths, 1994; Coventry & Norman, 1998).  
 In addition, disordered gamblers hold particular exaggerated or mistaken perceptions 
and interpretative biases (Toneatto, Blitz-Miller, Calderwood, Dragonetti, & Tsanos, 1997; 
Johannson, et al., 2009). For example, disordered gamblers are more likely to overestimate skill 
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(Toneatto, et al., 1997; Fortune & Goodie 2011; Jacobsen, Knudsen, Krogh, Pallesen, & Molde, 
2007; Myrseth et al. 2010), or the chance of positive outcomes (Delfabbro 2004; Walker, 
1992b; Wohl 2008; Wood & Clapham, 2005; Joukhador, et al., 2004).  
A number of theorists have attempted to describe patterns or categorize problematic 
cognitions, or systematize relationships between types of error or bias, in order to guide 
research that may further quantify differences between gambler subgroups (e.g., Toneatto, 
1999; Redish, et al., 2008). Reviews of the cognitive literature (e.g., Crockford & el-Guebaly 
1998; Goudriaan, et al., 2004; Raylu & Oei 2002), and models of gambling (e.g., Toneatto, 1999; 
Sharpe, 2002) typically discuss gambling cognitions according to beliefs, heuristics, biases, or 
some combination of fixed beliefs and dynamic cognitive processes. Taxonomies or models 
typically divide cognitions into categories and subcategories of bias or error – though there is 
no clear consensus among researchers as to how this may be systematically achieved, and 
consequently no commonly agreed upon model or taxonomy. Toneatto (1999) for example, 
attempted to differentiate erroneous beliefs (e.g., superstitions about luck), interpretative 
biases (e.g., the availability heuristic), and abnormal processes (e.g., memory biases), classifying 
frequently identified erroneous or distorted cognition types (e.g., ‘the illusion of control’, ‘the 
gamblers’ fallacy’) into these three types of domain. By contrast, Fortune and Goodie (2011) 
attempted to reclassify commonly described distortions and beliefs based on the heuristics 
(e.g., ‘representativeness’, ‘availability’) from which they apparently derive.  
 A broad range of cognitive or cognitive-behavioural interventions are aimed at 
‘debiasing’ gamblers’ erroneous or distorted cognitions, correcting beliefs about odds, 
randomness, and control (e.g., Griffiths, 1995; Walker, 1992b). In fact, the majority of gambling 
treatment approaches fall broadly within cognitive or cognitive-behavioural frameworks 
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(Cowlishaw, et al., 2012; Thomas, et al., 2011; Gooding & Tarrier, 2009), and review and 
meta-analysis of cognitive-behavioural interventions demonstrate significant, long term 
reduction of gambling, based on cognitive-behavioural therapeutic approaches (Gooding & 
Tarrier, 2009). Some researchers argue that the effectiveness of cognitively-oriented treatment 
interventions is strong evidence of the practicality and legitimacy of cognitive gambling models, 
particularly in comparison to abstracted, expensive or invasive biopsychological methodologies 
(Clark, 2010). 
 
Issues in developing a cognitive model of decision making 
A range of approaches to investigating cognitive decision making have been applied in 
the gambling literature. Evidence falls predominantly across three broad methodological 
approaches: laboratory-based experiments investigating specific aspects of decision making, 
investigation of beliefs and reasoning in more ‘naturalistic’ settings such as via verbalisation, 
observation and interview techniques; and questionnaire studies that attempt to identify, 
quantify and describe relationships between cognitions involved in decision making (Moodie, 
2007). These different approaches have particular strengths and weaknesses related to the 
validity and reliability of findings and have been critiqued accordingly, with particular 
implications for gambling decision making theories. 
 
Poor ecological validity in laboratory-based research  
A large body of research has attempted to systematically investigate reasoning 
processes within laboratory settings (e.g., Ladouceur & Sévigny, 2005). However, several 
authors argue that ecological conditions in many laboratory-based studies undermine the 
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validity of findings, and cast doubt on contributions to cognitive gambling models (Delfabbro, 
2004). Walker (1992a, 1992b) for example, argued that significant effects, or lack thereof, may 
result from the artificiality of laboratory-based tasks, or non-representativeness of participant 
samples. Arousal for example, has been shown to play a significant role in selection and 
execution of gambling decisions (Baudinet & Blaszczynski, 2012), but is likely to be significantly 
reduced in laboratory tasks in which participants do not wager real money (e.g., Kassinove & 
Schare, 2001; Coventry & Norman, 1998; Dixon, Hayes, & Ebbs, 1998) or are not exposed to 
realistic game or environmental stimuli (e.g., Coventry & Norman 1998; Fisher & Griffiths, 
1995).  
A more significant issue in laboratory based studies relates to variation in how 
cognitions are applied during decision making. Delfabbro (2004) and Rachlin (1990) for 
example, point out that accounts of decision making relying on systematic subgroup differences 
between beliefs, heuristics or biases (e.g., Wagenaar, 1988) are hindered by evidence of the 
context-dependence of beliefs, heuristics and biases in decision making. The ‘availability’ 
heuristic for example suggests that what is most easily remembered by the gambler has the 
most powerful effect on probability judgments. Therefore, if a gambler were to apply a 
heuristic such as ‘availability’, it might be expected that gambling persistence would be 
associated with memory biased to wins over losses, or the exaggerated expectation of winning 
proportionate to past experience. However, at least one study has found results contradictory 
to such expectations, instead showing that persistent gamblers tended to remember losses 
better than wins (Gilovich, 1983). Similarly laboratory studies show that individuals typically 
avoid risk when choosing between single shot options with positive outcomes, but this pattern 
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is reversed when the same alternatives are presented multiple times (Keren & Wagenaar, 
1987).  
 In fact, evidence indicates that a number of heuristics and biases commonly referred to 
in the gambling literature are not inevitable features of gambling decision making, but are 
highly sensitive to the context in which they are investigated, and only arise in specific 
circumstances (Delfabbro, 2004). Thompson, Armstrong and Thomas (1998) for example, found 
that the ‘illusion of control’ tended only to occur in situations when gamblers perceived 
association between actions and outcomes based upon ‘contiguity’ (i.e., temporal proximity) or 
‘contingency’ (i.e., actions appeared to predict outcomes). In contrast, when these factors were 
absent or greater emphasis was given to the failure of strategies (e.g., through feedback), the 
illusion of control was rarely observed. Argument for the context dependence of the illusion of 
control is further strengthened by studies linking illusory control to individual difference 
variables such as gender (Delfabbro, 2000), locus of control (Hong & Chui, 1988), and control 
motivation (Burger, 1991), suggesting that individual differences may predispose particular 
individuals towards developing the bias (Delfabbro, 2004).  
 Similar issues relate to research investigating other beliefs, heuristics or biases argued 
to differentiate disordered gamblers. Delfabbro and Winefield (1999) for example, found little 
evidence to suggest electronic gaming machine gamblers adapted bet sizes in response to a 
series of losses or large wins, as would be expected according to the ‘gamblers’ fallacy’ and 
‘availability’ heuristic, respectively.  
 Evidence therefore suggests that gamblers’ application of heuristics and biases may not 
be inevitable features of gambling decision making in gambling disorder. Instead, problematic 
decision making appears to depend heavily on contextual factors. A serious problem with 
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cognitive decision making theories that account for subgroup differences according to 
systematic differences in reasoning rules is that theories have failed to specify rules outlining 
when heuristics will be applied to a given situation (Waganaar 1988; Tversy & Kahnemann, 
1973; Tversy, Kahnemann, & Slovic, 1982). Such theories are left with explanatory gaps 
disabling accurate prediction of gambling cognition and decision making in real world scenarios.  
 A number of heuristics studies indicate that several heuristics may be applied by 
gamblers to the same situation, and that different heuristics lead to varied or opposite 
behaviours (Rachlin, 1990; Wagenaar, 1988), as well as vice versa. That is, the same behaviour 
applied in different situations has been explained by researchers according to different 
heuristics and biases (Delfabbro & Winefield 1999; Delfabbro, 2004). Accordingly, theories of 
gambling disorder heavily reliant on laboratory study research (e.g., Toneatto, 1999; Wagenaar, 
1988), fail to take into account decision making variation relevant in real world gambling 
scenarios (Mischel, 2004), and lack explanatory and predictive power important to 
development of an effective model that captures the context dependent application of decision 
making processes in gambling. 
 
Naturalistic studies and normative decision making theories 
 A number of studies have attempted to conduct cognitive research mindful of the 
limitations on ecological validity of laboratory based research. For example, studies asked 
gamblers to verbalize decision making processes during real-world gambling sessions 
(Coulombe, Ladouceur, Desharnais, & Jobin, 1992; Griffiths, 1994; Coventry & Norman, 1998; 
Delfabbro & Winefield, 2000) or applied observational or open-ended interview techniques 
with gamblers in naturalistic settings (Toneatto, Blitz-Miller, Calderwood, Dragonetti, & Tsanos, 
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1997). Attempts to identify and describe gamblers’ belief structures in real-world scenarios 
have met with a number of specific methodological and theoretical issues and criticisms. For 
example, naturalistic gambling studies frequently include non-representative samples that are 
likely to express views that do not generalise to the population, for example: treatment seeking 
disordered gamblers (Joukhador, MacCallum, & Blaszczynski, 2003), students (Walker, 1992b; 
Kweitel & Allen, 1998; Côté, Caron, Aubert, Desrochers, & Ladouceur, 2003), or low-frequency 
gamblers (Gaboury & Ladouceur, 1989; Benhsain, Taillefer, & Ladouceur, 2004; Ladouceur & 
Sévigny, 2005). 
A more significant issue for naturalistic studies relates to the classification of data and 
comparison across groups (Moodie, 2007). Many naturalistic studies for example have 
attempted to quantify the ‘irrationality’ of gamblers, by comparing the quantity or quality of 
erroneous statements made by gamblers. Critics have suggested that studies often confuse the 
intensity of irrationality with number of statements or beliefs (Delfabbro, 2004). Given there 
are only a limited number of ways participants can express accurate or rational cognitions 
about chance and randomness, the more participants speak in these studies, the more 
irrational they are assessed to be – though critics argue this is not necessarily a reasonable 
conclusion (Dickerson & O’Connor 2006). Flippant verbalizations do not necessarily reflect 
cognitions held with conviction, and individual participants may respond differently to study 
demand characteristics in a manner that is not reflective of irrationality. For example, regular 
gamblers with greater experience of gambling are likely to develop and report a wider 
repertoire of beliefs and behaviours - these complex belief systems are not necessarily 
reflective of more irrational cognitions, though they are likely to be classified as such in ‘think 
aloud’ studies.  
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Further, normative views of cognition assumed by studies may make unreasonable 
assumptions about what constitutes an ‘irrational’ belief. For example, many studies have 
defined ‘irrationality’ according to variations between subjective and objective estimations of 
long term success (Walker, 1992a, 1992b). However, it may be inappropriate to assume that all 
gamblers are primarily focused on long term goals, or profit maximisation. Delfabbro and 
Winefield (1999) for example, argue that gamblers often hold specific, short-term goals, such as 
winning back losses from the previous day, gaining a win or game feature of a specific size or 
type, or gambling for as long as possible. Little consideration might therefore be given to how 
much money has been lost in previous sessions, or the likelihood of poor long term outcomes.  
Alternatively, maladaptive decision making may stem not from error, but from selective, 
or inappropriate application of beliefs. For example, gamblers may justify continued gambling 
through cognitive mechanisms that suppress or deny gambling risks and harms as protection 
against shame, guilt or other distressing emotions (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). 
Cognitive models that assume a purely error based approach are therefore problematic, as 
maladaptive beliefs may stem more from selective misuse of information than from a lack of 
knowledge about gambling activities. 
Research replicating ‘think aloud’ studies with more comprehensive methodologies 
have further undermined naturalistic research findings (e.g., Moodie, 2007; Coventry & 
Norman, 1998). Moodie (2007) for example applied a mixed qualitative-quantitative method, 
combining think aloud, questionnaire, interview studies, but failed to find significant 
differences between recreational and disordered gamblers in number of erroneous cognitions 
(e.g., Moodie, 2007; Coventry & Norman, 1998). Most statements made during gambling 
sessions were classifiable as descriptive, but not irrational. Further, when individuals were 
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given the opportunity to explain responses deemed inadequate (e.g., alluding to predictions or 
confirmation of predictions while thinking aloud), both recreational and disordered gamblers 
were able to adequately explain more than half of cases relating to supposedly irrational beliefs 
(Moodie, 2007).  
 
Limitations of psychometric measurement 
A more recent, alternative approach to laboratory-based and naturalistic research, 
involves investigating cognition involving quantitative, psychometric assessment, for example, 
through development and use of self-report questionnaires about decision making cognitions 
(e.g., Raylu & Oei, 2004; Wood & Clapham, 2005). Psychometric approaches enable flexible but 
targeted assessment of explicit beliefs, based in lay language that is potentially free from 
normative assumptions.  
Again, however, criticisms apply to current psychometric assessment tools. Relatively 
few measures have been developed investigating the content of gambling cognition, and many 
of the existing measures remain relatively untested (e.g., the Gambling Related Cognitions Scale 
(GRCS; Raylu & Oei, 2004)). Further, evidence suggests that the majority of existing measures 
poorly discriminate gambling subgroups and cognitive constructs. Strong and colleagues (2004) 
for example, found only 15 of 35 items of the Gambling Attitudes and Beliefs Scale (GABS; 
Breen & Zuckerman, 1999) effectively discriminated students from clinical gamblers.  
Critics have also questioned the utility of questionnaires that identify or reduce 
gambling cognition to only a small number of constructs - given that evidence suggests 
gamblers hold complex belief systems responsive to contextual cues and mental states 
(Delfabbro, 2004; Clark, 2010; Baudinet & Blaszczynski, 2012). For example, the Gamblers' 
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Beliefs Questionnaire (GBQ; Steenbergh, Meyers, May, & Whelan, 2002) and Drake Beliefs 
about Chance Inventory (DBC; Wood & Clapham, 2005) each load on only two factors – ‘Illusion 
of Control’ and ‘Luck/Perseverance’; and ‘Illusion of Control’ and ‘Superstition’, respectively. 
Psychometric tools therefore fail to meaningfully identify or assess many of the concepts 
expressed by gamblers that are likely to be important in decision making. Instead tools reduce 
cognitions to a limited number of domains, related to over-exaggeration of either control or 
probability.  
A notable area of cognition absent from this area of research is risk perception and 
interpretation. A number of related disciplines suggest that risk perception plays an important 
role in decision making and behaviour (Ajzen, 2011; Albarracin, Johnson, Fishbein, & 
Muellerleile, 2001; Glanz, Rimer, & Viswanath, 2008; Siegrist, Keller, & Kiers, 2005; Morgan, 
Fischhoff, Bostrom, & Atman, 2002; Skog 2000). However, gambling theories to date have not 
considered gamblers’ explicit perceptions, beliefs or attitudes about potential negative 
outcomes, nor how this information is utilised within decision making systems to make 
reasoned choices or motivate behaviour. The existing cognitive research therefore appears to 
lack examination of the full range of beliefs considered by gamblers in making decisions, such 
as negative outcome expectancies, and how percepts relate to the motivation, interpretation 
and goals of individuals. 
 
Conclusions 
Cognitive and biopsychological approaches identify a number of important differences 
between recreational and disordered gamblers’ cognitive and neurophysiological functioning 
but lack clarification in a number of important areas based on methodological and theoretical 
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issues (outlined above). In contrast, a comprehensive gambling decision making model should 
be integrative, idiosyncratically and contextually sensitive, and avoidant of normative 
assumptions. An important next step in developing such a model therefore is to examine other 
theories of risky decision making that have more effectively addressed the gaps inherent in 
gambling research.   
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CHAPTER 3: Alternative theories of risky decision making 
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Decision making models 
A range of theoretical approaches have addressed decision making in potentially 
hazardous scenarios, including: the Theories of Planned Behaviour and Reasoned Action (Ajzen 
2011; Albarracin et al. 2001); the Health Belief Model (Glanz et al. 2008), the Psychometric 
Paradigm of Perceptions of Hazards (Siegrist et al. 2005), the Mental Models approach (Morgan 
et al. 2002); and Choice theory (Skog 2000). Consequently, risk perception, interpretative 
biases, and decision making involving potentially harmful scenarios has been addressed in many 
areas of research. Two areas in which risk perception has been investigated with particular 
relevance to harmful and disordered gambling, include (1) the mental models of risk literature, 
and (2) research addressing substance addiction.  
Mental model and substance addiction research are significant to gambling because 
these areas examine concepts that have largely remained unexplored in the gambling 
literature, but have yielded valuable insights into methodological and theoretical approaches 
that may enable more effective modelling of risk decision making in gambling, while avoiding 
normative assumptions about rationality.  
Mental models research outlines a specific theoretical and methodological approach to 
decision making in hazardous scenarios, identifying risks, factors controlling exposure to risk, 
and mapping user concepts of risk to identify gaps or errors in need of intervention (Morgan et 
al., 2002). Substance addiction research also includes concepts of risk perception, but goes 
further to consider the impact of conflicting motivation in risky choice, contextualizing risk 
perception within an integrative understanding inclusive of environmental, biological, or 
cognitive factors that may impact on decision making. The concepts outlined here appear to 
have received little attention in the gambling research literature. Hence, examination of mental 
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models and substance addiction research may provide insights valuable to future gambling 
research.  
 
Mental models of risk perception  
The mental models approach describes a methodology developed to examine the belief 
systems applied by individuals using known hazards, such as employees working with nuclear 
energy (Morgan et al., 2002). The mental models approach seeks to identify for a particular 
hazard both accurate and inaccurate beliefs that are held by a target population. Findings are 
used to develop risk communication material that will correct misunderstandings, thereby 
enabling more responsible, adaptive decision-making by individuals exposed to risk.  
The mental models approach argues that the decisions people make when faced with a 
‘hazard’ depend at least in part on the knowledge or beliefs they hold about it (Breakwell, 
2007). For example, research suggests that individuals often develop schemas about identified 
hazards that may account for causal relationships (Breakwell, 2007) and that decision-making 
processes people apply in rapidly changing ‘real world’ scenarios depend more on pre-existing 
or learned beliefs and theories than on formal rational judgment procedures (Nisbett & Ross 
1980; Breakwell, 2007; Cantor & Mischel, 1977). The term ‘mental model’ has been applied to 
the theoretical overarching knowledge schemas composed of these beliefs and theories 
(Breakwell, 2007).  
Mental models may be made up of information that is propositional (e.g. gambling 
expenditure is harder to limit if alcohol is consumed), or holistic/schematic (e.g. knowing 
generally what happens in a gambling venue), and describes various aspects of a hazard (e.g., 
who or what is implicated in the hazard, how it can be controlled, or factors impairing control). 
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For mental models to enable effective or adaptive interaction within an individual’s 
environment they need not be factually accurate, follow a standardized format, remain 
constant over the long-term, or be bound by the specifics of a hazard, instead remaining free to 
evolve in response to the particular needs of an individual or community to account for a 
hazard (Breakwell, 2007). Such a model avoids normative assumptions about rationality or the 
innate ‘structure’ of cognition or cognitive systems – instead enabling non-directive, 
dynamically responsive mapping of individuals own idiosyncratic beliefs (and relationships 
between beliefs) relevant to the specific hazard under investigation. This may include not just 
the biases that lead people to make particular decisions, but the actual information that is used 
by the individuals, and how that information is utilized in making decisions. 
In response to mental models theory, Morgan and colleagues developed a 
methodological approach that has been applied to a large number of hazardous scenarios to 
identify and correct maladaptive components of mental models applied in risky decision making 
(Morgan et al., 2002). A number of studies have looked into mental models about risks, e.g.: 
radon gas or nuclear contamination (Bostrom, Fischoff, & Morgan, 1992); effects of drugs 
(Jungermann, Schutz, & Thuring, 1988); physical processes (Gentner & Stevens, 1983); and 
energy conservation (Kempton, 1987). 
This research has provided information about the tacit theories people develop to cope 
with uncertain environments. These theories identify potential negative outcomes of 
interacting with hazards, as well as causality within systems that manage or contribute to 
exposure to risk and harm. In addition research has demonstrated that if mental models 
contain ‘critical bugs’, individuals may draw incorrect conclusions and engage in maladaptive 
behaviours - even among otherwise well-informed people (Fischhoff, 1995; Galotti, 1989). For 
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example Bostrom and colleagues (1992) found that many people know radon is a colourless, 
odourless radioactive gas, but frequently incorrectly associate it with permanent 
contamination. In not realizing that radon has a short half-life, home owners tended not to 
bother to test homes for radon, believing that there is nothing they can do to correct for radon 
contamination (Bostrom et al., 1992). Consideration of potential negative outcomes and risk 
therefore impacts on the decisions and behaviour of people interacting with hazards, in this 
instance leading to ineffective use of resources. Further, in identifying misconceptions of harm 
and causality, research was able to predict behaviour and guide interventions that may correct 
inaccurate beliefs about interacting with this hazard.  
Morgan and colleagues (2002) have contributed to the development of a well-defined 
means of evaluating the practical risks associated with hazards, and factors mediating exposure 
to risks, along with how people perceive and use risk data to make decisions. Interventions 
identify gaps between real and perceived risk, enabling targeted education to correct 
maladaptive beliefs in language comprehensible to the user. Targeted interventions have 
shown efficacy in addressing maladaptive decision making in various problem areas (Breakwell, 
2007; Morgan, et al., 2002; Fischhoff, 1995).  
Such analysis and intervention is particularly relevant to gambling risk because relatively 
clearly defined subgroups of gamblers experience problems due to gambling, and gambling 
decision making, and gamblers with more severe problems demonstrate a higher rate of 
cognitive errors and biases in general (e.g., overestimating the probability of winning and the 
capacity to control the outcome of games) (Raylu & Oei, 2002; Ferris & Wynne, 2001). A 
limitation of these studies is that they do not present a complete or cohesive model of the 
beliefs and theories that are held by gamblers about gambling. Evidence suggests that beliefs 
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play a significant role in the development and maintenance of disordered gambling at least for 
some gamblers (Johannson, et al., 2009). That is, disordered gamblers hold a number of 
erroneous, biased or incomplete beliefs about gambling that help to maintain gambling despite 
heavy or continuous losses. Hence, the context within which gambling-related judgments are 
made by gamblers remains largely unexplained. This is significant because the decisions that 
people make when faced with a ‘hazard’ depend at least in part on the knowledge they hold 
about it (Breakwell, 2007). Gamblers’ ‘negative’ perceptions, such as beliefs about risk, harm, 
and risk causality, remain largely uninvestigated within gambling. 
An issue within the mental models literature with possible implications to potential 
gambling research is that mental models research has not previously considered motivation, or 
risk scenarios in which agents may have conflicting goals, and therefore how this may influence 
decision making. It is assumed most users of hazards are primarily motivated to safely use a 
hazard. In contrast, the substance addiction literature considers potential conflict between 
positive and negative contingencies, suggesting this may be a relevant area for further 
discussion.  
 
Drug and alcohol models of risky choice 
Research into drug and alcohol use has also examined how individuals perceive positive 
and negative potential outcomes – going further than mental models research to consider how 
idiosyncratic differences in the importance of different contingencies may influence decision 
making. A large body of biological and psychological drug and alcohol research has investigated 
positive and negative outcome expectancy associated with preferences over long term use 
(e.g., Aarons, Brown, Stice, & Coe, 2001). Research suggests that users’ expectations of 
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potential outcomes are important to the development, maintenance and moderation of risky 
behaviours such as alcohol and drug use (Smith, Goldman, Greenbaum, & Christiansen, 1995), 
and addiction (Aarons et al., 2001; Goldberg & Fischhoff, 2000). In addition, behaviour and 
experience have been shown to influence risk perception. For example, longitudinal alcohol 
research has demonstrated both the influence of outcome expectancy on drinking behaviour, 
and experience on outcome expectancy (Smith et al., 1995). 
A number of studies have linked overestimation of positive outcomes to increased drug 
and alcohol use, and riskier behaviour. For example, heavy substance users overestimated 
positive outcomes, exaggerated emphasis or magnified low probability outcomes, and were 
more likely to consider vivid, immediate positive consequences in decision making (Leigh, 1999; 
Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1978). Similarly and independently, underestimation of risk is 
also associated with increased risk taking and substance dependence (Breakwell, 2007; Oei & 
Jardim 2007). For example, heavy substance users were more likely to underestimate the 
significance of harm, personal vulnerability, and the likelihood of harmful outcomes (Jones, 
Corbin, & Fromme, 2001; Leigh, 1999; Lipkus, Eissenberg, Schwartz-Bloom, Prokhorov, & Levy, 
2011; Weinstein 1987).  
Evidence also suggests that users may hold multiple positive and negative perceptions 
of substance use at the same time (Oei & Jardim 2007; Smith, et al., 1995; Lipkus, et al., 2011; 
Jones, et al., 2001), implying individuals may negotiate conflicting motivational goals when 
making decisions. For example, both higher expectation of pleasure, and lower expectation of 
addiction, significantly and independently contributed to increased experimentation and 
problems with drug use (Goldberg & Fischhoff, 2000; Jones, et al., 2001). Jones and colleagues 
(2001) also reported that priming positive expectancies increased alcohol consumption, while 
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priming negative expectancies decreased alcohol consumption. However, while increasing 
negative perceptions reduced alcohol use, reducing positive expectancy failed to significantly 
change behaviour.  
Certain contextual and individual factors have also been shown to influence the decision 
making of substance users, along with between group differences. For example, current heavy 
users were more likely to underreport risk and experience of harm (Magura & Kang, 1996; 
James, Lonczak, & Moore, 1996), based on cognitive strategies that inhibit risk perception or 
reporting (e.g., externalizing blame, exaggerating personal control) (Howard, et al., 2002; 
Peretti-Watel, 2003; Rebelo 1999), and neuro-physiological changes associated with impaired 
insight about risk (Goldstein, Craig, Bechara, Garavan, Childress, & Paulus, 2009; Rinn, Desai, 
Rosenblatt, & Gastfriend, 2002).  
 
Addressing the gap in the gambling literature 
A number of similarities between substance use and gambling addiction highlight the 
relevance of substance theories to future gambling research (Holden, 2010; American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013). For example, both substance users and gamblers report varied 
and potentially competing motivations for use (Binde, 2009; Clarke, Tse, Abbott, Townsend, 
Kingi, & Manaia, 2007; Cotte, 1997), while the relevance of particular cognitions to decisions 
vary depending on contextual factors and individual differences (Delfabbro & Winefield, 1999) - 
such as increased suppression of negative perceptions with compounding experience of harm 
(Magura & Kang, 1996; James, et al., 1996). Biopsychological research has also identified 
similarities between gambling and substance-based decision making processes such as: the 
presence of cravings and highs, hereditary, comorbidity, and similarities in efficacious 
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treatment modalities (e.g., 12-step programs, cognitive behavioural therapy) (Kessler, Hwang, 
LaBrie, & Petukhova, 2008). Risk perception concepts explored in the substance addiction 
research are therefore likely to have relevance to gamblers’ decision making processes, yet 
have garnered little attention to date in the gambling literature. 
Several issues further limit gambling decision making models, including problematic 
normative assumptions, descriptive rather than predictive reduction of cognitive concepts, and 
failure to consider the role of distinct negative and positive contingencies. Gambling models 
have not to date considered gamblers’ explicit perceptions, beliefs or attitudes about potential 
negative outcomes, or how risk perception is utilised in risky decision making. Further, an 
integrative gambling model is needed, that avoids normative concepts of rationality, and 
provides scope to capture individual or subgroup variations, the diversity, intensity and 
importance of concepts applied by gamblers during decision making, and the contextual 
dependence of decision making processes. 
Theories of risky choice in hazard management and substance addiction therefore 
highlight several factors warranting further attention in gambling theories and research 
methodologies: gamblers’ perceptions of harmful versus beneficial outcomes (Morgan, et al., 
2002), the relative significance and influence of competing motivations (Ajzen, 2011), and 
consideration of how contextual factors such as ‘denial’ mechanisms may influence risk 
perception and decision making (Howard, et al., 2002; Peretti-Watel, 2003; Rebelo 1999).  
A particular strength of outcome expectancy research in substance use relates to the 
predictive power of expectancy theories compared to the ‘post-hoc’-descriptive categorical 
systems presented in the gambling literature (e.g., Toneatto, 1999; Fortune & Goodie, 2011). 
That is, exaggerated estimation of positive and negative outcomes, associated with disordered 
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use, are likely to be useful in predicting maladaptive decision making in a manner that 
inconsistent ‘heuristic-bias’ models are unable to predict consistently, particularly when the 
influence of contextual and individual difference factors such as ‘denial’ are taken into account. 
The broad aim of this thesis, therefore, is to investigate risk perception in gambling, and 
to present a refined model of gambling decision making, inclusive of risk perception concepts. 
This thesis is presented as a thesis by publication (see table 2).  
 
Table 2 
List of publications and manuscripts prepared for publication presented within the thesis 
 Manuscript 
Chapter 4 (study 1) Spurrier, M. & Blaszczynski, A. (2013). Risk Perception in Gambling: A 
Systematic Review. Journal of Gambling Studies, DOI 
10.1007/s10899-013-9371-z 
Chapter 5 (study 2) Spurrier, M., Blaszczynski, A., & Rhodes, P. (2014a). An expert map of 
gambling risk perception. Journal of Gambling Studies, DOI: 
10.1007/s10899-014-9486-x 
Chapter 6 (study 3) Spurrier, M., Blaszczynski, A., & Rhodes, P. (2014b). Gambler risk 
perception: A mental model and grounded theory analysis. 
Journal of Gambling Studies, DOI 10.1007/s10899-013-9439-9.  
Chapter 7 (study 4) Spurrier, M., Blaszczynski, A., & MacCann, C. (To be submitted) 
Development of the Gambling Risk Decisions Questionnaire 
and a Risk Decision Model of Gambling Disorder 
 
Chapter four systematically reviews risk perception evidence in the gambling literature, 
highlighting important further areas of research.  Chapters five and six examine the role of risk 
perception in gambling based on qualitative investigation guided by mental models and 
grounded theory methodologies (Morgan, et al., 2002). Chapter five investigates factors 
directly influencing perception of risk in gambling, while chapter six investigates factors 
influencing how risk perception data is used to make decisions. Chapter seven quantitatively 
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examines the contribution of direct and indirect risk perception factors on gambling decision 
making using a self-report questionnaire methodology. Chapter eight proposes a gambling risk 
decision model summarizing the role of risk perception in decision making, how gambling 
decision making operates, and in what circumstances individuals may become disordered 
gamblers. Chapter nine summarizes implications for gambling theory and intervention, future 
directions, and the limitations of the current studies. 
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CHAPTER 4: Risk Perception in Gambling: A Systematic Review 
 
 
 
 
This chapter was accepted for publication in the Journal of Gambling Studies. 
 
Reference: 
Spurrier, M. & Blaszczynski, A. (2013). Risk Perception in Gambling: A Systematic Review. 
Journal of Gambling Studies, DOI 10.1007/s10899-013-9371-z 
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Introduction 
Gambling is a widely available, commonly accessed hazard, associated with significant social 
costs (Productivity Commission, 2010). Yet, only some individuals gamble long enough, or with 
large enough sums, that they experience significant harm (Walker, 2005). A large body of 
research argues that attitudes, perceptions and beliefs about risk play an important role in risky 
behaviour (Breakwell, 2007; Glanz, Rimer, & Viswanath, 2008; Binde, 2009). Understanding 
how gamblers perceive risk is likely to be important in understanding why specific subgroups of 
gamblers expose themselves to gambling-related harm (Johansson, Grant, Kim, Odlaug, & 
Gotestam, 2009).  
 
Risk perception, decision-making and gambling behaviour 
A key feature of gambling is that it involves risky choice, in that outcomes are typically 
both uncertain, and potentially harmful. Evidence from risk and health behaviour research 
suggests that when faced with risky choices, agents’ perceptions of risk play a significant role in 
determining intention, and subsequent behaviour (Ajzen, 2011; Breakwell, 2007; Morgan, 
Fischhoff, Bostrom, & Atman, 2002; Oei & Jardim, 2007; Siegrist, Keller, & Kiers, 2005). Central 
to risky choice and behaviour is how agents perceive critical risk parameters: the range of 
potential outcomes; the meaning of potential outcomes; and factors that determine the 
likelihood of outcomes (e.g., the agents’ cognition, and behavioural control, or game mechanics 
determining probability) (Ajzen, 2011; Weber, Blais, & Betz, 2002).  
In uncertain systems, agents must estimate one or more of the parameters defining 
outcomes. By its nature, such estimation is open to error. Estimation may relate to parameters 
determining outcomes, e.g., the likelihood of one side of a die facing up instead of another. 
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However, estimation may also be involved in the interpretation of potential outcomes 
(Campbell, 2006). That is, individuals may accurately or inaccurately perceive the potential 
impact of particular outcomes, such as the harm caused by losing a wager, or series of wagers.  
Risky choice may expose people to harm, via underestimation of risk related to how 
outcomes are determined, error in the meaning assigned to outcomes, or through conscious 
engagement with risk-bearing systems. However, while agents may knowingly make choices 
that carry risk of negative consequences, the accuracy of risk estimation in itself may have 
important consequences for behaviour related to hazards (Breakwell, 2007). Understanding 
how agents estimate risk parameters, and how estimations are used in decision-making and 
behaviour, is important in assisting people to safely negotiate hazards. An empirically-based 
understanding of gambling risk-perception would be useful for guiding treatment or developing 
preventative education for individuals who experience harm as a result of systematic errors in 
risk estimation. What then does the existing literature tell us about how individuals perceive 
gambling-related risk parameters, and the role of risk perception in choice and behaviour? 
 
Risk and positive perception of gambling  
Research suggests that users’ expectations of potential outcomes are important to the 
maintenance or moderation of risky behaviours such as alcohol (Oei & Jardim, 2007; Smith, 
Goldman, Greenbaum, & Christiansen, 1995); and drug use (Aarons, Brown, Stice, & Coe, 2001; 
Julie Goldberg, & Fischhoff, 2000). Similarly, cognitive research in gambling has shown that 
gamblers’ perceptions about risk play a significant role in gambling behaviour. Gamblers hold 
preferences (Lee, Chae, Lee, & Kim, 2007; Binde, 2009) and make predictions (Fortune & 
Goodie, 2011) about particular game outcomes.  
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Gamblers report different motivations for engaging in, or avoiding gambling (Clarke et 
al., 2007). Preferences for particular outcomes are reflected in idiosyncratic motivation for 
gambling. When gambling, individuals or subgroups appear to be differentially motivated by 
potential outcomes, such as: winning money (Rosecrance, 1985); the ‘dream’ of a substantial 
win (Cotte, 1997); intellectual challenge (Cotte, 1997; Lee, et al., 2007); emotion regulation 
(Shead, Callan, & Hodgins, 2008); avoiding loss (Hing & Breen, 2008); and social rewards (Cotte, 
1997; Lee et al., 2007).  
In addition, gamblers hold detailed representations of the causality within gambling 
systems. Causal representations of gambling operations have been examined in the literature in 
the form of explicit beliefs about: luck (Wohl, 2008; Wood & Clapham, 2005); determinism 
(Joukhador, Blaszczynski, & Maccallum, 2004); strategies for playing (Luengo et al., 2000); and 
the perceived impact that the gambler has on game-play and outcomes (Jacobsen, Knudsen, 
Krogh, Pallesen, & Molde, 2007; Myrseth, Brunborg, & Eidem, 2010).  
Evidence suggests that there is considerable individual variation in perceptions of 
gambling-related preference (Clarke et al., 2007; Shead et al., 2008) and causality (Delfabbro, 
2004). Further, some types of perceptions about gambling have been explicitly linked to 
disordered gambling (Toneatto, 1999). For example, more preoccupied, disordered gamblers 
were both: more likely to perceive gambling as a means of escape from stress or problems 
(Clarke, et al., 2007) or augmentation of positive mood states (Shead, et al., 2008); and, more 
likely to overestimate skill (Fortune & Goodie, 2011), and the chance of positive outcomes 
(Delfabbro, 2004). Such research provides evidence of a relationship between risk perception, 
motivation, and gambling although it does not provide sufficient data for a comprehensive 
model of how individuals think and behave in relation to perceived gambling risk.  
62 
 
Highly-cited reviews (e.g., Crockford & el-Guebaly, 1998; Goudriaan, Oosterlaan, de 
Beurs, & Van den Brink, 2004; Raylu & Oei, 2002; Toneatto, Blitz-Miller, Calderwood, 
Dragonetti, & Tsanos, 1997), and models (e.g., Blaszczynski & Nower, 2002; Sharpe, 2002) of 
gambling typically discuss gambling cognitions in relation to: beliefs or heuristics related to 
overestimation of either the likelihood of positive outcomes; the gamblers’ capacity to 
favourably control outcomes; or both. However, gambling models have not to date included 
consideration of gamblers’ explicit perceptions, beliefs or attitudes about potential negative 
outcomes. Representing risk perception in this way fails to include important components of 
perception and choice, according to many, well-supported models of risky choice across other 
disciplines, e.g., the Theories of Planned Behaviour and Reasoned Action (Ajzen, 2011; 
Albarracin, Johnson, Fishbein, & Muellerleile, 2001); the Health Belief Model (Glanz et al., 
2008), The Psychometric Paradigm of Perceptions of Hazards (Siegrist et al., 2005), the Mental 
Models approach (Morgan et al., 2002); and Choice theory (Skog, 2000). 
Theories of risky choice highlight several factors warranting further attention in 
gambling theories such as gamblers’ perceptions of beneficial versus harmful outcomes 
(Morgan et al., 2002), the risk of harmful outcomes (Glanz et al., 2008), and the meaning of 
outcomes (Ajzen, 2011); and influence between risk perception, motivation and behaviour. The 
aim of this systematic review was to evaluate existing evidence related to: gamblers’ 
perceptions of gambling risks and harms; and the relationship between risk perception and 
behaviour. Specifically, we attempted to determine what research tells us about: (1) the 
harmful outcomes gamblers expect from gambling; (2) the role of gambling outcome 
expectations in decision-making and behaviour; and (3) cognitive factors that moderate 
relationships between outcome perception and choice behaviour. 
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Method 
A literature search was conducted using the electronic databases MEDLINE, PsycINFO, 
Web of Science, and Google Scholar were searched using keywords: ‘risk*’, ‘harm*’, and 
‘outcome*’, combined with ‘gambling’. There were no limits placed on the years for searched 
articles. All subject headings were auto-exploded to broaden the search for relevant studies. 
Article reference lists were reviewed to identify research not captured in the initial screening 
process.  
Studies were included if they made reference to: perception of negative or harmful 
consequences of gambling; perception of risk or likelihood of potentially harmful consequences 
of gambling; appraisal or comparison of different gambling outcomes.  
Studies were excluded if they: did not include human participants; were not published in 
English; were not available as full-text (e.g., published conference abstracts with no associated 
article); or were not published in a refereed format (excluding government reports). Studies 
were not included if they were limited to discussion of only: risks or harms to society or non-
gamblers (e.g., family members of gamblers); perceptions of purely beneficial consequences of 
gambling; general attitudes about gambling; non-gamblers’ perceptions of risks or harms (e.g., 
expert opinion, general public sample); examination of past, but not current or future-oriented 
gambling consequences.  
  In all, 2,814 articles were identified through the search strategy. Titles and abstract 
were reviewed to determine the relevance of studies to the inclusion and exclusion criteria. 
Eighty-four articles were retained and read in full. Of these articles, four were excluded Articles 
meeting inclusion criteria (as described above) were retained and reviewed in detail.  
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Results 
Of the 2,814 articles identified, 2743 articles did not examine perceptions of gambling 
risk or consequence, 36 were replicated titles, 7 were not peer-reviewed, and 12 addressed 
perceptions of gambling by non-gamblers. 16 studies met criteria for inclusion, and their 
characteristics are summarized in Table 3.  
Year of publication ranged from 2003 to 2012. Of the 16 articles reviewed, three were 
carried out in Australia, four in Canada, three in China, one in Switzerland, one in the UK, and 
four in the USA. Eleven studies included some measure of gambling behaviour (e.g., self-report 
of gambling activity or spending), psychopathology (e.g., psychometric measures such as the 
SOGS (Lesieur & Blume, 1987) and DSM-IV-MR-J (Fisher, 2000), or both behaviour and 
psychopathology. It is noted that Gillespie et al., (2007a, 2007b) published two papers using the 
same sample of participants, but reporting different comparative breakdown of data. Articles 
were analysed according to how they addressed the three aims of the review. 
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Table 3  
Summary of articles reviewed 
Author Sample and study design Measures # Gambling risk perception and behavioural 
variables 
Key findings about risk perception in gambling 
(Wong & 
Tsang, 2012) 
Study 1: N=14 (28.6% 
female) (Mage=16.5yrs, 
SD=0.8, Range=13-18). 
Purposive sampling from 
three public children and 
youth services in Hong Kong. 
Focus group interviews. 
Study 2: N=258 (25.2% 
female) (Mage=16.1yrs, 
SD=2.0). See Study 1. Self-
report survey. 
Study 3: N = 1218 (43.8% 
female) (Mage=14.8yrs, 
SD=1.3, Range=12-18). Hong 
Kong public school students. 
Self-report survey. 
Study 1:  
Focus group interviews 
  
Study 2:  
CAGES (38 items) 
 
Study 3:  
CAGES (18 items)   
SOGS-RA  
 
Study 1: qualitative focus group 
interviews: expectations from gambling, 
including benefits and risks. Participant 
gambling behaviour classified based on 
self-report. 
Study 2: 38-item (9 factors), forced-choice 
Chinese Adolescent Gambling Expectancy 
Scale (CAGES) measured gambling 
expectations. 
Study 3: 18-item (5 factors) version of the 
CAGES.  
Study 1: two main themes emerged: positive (material gain, 
social benefit, enjoyment/arousal, self-enhancement, 
tension/boredom reduction) and negative gambling 
consequences (relational cost, out of control, money loss, 
behavioural problems).  
Study 2: Principal Components Analysis reduced CAGES to 18 
items loading on five factors (relational, social benefit, 
material gain, out of control, money loss). 
Study 3: Chinese adolescents held well-formed gambling 
expectations. Individuals with greater gambling involvement 
reported higher expectations of positive outcomes (social 
benefit and material gain) and some negative outcomes 
(being out of control); reported weaker expectations of other 
types of negative outcomes (relational costs, money loss). 
(Tao, Wu, 
Cheung, & 
Tong, 2011) 
N=791 (42.2% female) 
(Age=≥18 yrs). Chinese-
speaking Macau residents; 
gambled in the last 12 
months. Telephone numbers 
randomly selected from 
Residential Telephone 
Directory. Standardized 
telephone self-report survey. 
GMAB* 
 
110-item, forced-choice Gambling 
Motives, Attitudes and Behaviour (GMAB) 
scale for Chinese gamblers measured: 
superstitious beliefs; techniques for 
winning; behavioural control; arousal; 
involvement; DSM-IV PG symptoms; 
motivations to gamble. GMAB includes 10 
items about perceived negative 
consequences of gambling; summed as 
single factor denoting perceived 
unfavourability of gambling. 
Perception that gambling has negative consequences 
significantly negatively correlated with: self-worth, 
sensation-seeking, superstitious beliefs and behavior; 
gambling involvement; positively correlated with: female 
gender, increased age, beliefs that gambling outcomes are 
determined by luck, chance or fate. No significant 
relationship between PG and perception of negative 
gambling consequences. 
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(Inglin & 
Gmel, 2011) 
N=2500 (51.2% female) 
(Mage=43yrs, Range=15-74). 
Random-quota sampling and 
interviewing using computer-
assisted telephone 
interviewing; Switzerland. 
*Attitudes scale 
Self-reported gambling 
activity and spending 
 
Attitudes scale evaluated various attitudes 
to gambling: gambling policy, purpose of 
gambling, typical gamblers’ personality. 
Scale includes: 1 item assessing perceived 
addictiveness of gambling, 7 items 
assessing perceived dangerousness of 
various games. 
Gamblers compared to non-gamblers rated some games 
(poker, video lottery, scratch cards, lottery, sport toto) 
significantly less dangerous. No significant differences in 
perception of table games and slot machines. Gamblers 
compared to non-gamblers perceived gambling and tobacco 
as less addictive. 
(Dean, 2011) N=103 (53.4% female) 
(Mage=21.6yrs, SD=1.3). 
Convenience sample of 
undergraduate business 
students; ≤24 yrs; some 
experience of blackjack; 
Albuquerque, USA. Self-
report survey. 
Socio-demographic 
characteristics 
Self-reported risk and skill 
related to playing blackjack 
Questionnaire evaluated perceived: 
financial risk for an average player; 
personal financial risk; enjoyment of 
playing; personal experience; skill at 
playing. 
Authors reported that perceived financial risk to self was 
both significantly correlated and significantly different to 
perceived risk to an average other player.  
Self-reported level of experience significantly associated with 
skill, but not risk to self. Higher perceived vulnerability to loss 
associated with perception of lower skill and fun. 
(Wickwire, 
Whelan, & 
Meyers, 
2010) 
Study 1: N=35 (58.8% 
female) (Mage=16.9yrs, 
SD=0.8, Range=16-19). High 
school students; Memphis, 
USA. 33 participants self-
identified as African-
American. Self-report survey.  
Study 2: N=1076 (55.9% 
female) (Mage =16.2yrs, 
SD=1.1, Range=13-19). 
Urban, public high school 
students; Memphis, USA. 
Self-report survey.  
Study 1:  
Open-ended expectancy 
questionnaire 
Fixed-list questionnaire 
Draft expectancy items 
Gambling Activity 
 
Study 2: 
Gambling Expectancies 
SOGS-RA 
Study 1: Participants listed all potential 
outcomes of gambling; rated expectancy 
of outcomes identified in literature 
review. 
Study 2: Participants rated expectancy of 
50 specific gambling outcomes (20 items 
from Study 1, 30 items from literature 
review). 
Adolescents hold well-formed expectations of gambling. All 
five expectancy domains accounted for significant variance in 
gambling problems and frequency, and together accounted 
for a majority of variance in gambling frequency, and 
approximately half of variance in gambling problems. More 
frequent gamblers and Problem Gamblers had higher 
expectation of material gain, negative emotions, self-
enhancement; and lower expectations of negative social 
consequences, parental disapproval.  
 
(Nower & 
Blaszczynski, 
2010) 
N=1601 (49.8% female) 
(Range=21-79 yrs). Problem 
gamblers voluntarily self-
excluding; Missouri casinos 
from 2001-2003. 
Application for self-
exclusion  
 
Application for exclusion from casinos 
included information about: gambling 
involvement and behaviour (including PG 
status); reasons for self-exclusion (i.e., 
perceived negative consequences of 
continued gambling). 
Participants across all age groups endorsed hitting rock 
bottom, needing help, and gaining control as three primary 
reasons for self-exclusion. Older adults were less likely to 
self-exclude because they hit rock bottom, recognized they 
needed help, or wanted to save their marriage or job; and 
more likely to self-exclude because they wanted to prevent 
suicide. 
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(Mishra, 
Lalumiere, & 
Williams, 
2010) 
N=240 (50% female) (Mage 
=20.3yrs, SD=1.9, Range=18-
25). Canadian undergraduate 
psychology students. Self-
report survey. 
SSS-V 
EIS 
RBS 
Choice Task 
VPT 
BART 
DOSPERT  
PGSI 
Self-reported gambling 
activity 
50 item Domain Specific Risk Taking Scale 
(DOSPERT; Weber, Blais, & Betz, 2002) 
measured risk attitudes across five 
domains: financial, health/safety, 
recreational, ethical, social. Participants 
rated perceived: riskiness; benefit; 
likelihood of engaging in activity. 
‘Financial’ subscale included four 
gambling items.  
PG and gambling involvement associated with greater 
gambling risk-acceptance, and overall risk-acceptance. 
Gambling risk acceptance significantly associated with risk 
acceptance in most other domains. 
(Li et al., 
2010) 
N=373 (58.7% female) 
(Range=18-55 yrs). Macau 
University of Science and 
Technology students. Self-
report survey. 
Perceived risk of gambling, 
anticipated regret,  and 
intention to gamble 
Questions measured: perceived risk of 
losing, anticipated regret attached to 
gambling loss, intention to gamble (across 
13 game types). 
N.B. No explicit measures of gambling 
behaviour or psychopathology included. 
Anticipated regret, risk perception, and type of gambling 
significantly predicted intention to gamble in 12 out of 13 
game types. Anticipated regret was more predictive of 
gambling intentions than gambling type, or risk perception. 
Higher risk perception associated with greater regret 
anticipation. 
(Derevensky, 
Sklar, Gupta, 
& 
Messerlian, 
2010) 
N=1147 (49.9% female) 
(Range=12-19yrs). Secondary 
school students; middle-class 
regions of Quebec and 
Ontario, Canada. Self-report 
survey. 
EGAQ*  
GAQ 
DSM-IV-MR-J 
 
Effects of Gambling Advertising 
Questionnaire (EGAQ) evaluated: 
exposure, recall, and attitudes related to 
gambling and gambling advertising 
(including five positive attitudes, one 
general negative attitude) 
PG compared to non-gamblers and social gamblers held 
more positive attitudes about gambling, and perceived 
gambling as less harmful. Males and older students held 
more positive attitudes to gambling, , and perceived 
gambling as less harmful. 
(Orford, 
Griffiths, 
Wardle, 
Sproston, & 
Erens, 2009) 
N=8880, (Range=≥16 yrs). 
Addresses randomly selected 
by postcode across UK 
regions. Standardized 
telephone self-report survey. 
ATGS* 
Socio-demographic, health 
and lifestyle characteristics 
Family gambling behaviour 
Self-reported gambling 
activity 
PGSI 
DSM-IV  
14-item Attitude Towards Gambling Scale 
(ATGS) measured: attitudes about 
gambling; perception of harms and 
benefits. Items summed as single factor 
denoting general favourability towards 
gambling. 
Overall attitude towards gambling correlated with: socio-
demographic status variables, gambling behaviour, health-
related behaviour, gambling psychopathology. PG, ‘At Risk’ 
gamblers, and more frequent gamblers tended to hold more 
favourable general attitude to gambling.  
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(Delfabbro, 
Lambos, 
King, & 
Puglies, 
2009) 
N=2669 (49.2% female) (Mage 
=14.6yrs, SD=1.4, Range=12-
17). South Australian high-
school students. Self-report 
survey.  
Perceptions of skill 
Understanding of objective 
odds 
Misperceptions of 
randomness 
Attitudes towards gambling 
Gambling habits 
DSM-IV-J 
 
9-item attitudes towards gambling 
subscale adapted from Delfabbro & 
Thrupp (2003) (see below), summed as 
single factor denoting perceived 
unprofitability of gambling. 
Adolescents had generally poor knowledge of gambling odds, 
chance and randomness. Adolescent PG reported 
significantly less ‘risk aversion’ than ‘At Risk’ gamblers, who 
in turn were less risk averse than non-problem gamblers. 
Adolescent PG compared to non-PG: were significantly less 
accurate in estimation of skill in chance tasks, coin 
sequences, EGM outcomes; more accurate about roulette 
odds; not significantly different in estimating odds of lottery, 
coin tosses, die tosses. 
(Wickwire et 
al., 2007) 
N=302 (60.6% female) 
(Mage=20.5yrs, SD=1.5, 
Range=18-25). Adult 
psychology undergraduates. 
Self-report survey. 
Perceived availability of 
gambling products and 
services 
Perceived likelihood of 
engaging in gambling 
Perceived benefits of 
gambling  
Socio-demographic 
characteristics 
SOGS 
Perceived harmfulness of gambling scale 
measured perception of general 
harmfulness of gambling. 
No significant relationship between perception of harm and 
PG status; perception of availability and PG status. PGs held 
greater expectation of benefit from gambling. 
(Gillespie, 
Derevensky, 
& Gupta, 
2007a) 
N=1013 (57.4% female) 
(Mage=14.8yrs, SD=1.5, 
Range=11-18). High school 
students; Montreal and 
Ottawa, Canada. Self-report 
survey. 
GEQ trial items 
 
 
48-item Gambling Expectancy 
Questionnaire (GEQ) assessed 
expectations of various, specific gambling 
consequences. 
Principal Components Analysis suggested retention of 23 
items: three ‘positive’ factors (enjoyment/arousal, self-
enhancement, money); two ‘negative’ factors (over-
involvement, emotional impact) 
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(Gillespie, 
Derevensky, 
& Gupta, 
2007b) 
Same sample as Gillespie, et 
al., (2007a) (see above). Self-
report survey.  
 
GAQ  
DSM-IV-MR-J 
GEQ  
 
 
 
 
 
 
23 item GEQ, developed by Gillespie, et 
al., (2007a) (see above).  
Gamblers versus non-gamblers reported different 
expectations about all five types of outcome. Probable 
Pathological Gamblers (PPGs) and at-risk gamblers more 
strongly anticipated positive outcomes (winning, enjoyment, 
self-enhancement) than social gamblers, who in turn 
anticipated positive outcomes more than non-gamblers. 
Non-gamblers expected negative emotional outcomes more 
than gamblers. Both PPGs and non-gamblers anticipated 
losing control significantly more than social, or at risk 
gamblers. Older adolescents more strongly endorsed the 
positive expectancy scale (enjoyment/arousal), and more 
weakly endorsed negative expectancy scale (emotional 
impact). Overall, males compared to females more strongly 
endorsed two positive expectancy scales (enjoyment/arousal 
and money); and more weakly endorsed one negative 
expectancy scale (emotional impact). For males, positive 
(enjoyment/arousal, self-enhancement, money) and negative 
(over-involvement) expectancy scales all significantly 
predicted gambling severity; with enjoyment/arousal the 
strongest predictor. For females, positive expectancies 
(enjoyment/arousal and money) significantly predicted 
gambling severity.  
(Delfabbro, 
Lahn, & 
Grabosky, 
2006) 
N=926 (48.4% female) 
(Mage=14.5yrs, SD=1.6, 
Range=11-19). South 
Australian high-school 
students. Self-report survey.  
Gambling habits 
DSM-IV-J 
VGS 
Attitudes towards gambling 
Perceptions of skill 
Understanding of odds and 
probabilistic concepts 
 
9-item attitudes towards gambling 
subscale adapted from Delfabbro & 
Thrupp (2003) (see below), summed as 
single factor denoting perceived 
unprofitability of gambling. 
Adolescents had poor general knowledge of gambling odds, 
chance and randomness. Adolescent PGs were more 
optimistic about gambling than non-problem gamblers. 
Adolescent PG compared to non-PG: had similar overall 
mathematical knowledge; were significantly less accurate in 
understanding the randomness of a die toss; were more 
accurate at calculating binary odds. 
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(Delfabbro & 
Thrupp, 
2003) 
N=505 (53.5% female) 
(Mage=16.5yrs, SD=0.8, 
Range=14-17). South 
Australian high-school 
students. Self-report survey.  
Gambling habits  
Future gambling intentions 
Peer and family approval of 
gambling 
Attitudes towards gambling 
DSM-IV-J 
Money management and 
economic socialization 
Initial gambling 
experiences  
12-item Attitudes towards gambling 
subscale assessed attitudes towards 
gambling. Nine items retained following 
Principal Components Analysis loaded on 
two factors: perceived unprofitability; 
perceived profitability. 
PG and ‘At Risk’ gamblers compared to other adolescents 
perceived gambling as more profitable, and less likely to 
involve ‘throwing money away’. Low future intention to 
gamble was associated with perception of gambling as: risky, 
not profitable, a waste of money, likely to lead to loss. 
Experience of early wins, higher frequency of gambling, and 
future intention to gamble was associated with perception of 
gambling as profitable. 
# All studies recorded some socio-demographic data on participants (e.g., gender, age, income). Standardized questionnaire names abbreviated. Measures without acronyms 
represent non-standardized question batteries developed through the study. Measures of gambling pathology, behaviour and involvement highlighted in bold.  
*Measure validated in summarised study. References were provided when study validating stated questionnaire has been included in this review.  
PG denotes Pathological or Problem Gambler status. All articles reported findings from cross-sectional, empirical studies. 
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General Limitations of the gambling risk perception literature 
Based on the literature review, very few studies evaluated or made reference to risk 
perception, in contrast to the wealth of literature addressing other forms of addiction (Ajzen, 
2011; Breakwell, 2007; Glanz et al., 2008), and cognitive distortions contributing to 
overestimation of winning (Delfabbro, 2004; Fortune & Goodie, 2011; Jacobsen et al., 2007; 
Raylu & Oei, 2002). Most studies reviewed made only tangential reference to risk perception, 
and were limited by several common methodological issues. 
First, all reviewed articles reported findings from cross-sectional empirical studies, 
meaning that inference could not be made about the causal influence between perception, 
intention and behaviour (Baron & Kenny, 1986; Weinstein, 2007). Several of the studies 
included indirect or no measurement of gambling psychopathology (Dean, 2011; Gillespie, 
Derevensky, & Gupta, 2007a; Inglin & Gmel, 2011; Li et al., 2010) or gambling behaviour (Dean, 
2011; Gillespie et al., 2007a; Li et al., 2010), therefore relationships between risk perception 
and behaviour could not be evaluated in many of the studies reviewed. 
Second, assessment of risk perception in all of the studies relied exclusively on 
subjective, self-report data. Gambling research has demonstrated that gamblers often 
deliberately misrepresent (Kuentzel, Henderson, & Melville, 2008; Rosenthal, 1986) or have 
poor insight into (Kuentzel et al., 2008; Yi & Kanetkar, 2010) cognitions and behaviour related to 
gambling. Further, many of the studies assessed risk perception constructs poorly via single 
(Derevensky, Sklar, Gupta, & Messerlian, 2010; Inglin & Gmel, 2011), or small numbers of 
specifically targeted questionnaire items (Dean, 2011; Li et al., 2010; Wickwire et al., 2007) not 
checked for reliability and validity via theoretically-supported statistical methods (Floyd & 
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Widaman, 1995). Various risk perception constructs were therefore poorly identified among 
many of the studies. 
Finally, most studies included specific, non-representative samples due either to 
recruitment procedures or research goals, e.g., university students (Li et al., 2010; Mishra, 
Lalumiere, & Williams, 2010; Wickwire et al., 2007), adolescents (Dean, 2011; Delfabbro, Lahn, 
& Grabosky, 2006; Delfabbro, Lambos, King, & Puglies, 2009; Delfabbro & Thrupp, 2003; 
Gillespie et al., 2007a; Gillespie, Derevensky, & Gupta, 2007b; Wickwire, Whelan, & Meyers, 
2010; Wong & Tsang, 2012), self-excluding problem gamblers (Nower & Blaszczynski, 2010), and 
blackjack players (Dean, 2011). Many of the restrictions placed on samples (e.g., age, history 
and experience of gambling problems) relate to well-established risk factors associated with 
biased cognition or excessive gambling behaviour (Johansson et al., 2009; Raylu & Oei, 2002), 
limiting the relevance of research findings to specific subpopulations in many cases.  
 
(1.)  Gamblers’ expectations about harmful outcomes 
Expectations about harmful gambling consequences have typically been dichotomized 
into: (1) perceptions about relative, overall consequences (e.g., Orford, Griffiths, Wardle, 
Sproston, & Erens, 2009); and (2) expectations about specific types of outcome (e.g., Gillespie et 
al., 2007a).  
 
Gamblers’ relative expectations of harm versus benefit 
Five studies have assessed the relationship between overall negative, or negative-
versus-positive expectations, and gambling behaviour (Derevensky et al., 2010; Inglin & Gmel, 
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2011; Orford et al., 2009; Tao, Wu, Cheung, & Tong, 2011; Wickwire et al., 2007). Each study 
gathered relative attitudinal ratings of risks and benefits of gambling (e.g., participant 
agreement that ‘gambling can become a problem’ Derevensky et al., (2010)), compiling group 
mean scores that represented perception of the general harmfulness of gambling. Overall, 
studies provided evidence that heavier and more disordered gamblers hold more positive 
relative expectations of gambling. Orford et al., (2009) found that more favourable attitudes 
towards gambling were associated with greater time and money spent gambling, as well as 
problem and ‘at risk’ gambling status. Similarly, Derevensky et al., (2010) and Wickwire et al., 
(2007) reported that pathological gamblers were more likely to perceive gambling as beneficial, 
than non-gamblers, or social gamblers. Partial support was provided by Tao et al., (2011), who 
found that a perception that gambling carried negative consequences was associated with less 
gambling involvement, but not with pathological gambling status.  
Inglin and Gmel (2011) included a single question investigating gamblers’ perceptions 
that gambling may be addictive. In line with other ‘relative attitude’ studies, results suggested 
that gamblers compared to non-gamblers expected gambling to be less addictive, though 
expectations did not vary based on proportion of income spent on gambling.  
 
Gamblers’ expectations about specific types of outcomes 
Four recent studies investigated gambling outcome expectancy with greater specificity 
than ‘relative attitude’ research (Gillespie et al., 2007a, 2007b; Wickwire et al., 2010; Wong & 
Tsang, 2012). Each study attempted to comprehensively investigate the full range of specific 
outcomes gamblers expect of gambling. Those who gambled excessively whether responsibly or 
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not at all perceived gambling expectancy differently. Overall, studies found: heavier and more 
disordered gamblers expected greater benefits from gambling; disordered gamblers and non-
gamblers expected some harmful outcomes to a greater degree than less experienced 
gamblers. All four studies were limited to exclusively adolescent populations, and followed a 
similar methodology (related to Gillespie et al. (2007a)). Each study compiled a questionnaire 
assessing the most commonly expected types of outcome (based on literature review, 
qualitative investigation, and factor analysis); then used their questionnaire to assess outcome 
expectancy among groups of gamblers and non-gamblers. 
Gillespie et al., (2007a) classified the most commonly expected gambling outcomes 
according to three positive categories (enjoyment or arousal; positive feelings of self-
enhancement; financial gain) and two negative categories (over-involvement or preoccupation; 
negative feelings of shame, guilt, and loss of control). Gamblers versus non-gamblers reported 
different expectations of all five types of outcome. Probable Pathological Gamblers (PPGs) and 
at-risk gamblers more strongly anticipated positive outcomes (winning, enjoyment, self-
enhancement) than social gamblers, who in turn anticipated positive outcomes more than non-
gamblers. Non-gamblers expected negative emotional outcomes more than gamblers. 
However, both PPGs and non-gamblers anticipated losing control significantly more than social, 
or at risk gamblers. All five expectancy scales accounted for significant variance in gambling 
involvement, although patterns differed between males and females. For males, both positive 
(enjoyment/arousal, self-enhancement, money) and negative (over-involvement) expectancies 
significantly contributed to prediction of gambling severity; with enjoyment/arousal being the 
strongest predictor of gambling behaviour. For females, the predictive value of outcome 
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expectancies was weaker. However, positive expectancies (enjoyment/arousal and money) 
were significant predictors of gambling severity. 
A similar, mixed pattern of expectations was found by Wong and Tsang, (2012), and 
Wickwire et al., (2010). Chinese Adolescents with greater gambling involvement reported 
higher expectations of positive outcomes (social benefit and material gain) and some negative 
outcomes (being out of control); but reported weaker expectations of other types of negative 
outcomes (relational costs, money loss) (Wong & Tsang, 2012). Wickwire et al., (2010) reported 
that more frequent and more problematic gambling related to more positive and negative 
expectations, including: greater expectancies of material gain, negative emotions, and self-
enhancement; and lower expectations of negative social consequences, and parental 
disapproval. Wickwire et al., (2010) found that all five expectancy domains accounted for 
significant variance in gambling problems and frequency, and together accounted for a majority 
of variance in gambling frequency, and approximately half of variance in gambling problems. 
Taken together, these studies suggest a complex pattern of mixed expectations, or 
ambivalence, among higher frequency and more disordered gamblers, with stronger 
expectations of positive outcomes (e.g., excitement, financial reward) and some negative 
outcomes (e.g., loss of control), at least among adolescents. Both positive and negative 
expectancies were important predictors of gambling behaviour and problems (Gillespie et al., 
2007b; Wickwire et al., 2010). However, positive expectancies (particularly emotional arousal) 
were more influential in decision making than perception of negative outcomes (Gillespie et al., 
2007b), in line with ‘general attitude’ research showing disordered gamblers to be more 
optimistic overall about their expectations of gambling. 
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(2.) The role of outcome expectancy in decision making and behaviour 
 
Disordered gamblers hold more optimistic overall expectations  
Despite few studies and poor identification of risk perception in some cases, ‘relative 
attitude’ research provided evidence that gamblers’ expectations relate to behaviour. 
Specifically, that a more optimistic outlook on gambling is associated with heavier and more 
disordered gambling. Several possible explanations are possible for the relationship between 
risk perceptions and gambling. Lower relative risk estimation or awareness may expose 
individuals to harm, e.g., because attitudes result in poor management and overinvestment of 
resources (time, money). Alternatively, high investment or disordered cognition may cause 
gamblers to under-report or lack insight about risk, based for example, on a wish to justify 
behaviour, or because of the greater salience of desired outcomes. Overall, cross-sectional 
‘relative-attitude’ research alone allows little more than speculation about cognitive processes 
underlying beliefs, or about causal influence between cognition and behaviour (Weinstein, 
2007).  
Evidence from a range of sources supports the assumption that attitudes influence 
behaviour, and vice versa. Research has shown that poor risk estimation increased risk-taking 
behaviour, resulting in increased risk of harm (Breakwell, 2007). Individuals have demonstrated 
several types of estimation errors that result in riskier behaviour and higher rates of harm, e.g., 
inaccurate calculation of personal vulnerability or likelihood of harmful outcomes (Jones, 
Corbin, & Fromme, 2001; Leigh, 1999; Lipkus, Eissenberg, Schwartz-Bloom, Prokhorov, & Levy, 
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2011; Weinstein, 1987), or exaggerated emphasis on low probability outcomes, or vivid, 
immediate consequences (Leigh, 1999; Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1978).  
Evidence from drug, alcohol, and offending research also supports the alternative, i.e., 
that riskier behaviour is associated with deception (Hall & Poirier, 2001; Magura & Kang, 1996); 
and leads to denial of harm (Auslander, 1999; James, Lonczak, & Moore, 1996) via cognitive 
strategies that inhibit risk perception (Howard et al., 2002; Peretti-Watel, 2003; Rebelo, 1999), 
and neuro-physiological changes associated with impaired insight and awareness of risk 
(Goldstein et al., 2009; Rinn, Desai, Rosenblatt, & Gastfriend, 2002). Although, further research 
is needed to clearly elucidate the influence between gambling-risk cognition and behaviour, 
more specific outcome expectancy research had provided preliminary evidence that 
expectations of gamblers may help to explain gambling behaviour.  
 
Disordered gamblers expect a range of negative and positive outcomes  
Outcome expectancy research suggests that not only do disordered gamblers hold more 
optimistic expectations overall, they expect a range of both positive and negative specific 
outcomes with differing influence on gambling behaviour.  
Little research has investigated how disordered gamblers may maintain greater 
optimism and continued motivation to gamble, despite ambivalent expectations. Risk and 
addiction research suggests that individuals may continue to engage in risky behaviour due to 
the greater weighting of positive-over-negative outcome expectancies based on the greater 
personal significance or salience of positive outcomes (Goldberg & Fischhoff, 2000; Leigh, 1999; 
Redish, Jensen, & Johnson, 2008; Slovic et al., 1978). At least one study provided evidence that 
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gamblers may perceive positive expectancies to be more important than negative (Gillespie et 
al., 2007b).  
Alternatively, automatic ‘urges’ to gamble may overwhelm attempts to critically 
evaluate the potential consequences (Grant, Brewer, & Potenza, 2006; Potenza et al., 2003). 
How individuals respond to mental states and environmental cues may therefore influence 
salience, and subsequent framing, of positive versus negative expectancies (Goldstein et al., 
2009; Stanovich & West, 2008; Toplak, Liu, Macpherson, Toneatto, & Stanovich, 2007).  
It is therefore possible that disordered gamblers, exposed to negative gambling 
experiences, learn to expect more negative outcomes than other gamblers (e.g., 
preoccupation), but continue to gamble due to dominant positive expectancies, automatic 
urges, or some combination of these factors (Baudinet & Blaszczynski, 2012). Similarly, negative 
expectancies among low or non-gamblers may protect individuals from gambling problems, by 
inhibiting motivation to engage in gambling, and thereby limited exposure to loss, problems, 
and conditioning processes (Blaszczynski & Nower, 2002; Jessor, 1998). 
 
The meaning of outcomes is idiosyncratic and important to decision making 
Outcome expectancy research also revealed important idiosyncratic variation in risk 
perception that may influence decision-making. Despite similarities in sample and methodology, 
outcomes identified among specific outcome studies varied considerably, and differences 
between samples appeared to reflect cultural differences related to sample demographics. For 
example, Chinese adolescents (Wong & Tsang, 2012), unlike their Canadian (Gillespie et al., 
2007a) and African-American counterparts (Wickwire et al., 2010), did not identify affective and 
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self-referent expectancies as discrete gambling expectancies, but perceived gambling as an 
activity through which they may impress peers or gain approval. Such a difference in emphasis 
follows well-established ‘value’ differences between Asian and North American populations 
(Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Morris & Peng, 1994).  
Demographic profiles of gambler risk perception further support the relevance of 
personal experience and individual difference in development of risk perception. Certain static 
demographic variables (i.e., younger age, male gender) correlated consistently with more 
optimistic risk perception (Derevensky et al., 2010; Gillespie et al., 2007b; Inglin & Gmel, 2011; 
Orford et al., 2009; Tao et al., 2011), in line with established patterns among disordered 
gambling (Johansson et al., 2009; Raylu & Oei, 2002). Gillespie et al., (2007b) in particular 
identified that, while male adolescents exhibit higher rates of disordered gambling than 
females, there were significant gender differences in expectations above and beyond those 
associated with gambling severity. For example, males more strongly expected some positive 
outcomes (enjoyment/arousal, money), while females were more perceptive of some harms 
(emotional impact).  
Perception of lower risk was also associated in at least one study with other static and 
dynamic factors: lower education and occupational status; better general health; higher levels 
of drinking and smoking; lower family history of gambling problems; higher sensation seeking 
and self-worth; stronger belief in superstition and luck; superstitious behaviour (Derevensky et 
al., 2010; Orford et al., 2009; Tao et al., 2011). Overall, these findings suggest that risk 
perception among gamblers is not homogenous in the general population, and that particular 
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demographic factors (and possibly socio-cultural and cognitive-behavioural factors) predispose 
gamblers to develop particular beliefs associated with greater exposure to risk and harm.  
No research to date has directly assessed the value individuals place on gambling 
outcomes. Nevertheless, evidence from four other studies further support the assertion that 
individual differences and context predispose gamblers to frame outcomes in particular ways, 
and that the meaning of outcomes play a role in expectation, motivation and risk-taking. In a 
study of self-excluding problem gamblers, participants reported a number of reasons for self-
exclusion from casinos related to perception of the harmful consequences of gambling (e.g., 
‘hitting rock bottom’, loss of control) along with anticipation and desire to avoid future harm 
(e.g., wanting to prevent suicide) (Nower & Blaszczynski, 2010). Gamblers’ personal experience 
therefore informed their anticipation of future emotional or cognitive states, and thereby acted 
as a deterrent to future gambling. Similarly, Li et al., (2010) found that intention to gamble in a 
lay sample was predicted by both the level of regret anticipated in relation to losing a day’s 
wages, and perception that a game was risky; with regret anticipation more predictive than risk 
perception of gambling intentions overall. Likewise, blackjack players found games less fun if 
they perceived themselves to be personally vulnerable to financial harm (Dean, 2011), while 
frequent and disordered gamblers were found to be more tolerant of risk than others, both 
overall and in relation to gambling (Mishra et al., 2010). This evidence is consistent with drug 
and alcohol research indicating that the meaning of outcomes to individuals is important in the 
way that expectations influence motivation and risk-taking. For example, ‘positive’ expectancies 
are better predictors of alcohol consumption than ‘negative’ expectancies. (Goldberg, Halpern-
Felsher, & Millstein, 2002; Stacy, Widaman, & Marlatt, 1990).  
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Taken together the research discussed here suggests that gamblers may frame 
consequences, overall attitudes, and decisions based on what they find important or salient, in 
itself influenced by cultural experience (Dhillon, Horch, & Hodgins, 2011; Kim, 2012), mental 
state (Raylu & Oei, 2002), environmental context (Baudinet & Blaszczynski, 2012), or other 
individual differences. 
Given the heterogeneity of outcome meaning across subgroups, the importance of 
meaning in motivation and behaviour, and exclusive use of lay adolescent samples; it is doubtful 
that measures developed in outcome expectancy studies comprehensively identify outcomes 
meaningful to the decision making of important gambler subgroups (e.g., disordered gamblers 
versus long-term, responsible non-problem gamblers). For example ‘parental disapproval’ 
(Wickwire et al., 2010) is unlikely to be one of the five most easily identifiable, important or 
salient outcomes for a 50 year old with a 30 year history of gambling, and comorbid mood 
disorder or antisocial personality traits (Milosevic & Ledgerwood, 2010).  
Further, the ‘value’ of outcomes identified in expectancy studies may not necessarily 
adhere to simple ‘positive-negative’ polarizations, or other categorizations imposed through 
factor analytic modelling, and instead may vary dependent on context or individual preferences. 
For example, ‘escape’ or tension reduction is a well-established effect or goal in gambling 
(Rockloff & Dyer, 2006) with both positive and negative potential effects for mood and 
behaviour (Wood & Griffiths, 2007). Yet, during development of the Gambling Expectancy 
Questionnaire, Gillespie and colleagues (2007a) removed six escape/tension reduction items 
from their scale, due to loadings on both positive and negative emotional scales. Such an 
omission follows well-established statistical guidelines (Floyd & Widaman, 1995), but may have 
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nevertheless pre-emptively removed important information that may predict decision-making 
and behaviour among disordered gamblers (Lee et al., 2007).  
Idiosyncratic variation in risk perception should be taken into account in cognitive-
behavioural and demographic formulations of disordered gambling (Milosevic & Ledgerwood, 
2010; Sharpe, 2008). Further, it is important to consider what research suggests are factors that 
may moderate or influence the role of risk perception in decision making and behaviour, 
including factors that influence the meaning of outcomes, as well as how gamblers resolve 
conflicting motivations and expectations. 
 
(3.) Factors that influence the role of risk perception in decision making and behaviour 
 
The perceived qualities of gambling outcomes 
Gambling risk perception research has tended to apply positive-negative labels to 
anticipated outcomes on the basis of assumptions about normative belief (e.g., Gillespie et al., 
2007a; Wong & Tsang, 2012). However, research suggests that a number of outcome qualities 
may influence what outcomes mean to individuals, such as: the impact of consequences; the 
likelihood of outcomes occurring; and the presence or absence of particular environmental cues 
and mental states.  
 
i) The perceived impact of consequences 
A number of researchers have argued that positive outcomes of addictive (Goldberg et 
al., 2002) or impulsive behaviours (Ainslie, 1975) are often more immediate and direct, and as a 
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result more powerful reinforcers and predictors of behaviour (Stacy et al., 1990). The 
immediacy and directness of consequences is highly relevant in gambling, where consequences 
vary, in terms of when and how directly outcomes affect individuals (Hing, Breen, & Gordon, 
2012; Nussbaum et al., 2011; Wardle, Griffiths, Orford, Moody, & Volberg, 2012), and how 
different aspects of the gambling experience (e.g., sensory stimuli) reinforce cognition and 
behaviour (Rockloff, Signal, & Dyer, 2007). Nevertheless, no studies to date have looked directly 
at how gamblers’ perceptions of risk are influenced by the immediacy or personal relevance of 
consequences. 
 
ii) The perceived likelihood of outcomes  
The importance of particular consequences may also be affected by the perceived 
likelihood of an event occurring. Several studies have measured the relationship between 
perceived risk and gambling activity. All but one of these studies (Wickwire et al., 2007), 
provided evidence that lower estimation of likelihood of harm was associated with higher 
gambling involvement (Inglin & Gmel, 2011) or psychopathology (Delfabbro et al., 2006; 
Delfabbro et al., 2009; Delfabbro & Thrupp, 2003; Derevensky et al., 2010), despite comparable 
risk estimation skills (Delfabbro et al., 2006; Delfabbro et al., 2009).   
All six studies considered ‘likelihood’ in a general sense, referring to perception of the 
overall likelihood of negative outcomes, similar to ‘general attitude’ research. Therefore, 
‘overall likelihood’ studies may in fact be measuring the same conceptual domain as ‘general 
attitude’ studies. Differentiating ‘likelihood’ from ‘attitude’ constructs is a difficult task. Few 
gambling studies have measured more than one risk perception construct among a single 
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experiment enabling comparison of conceptual constructs; those studies that did (Derevensky 
et al., 2010; E. Wickwire et al., 2007) present mixed results. Derevensky et al., (2010) for 
example, included questions that addressed perceived benefits, risk of long-term problems, and 
likelihood of beneficial outcomes, and found problem gamblers to be more optimistic across all 
factors. Wickwire et al., (2007) measured perceived riskiness distinct from the perceived benefit 
of gambling, and found problem/pathological gamblers to expect greater benefit from gambling 
with no differences from other groups in perceived riskiness. Therefore, one study showed 
perceived of the likelihood of harm to be distinct and subordinate to expectations of benefit in 
predicting problem behaviour (Wickwire et al., 2007), but this distinction was not necessarily 
consistent (Derevensky et al., 2010). 
Therefore, evidence suggests that lower estimation of risk is associated with greater 
gambling involvement and psychopathology, but to date estimation of likelihood has not been 
clearly differentiated from other attitudes or beliefs about harm.   
 
iii) The presence of perceptual cues and mental states 
Investigators have also suggested that the salience and meaning of particular 
expectations may be influenced by subjective experience, and the presence of particular 
environmental cues or mental states. Gambling research highlights the importance of subjective 
arousal to development of disordered gambling (Baudinet & Blaszczynski, 2012). Gambling 
triggers states of arousal (e.g., through intermittent rewards, and sensory cues (Rockloff et al., 
2007)), and individuals learn to associate arousal with environmental stimuli via classical and 
operant conditioning processes (Blaszczynski & Nower, 2002). Exposure to environmental 
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stimuli, particularly when individuals are in vulnerable mood states, may therefore come to 
trigger particular expectations, as well as precipitating emotional responses associated with the 
urge to gamble (Sharpe, 2002; Wood & Griffiths, 2007). Hence individual experiences of 
gambling, in conjunction with the presence or absence of particular environmental cues or 
vulnerable mental states is likely to impact on the salience and motivational power of particular 
gambling outcomes (Freidenberg, Blanchard, Wulfert, & Malta, 2002). Nevertheless research is 
yet to investigate the influence of psychological states or environment on gambling risk 
perception. 
Therefore, while there is reason to believe that a number of factors may affect the 
perceived meaning of gambling consequences, there is limited research about how these affect 
gambling risk perception. 
 
Lack of insight and resolution of conflicting expectations 
Although risk assessment may be influenced by various qualities of outcomes, risk 
perception is also affected by individuals’ knowledge or information processing in relation to 
gambling. Evidence suggests that particular individuals are prone to processing gambling wins 
and losses differently (Gilovich, 1983; Toneatto et al., 1997), and in doing so unrealistically 
enhancing expectations of positive outcomes (Joukhador et al., 2004). Regardless of individual 
differences in cognitive biases, all gamblers appear to hold poor understandings of the 
mechanics determining outcomes (Delfabbro, 2004; Delfabbro et al., 2009; Lambos & 
Delfabbro, 2007). It is likely that processing biases that inhibit awareness of harmful outcomes, 
along with poor insight about risk, may result in some gamblers underestimating risk and 
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exposing themselves to risk and harm. However, while research has explored the range of 
processing biases and erroneous beliefs of gamblers, no studies to date have explicitly tested 
the accuracy of expectations about gambling harm, beyond tests of mathematical ability. 
In addition, it is likely that gamblers further expose themselves to risk through attempts 
to justify desire to gamble in the context of distressing expectations or conflicting cognitions. 
Addiction research suggests that some anticipated outcomes in risky scenarios are motivating 
enough that individuals become dependent on substances or activities (Freidenberg et al., 
2002; Gawin, 1991; Grant et al., 2006; Toplak et al., 2007). Individuals nevertheless report 
regret or distress in response to perceived dependence, as well as other consequences of risky 
behaviours (Anderson, Sisask, & Varnik, 2011; Li et al., 2010; Yi & Kanetkar, 2011). It is likely 
that individuals are therefore motivated to both: continue gambling due to expected positive 
outcomes, and reduce negative emotions such as regret and cognitive dissonance.  
Research suggests that individuals may appease conflicting motivations through 
behavioural change (e.g., by discontinuing gambling (Slutske, 2010; Sobell et al., 2001)) or on a 
cognitive level (e.g., by altering existing beliefs, adding new beliefs, or reducing the importance 
of a cognitive element (Cooper, 2012; Jarcho, Berkman, & Lieberman, 2011)). This process of 
minimising negative expectations, or bolstering positive expectations, may mean that gamblers 
do not take adequate steps to avoid risk. In line with these expectations, disordered gamblers 
have been shown to hold a mix of negative and positive unconscious expectations, but explicitly 
report only positive expectations (Yi & Kanetkar, 2010), implying that disordered gamblers are 
unconsciously denying negative outcomes, or deceptively reporting expectations.  
 
87 
 
Conclusions 
Despite an extensive focus in the literature on cognitive biases and errors associated 
with disordered gambling, there has been a paucity of research addressing gamblers’ 
perceptions of potential harms and risk related to gambling. The extant research provides 
evidence that disordered gamblers hold both: more optimistic overall perceptions of risk, and a 
mix of more positive and more negative specific expectations about outcomes. Despite holding 
more negative expectations, disordered gamblers maintain motivation to gamble, and hence 
we may assume that this group is discounting risks in some way, such as by attributing 
preferential importance to positive outcomes. 
Research suggests that risk perception varies based on contextual factors or individual 
differences, such as gamblers’ cultural experiences and exposure to gaming. A range of factors 
may moderate the role of risk perception in decision-making and behaviour such as the 
perceived qualities of anticipated outcomes, awareness of consequences, and responses to 
conflicting cognitions. Given potential differences in the perception of risk between various 
categories of gamblers, clinicians should take into account how gamblers in treatment view 
gambling as a risky behaviour. Improving the accuracy of such perceptions may reduce the 
propensity for risk-taking behaviours. 
Further research is needed to identify the range of outcomes expected by important 
subgroups of gamblers, how gamblers interpret and use information about risk perception, and 
the influence of individual differences and context on gambling risk perception and behaviour. 
 The current literature is limited in a number of ways, related to sample specificity, 
cross-sectional study design, and methodological approach to the identification of risk 
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perception parameters. Future research should work to address these issues in study design 
and implementation. 
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CHAPTER 5: An expert map of gambling risk perception 
 
 
This chapter was accepted for publication in the Journal of Gambling Studies. 
 
Reference: 
Spurrier, M., Blaszczynski, A., &, Rhodes, P. (2014a). An expert map of gambling risk perception. 
Journal of Gambling Studies, DOI: 10.1007/s10899-014-9486-x  
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Introduction 
Gambling is a risky behaviour associated with harmful consequences for a proportion of 
participants (Productivity Commission, 2010). Although evidence from studies on offending, and 
drug and alcohol use indicates that risk perception plays an important role in risk taking 
behaviors (Glanz, Rimer, & Viswanath, 2008), few studies have investigated the role played by 
an individual’s perceptions of risk and harm in gambling (Spurrier & Blaszczynski, 2013).  
 Data derived from risk perception studies suggests that gamblers’ perceptions of 
negative consequences play an important role in decision-making, behaviour, and disordered 
gambling aetiology (Spurrier & Blaszczynski 2013). Studies have reported the presence of a 
functional relationship between disordered gambling and a mix of positive (‘material gain’, 
‘social benefits’) and negative expectations (‘loss of control’) (Gillespie, Derevensky, & Gupta, 
2007;  Wickwire, Whelan, & Meyers, 2010), and lower overall risk expectancies (Derevensky, 
Sklar, Gupta, & Messerlian, 2010; Inglin & Gmel, 2011).    
Findings that gamblers maintain greater optimism about gambling, despite the 
experience and expectation of negative consequences (Wickwire, Whelan, West, Meyers, 
McCausland, & Luellen, 2007; Wong & Tsang, 2012; Yi & Kanetkar, 2010), suggest that 
disordered gambling cannot be fully explained by gamblers overestimating positive outcomes or 
personal control (Fortune & Goodie, 2011; Toneatto, 1999). Instead, both positive and negative 
perceptions play independent but interrelated roles in motivation and risky decision making 
(Wickwire, et al., 2007; Yi & Kanetkar, 2010). Disordered gamblers appear to maintain 
maladaptive optimism through, either, dominance in magnitude, salience, or significance of 
positive over negative perception, or implicit or explicit manipulation of perceptual data 
91 
 
(Gillespie et al., 2007; Wickwire et al., 2010). Yi and Kanetkar (2010) for example, showed 
disordered gamblers hold more positive and negative implicit expectations, but explicitly 
acknowledge only positive expectations, suggesting the implicit or explicit resolution of tension 
between conflicting perceptions, through implicit suppression or amplification of risk 
perceptions, deceptive reporting, or both. 
Related drug, alcohol and offending research also suggest that stronger positive and 
weaker negative perceptions relate to riskier behaviour, also at times a consequence of users’ 
manipulation of risk data. Problematic users and offenders exaggerate emphasis on low 
probability outcomes and vivid, immediate consequences (Leigh, 1999; Slovic, Fischhoff, & 
Lichtenstein, 1978), and underestimate personal vulnerability, and likelihood of harmful 
outcomes (Jones, Corbin, & Fromme, 2001; Lipkus, Eissenberg, Schwartz-Bloom, Prokhorov, & 
Levy, 2011; Weinstein, 1987). In addition, harmful users exhibit greater deception of self and 
others (Hall & Poirier, 2001; Magura & Kang, 1996) and denial of harm (Auslander, 1999; James, 
Lonczak, & Moore, 1996), employ cognitive strategies that inhibit risk perception (Howard, 
McMillen, Nower, Elze, Edmond, & Bricout, 2002; Peretti-Watel, 2003; Rebelo, 1999) and 
experience neurophysiological change associated with impaired risk awareness (Goldstein et al., 
2009; Rinn, Desai, Rosenblatt, & Gastfriend, 2002).  
Findings in the gambling literature are compatible with drug, alcohol and offending 
research. However, comparable conclusions about gambling risk perception are limited by a 
paucity of relevant research, and design issues potentially biasing or restricting results (cross-
sectional and self-report designs, limited risk perception construct measurement, non-
representative sampling) (Baron & Kenny, 1986; Spurrier & Blaszczynski, 2013; Weinstein, 
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2007). Therefore, despite a clear relationship between risk perception and gambling, the 
available research allows only limited inference about cognitive, behavioural, social, biological 
or environmental processes underlying risk perception and risky decision making in gambling 
(Spurrier & Blaszczynski, 2013; Weinstein, 2007).  
The aim of this study was to investigate the perspectives of expert gambling clinicians 
and researchers about how disordered versus recreational gamblers perceive, interpret and use 
risk information in gambling decision making and behaviour. 
 
Method 
 
Participants  
A convenience sample of eleven experts were invited to participate. Selection criteria 
included local and international experts identified by the second author, with gambling-specific 
research or clinical experience greater than four years, and specific expertise in gambler 
perceptions, beliefs, or appraisals. Eight participants were located in Australia, two in Canada, 
and one in the USA.  
Three experts accepted an email invitation to participate in the first round of interviews. 
Six experts were subsequently recruited after preliminary data analysis was completed in order 
to clarify and extend emergent themes until theoretical saturation was achieved (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1994). Two additional interviewees were recruited post-saturation, to check if any new 
themes or concepts emerged (Strauss & Corbin, 1994). 
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Table 4 lists expert participants’ descriptive information. Pseudonyms were used for all 
participants to protect anonymity. 
 
Table 4  
Experts’ professional experience 
Name Gambling-specific & years of experience  
Expert 1  Counsellor, trainer/educator, policy development >30years 
Expert 2  Clinical psychologist, researcher (cognition) 7years 
Expert 3  Counsellor >10years 
Expert 4  Researcher (sociological factors, technology/EGMs)  >10years 
Expert 5  Researcher (reinforcement/behaviour, technology/EGMs) >10years 
Expert 6  Clinical psychologist, researcher (cognition) >4years  
Expert 7  Trainer/educator, policy development >10years 
Expert 8  Clinical psychologist, trainer/educator, researcher (individual differences, 
sociological factors) 
20years 
Expert 9  Researcher (cognition, reinforcement/behaviour, risk decision-making, 
technology/EGMs), policy development 
>10years 
Expert 10 Researcher (behaviour, individual differences, technology/EGMs, cognition) >10years 
Expert 11 Clinical psychologist, policy development, researcher (individual differences, risk 
decision-making) 
>10years 
 
 
Measures 
A semi-structured interview based on a combination of Grounded Theory and Mental 
Models methodologies (Morgan, Fischhoff, Bostrom, & Atman, 2002; Strauss & Corbin, 1994, 
1998) was used to elicit expert perspectives. Initial interview questions were open-ended and 
attempted to explore participants’ beliefs about the content and influence of gambler risk 
perception cognition (see Appendix A for sample questions) (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Coding 
overlapped with interviews such that as analysis developed interview content and participant 
selection was modified to affirm, modify, add, elaborate, clarify, and find exceptions in 
emerging themes (Strauss & Corbin, 1994). Interviews lasted 40-90 minutes. Six interviews were 
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conducted in person, four via Skype, and one by telephone. With the permission of the 
participants, all interviews were digitally audio-recorded and transcribed. The University of 
Sydney Human Research Ethics Committee approved the conduct of the study. 
 
Procedure 
The study combined the Mental Models (MM) approach to risk perception evaluation 
(Morgan et al., 2002), with data collection and interpretation based in Grounded Theory (GT) 
(Strauss & Corbin, 1994, 1998).  
The MM approach aims to identify incomplete or inaccurate content in lay mental 
models associated with the use of specified hazards; where this content is assumed to be 
responsible for potentially harmful outcomes among users (Fischhoff, 1995). GT analysis 
enables development of a substantive theories to describe content and process in perception, 
decision making, or behaviour. Both the MM and GT approaches have demonstrated efficacy in 
the development of effective, evidence-based risk communication interventions (Jungermann, 
Schutz, & Thuring, 1988), and psycho-social theory (Strauss & Corbin, 1994, 1998), and were 
therefore deemed appropriate for investigating gambling risk perception, since gambling is a 
hazardous activity. 
The study followed the step-by-step MM procedure outlined by Morgan et al. (2002). 
First, semi-structured interviews were conducted with gambling experts. Second, interview data 
was compiled into a comprehensive mental model ‘map’ that detailed vulnerability and 
protection factors contributing respectively to harmful or safe gambling. Within each phase, 
systematic overlapping processes of data gathering and analysis were used to iteratively 
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extend, saturate, test for exception and verify the content of mental model maps (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1994, 1998; Hayes, 1997). 
 
Data analysis 
NVivo qualitative data analysis software was used to apply open, axial and selective 
coding analyses (QSR International, Version 9; Richards, 2005; Strauss & Corbin, 1994, 1998). 
Coded concepts were arranged chronologically to enable processes to emerge, after which data 
was subject to open coding. As the interviews progressed, recurrent themes were explored in 
subsequent interviews to enable theoretical sampling. Conceptual relationships were 
assembled through a process of axial coding whereby initial categories were linked to 
subcategories along the lines of their properties and dimensions. Finally, selective coding 
integrated and refined final categories, in order to provide a detailed, complete explanation of 
situated gambling risk perception. Two additional participants confirmed that theoretical 
saturation was achieved. A comprehensive expert influence map emerged from the coding 
process (see Figure 1).  
 
Controlling for bias  
Several strategies were employed to reduce potential researcher bias based on Chiovitti 
and Piran's (2003) recommendations. Interview paradigms were initially based on open 
questions. The author kept notes during interview, transcription, and analysis, to detail 
emergent concepts and identify potential personal bias. At the same time, participants’ own 
language was used where possible to label and describe concepts. Following initial coding, two 
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randomly selected interviews were blind-coded by a co-author, and used to refine coding and 
theory development. Finally, within-interview member checking tested interviewer 
interpretation of participant data. Participant statements were selected and included below to 
represent either typical, exemplar, or contrasting viewpoints on a particular topic. 
 
Results 
 
Experts’ model of risk perception 
Responses were consistent with the hypothesis that gambler perceptions of risk and 
value have adaptive or maladaptive influence on decision-making and behaviour (Spurrier & 
Blaszczynski, 2013). Coding of interviews with experts revealed eight major themes 
(represented in Figure 1 below). Three of these themes related to the core functional 
components of gambler risk perception content and processes: 
(1) Estimation and expectancy: beliefs or estimations about how gambling systems 
operate and generate outcomes combine with perception of the benefit versus 
cost of expected or possible event outcomes. 
(2) Meaning and motivation: perception of the meaning or value of gambling and its 
consequences combine with individuals’ wants, motivation drives and goal 
seeking.(3) Strategic planning: understanding of how operating rules and 
strategies are prioritised and integrated according to internal goals. 
Five additional themes described environmental and individual factors mediating or 
moderating relationships between risk perception, decision making and behaviour:  
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(4) Reinforcement, learning and experience: exposure to gambling reinforcement 
schedules, and resultant cognitive changes. 
(5) Decisional context and available choice: availability, salience and sensitivity to 
internal and external cues. 
(6) Implicit versus explicit cognition: the comparative application and control of 
implicit versus explicit cognitive processes. 
(7) Ambivalence and manipulation of risk data: perception and implicit or explicit 
suppression or amplification of positive and negative perceptions. 
(8) Innate and developmental individual differences: experiential or dispositional 
differences between individuals. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Expert map of gambling risk perception, decision making, and behavioural operations. Perception and decision making processes involve both implicit and explicit cognition, and 
may be subject to deliberate or automatic distortion or manipulation. Risky operations within the gambler’s cognition or interaction with the environment may result in disordered gambling. 
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Themes are presented here as modular schema to enable meaningful discussion of 
decision-making processes. However, it is important to bear in mind that individual risk 
perceptions had referential overlap, that is, perceptions related concurrently to multiple 
themes, with aspects of risk perception potentially occurring simultaneously, sequentially, 
and/or with reciprocal influence during sessions of play. 
Certain types of risk perception content relating to key themes were found to either 
increase or decrease risk of harm (summarized respectively as ‘vulnerability’ and ‘protection 
factors’ in Table 5 below). In the following sections, expert accounts of each of the key themes 
were summarized and contrasted. 
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Table 5 
Vulnerability and protection factors associated with specific individual and environmental domains related to gambling risk 
perception 
Domain Vulnerability Factor Protection Factor  
Estimation & expectancy 
 
Inaccurate risk estimation (low erudition, expectation, 
emphasis on negative outcomes; high erudition, 
expectation, emphasis on positive outcomes; 
inconsistent estimation; inaccurate causal 
understandings; overall underestimation of negative 
outcomes and long term loss) 
Accurate or cautious risk estimation (detailed, 
consistent, heightened negative expectations; 
consistent low erudition, expectation, emphasis on 
positive outcomes; overestimation or accurate 
expectations of outcomes and long term loss)  
Meaning & motivation 
 
Low emphasis or value attributed to risk management 
High value attributed to risky gambling goals (e.g., 
winning, emotion regulation, other non-monetary 
goals) 
Difficulty resisting impulse to gamble  
Presence of intense urges to gamble 
Increasing will to manipulate risk perception (exposure 
to problems and consequent need for emotion 
regulation, avoidant coping, rationalization of 
gambling behaviour and its consequences) 
High value attributed to risk management 
Low emphasis or negative attributions towards 
gambling  
Competing gambling-inconsistent goals 
Increasing will to decrease gambling with exposure to 
negative outcomes 
Strategic planning 
 
Insufficient risk management emphasis (low or 
inconsistent prioritization of risk management goals; 
failure or inconsistency setting or following 
sustainable limits; high prioritization of conflicting, 
risky goals, e.g., winning money, emotion regulation) 
Consistent, high risk management emphasis 
(prioritization of risk management goals; consistent, 
cohesive, precise limit setting) 
 
Reinforcement, learning, experience Exposure to high value representations of gambling  
Significant exposure to reinforcement schedules 
(intermittent wins; money-independent rewarding 
outcomes; game configurations and events 
distorting perception of causality, softening 
punishment, or amplifying intensity or rate of 
rewards) 
Exposure to meaningful negative consequences 
Decisional context & available choice Availability of internal or external triggers  
Presence of risky mental states or significant stressors 
(e.g., low mood) 
 
Implicit versus explicit cognition Implicit reasoning problems (overuse of implicit 
reasoning; lack of error correction; dominance of 
implicit over explicit reasoning) 
Hypersensitivity to gambling cues (presence of risky 
mental states, sensitivity to internal or external 
triggers, presence of intense urges)  
Increasing automaticity of gambling with experience 
 
Ambivalence and manipulation of risk data Perceptual or attentional distortion (implicit or explicit 
suppression of negative outcome expectancy or 
value, implicit or explicit amplification of positive 
outcome expectancy or value; deception)  
Increasing awareness of probability of negative 
outcomes with exposure to negative outcomes 
Innate & developmental individual differences 
 
Individual differences amplifying vulnerability factors 
(Overvaluation and hypersensitivity to gambling 
rewards; hyposensitivity to punishment; 
vulnerability to erroneous associations;  vulnerability 
to processing biases; poor gratification delay skills; 
need for emotion regulation, escape, hope, money) 
Individual differences amplifying protection factors 
(Low valuation and sensitivity towards gambling 
rewards; hypersensitivity to punishment) 
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Functional components of gambler risk perception 
 
Estimation and expectancy 
Two experts (Experts 9 and 10) argued that common, contemporary models (e.g., 
Fortune & Goodie, 2011; Toneatto, 1999) of disordered gambling cognition lack concepts of risk 
perception, and only a handful of studies explicitly address outcome expectancy (see Spurrier & 
Blaszczynski, 2013). As a result, attempts to predict outcomes are based on only a partial 
picture of disordered gamblers’ excessive optimism about specific aspects of gambling, such as 
luck, or the controllability of outcomes, without due attention to independent positively versus 
negatively motivating content, or contextual factors influencing decisions. Current models 
therefore remain “controversial”, because commonly discussed gambling cognitions (e.g., the 
gamblers’ fallacy, the availability heuristic) remain “circular” (Expert 9) or descriptive rather 
than predictive, because they lack clear guidelines for when gamblers apply particular 
principles.  
Several experts cited evidence that gamblers hold highly idiosyncratic mental models of 
causality, outcome, and game structural configurations, used to estimate outcomes and make 
decisions (Moodie, 2007). A majority of experts cited either clinical experience or research 
showing the influence of both positive and negative perceptions on decision-making (e.g., 
Aarons, Brown, Stice, & Coe, 2001).  
High attention or importance, along with accurate or overestimated estimation of risks 
was interpreted to lead to protective gambling choices and behaviours:  
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“People who are not convinced of winning, of course approach gambling, as: "I'm going 
to lose this, so can I afford it, and what will happen if I do?" Assessment of risk is more 
practiced, likely to be more accurate, and certainly more realistic in its conclusion that "I 
am likely to lose and therefore am I OK with losing it?"” Expert 2 
 
In contrast, experts reported problem and disordered gamblers place low emphasis on risk 
evaluation, underestimate likelihood or magnitude of negative outcomes, or both: 
 
“Problem gamblers do not put a great deal of well-considered effort into risk 
management.” Expert 1 
 
“There’s a naive view out there that the rules of probability don't actually operate the 
way mathematicians think they do.” Expert 4 
 
Experts also reported that low prioritisation of risk or underestimation of risk, may be, 
but is not always due to over-prioritisation, or over-estimation of positive outcomes. That is, 
any or all of these four factors may independently contribute to increased vulnerability to 
harmful gambling. However, how these factors combine as overall optimism or pessimism 
about gambling is critically important to predicting gamblers’ vulnerability to harm - this 
importantly relates to the meaning or value gamblers attribute to cognitions, goal-prioritisation 
and planning. 
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Meaning and motivation 
The majority of expert perspectives described overvaluation of gambling and gambling 
outcomes as intrinsically risky, and a core, or the core feature of gambling disorder: 
 
“Not many things are true for every single person who gambles, but I think one is they 
overvalue gambling as an activity. I think every single person who has a gambling 
problem has their perception of themselves in the world somehow out of line with reality, 
like their value as people... I think part of what that thinking - that cognitive distortion is 
- about their own values, is they over-attribute how much better they will feel about 
themselves if they were good at this gambling thing. I think that’s true for everybody.” 
Expert 8 
 
Over-valuation of gambling was referenced by a majority of experts who discussed two 
aspects of gamblers’ cognition: (1) evaluation or interpretation of gambling information, 
including the value and importance attributed to perceived benefits and costs (discussed 
above), and (2) motivation, or the goals and needs of individuals, and how this motivation 
related to the value attributed to anticipated outcomes. That is, how gambling outcomes are 
perceived to help or hinder individuals from attaining goals, and how needs or goals are 
prioritised by individuals ultimately determines how much motivation individuals have to 
gamble. Hence, evaluation and motivation were represented by experts as highly influential 
aspects of risk perception.  
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Participants argued that evaluation and motivation may influence risk perception, and 
hence decision making, in several harmful or protective ways. For example, evaluation of 
outcomes and intrinsic motivational drives lead gamblers to attend to, or value particular 
outcomes as important or insignificant, and based on this, prioritise particular goals in strategic 
planning within gambling systems - increasing vulnerability or protection from risk, depending 
on the type of goals prioritised. 
Experts cited a number of specific examples, increasing or decreasing vulnerability to 
problematic or disordered gambling. Overall, high value or importance attributed to risk-
management, and non-gambling life goals are likely to protect individuals from harm by leading 
gamblers to limit time and money expenditure. Alternatively, high value attributed to goals that 
failed to prioritise risk management (e.g., winning money), particularly if goals were achieved 
through gambling but were independent of monetary outcomes (e.g., emotion regulation), are 
likely to increase vulnerability to harm and disordered gambling, since these goals respectively 
lead gamblers to perceive expenditure on gambling as an important priority, increase sensitivity 
to risky cues, or gamble with low attention or importance attributed to spending. 
 
Strategic planning 
Experts cited evidence that gamblers make gambling decisions according to personal 
compilations of cognitive-behavioural ‘if...then...’ imperatives - labelled “stratagems” by one 
expert (Expert 2). Stratagem imperatives are derived from causal understanding, estimation, 
meaning, and motivation. Stratagems aim to achieve goals, according to gamblers’ 
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understanding of outcome determination. Reciprocally, strategic planning may influence 
attention and importance attributed to risk data.  
Experts typically described stratagems as dynamic and flexible, since gamblers must 
often unify, satisfice (attempt to meet a threshold of acceptability rather than find an optimal 
solution), or switch between competing or contradictory motivations, beliefs, and contextual 
demands. Like other aspects of risk perception, the salience and composition of stratagem 
content may change over the short- or long-term, according to how experiential and contextual 
input affects perception, motivation, and available choice.  
A majority of experts made reference to at least three significant themes when 
discussing stratagem goals that differentiated recreational from disordered gamblers: (1) risk 
management, (2) winning, and (3) emotional or self-regulation.  
Experts argued that preferential, consistent emphasis on risk exposure management is 
associated with protection from harm and disordered gambling. Gamblers may achieve this 
through specific strategies such as setting firm, realistic, consistent, and sustainable spending 
limits: 
 
“Most people enjoy playing the pokies, but don't appear to be experiencing harm, or 
experience it only sporadically. They manage their risk by managing their exposure to 
that risk, they almost religiously refuse to get any money out, and when that's gone they 
go and have a drink and go home, or whatever.” Expert 4 
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In contrast, experts stated that gamblers leave themselves vulnerable to harm and 
disordered gambling if: stratagems contain erroneous, inconsistent or contradictory content; 
are easily influenced by contextual demands or mental states; or prefer strategic goals other 
than risk management - particularly ‘winning’ or short term monetary goals, or emotional or 
self-regulation. Prioritisation of non-risk-management strategies, even if only for short periods, 
leaves gamblers vulnerable to harm, since goal-directed behaviour becomes detached from 
monetary outcomes associated with gambling problems. Further, decisions may be reinforced 
by outcomes despite losses. For example, gamblers are likely to experience intermittent wins 
and motivating emotional outcomes regardless of overall loss, sustaining motivation to gamble. 
Emotional and self-regulation goals in particular are likely to contribute to downward spiralling 
into disordered gambling, since exposure to loss and problems are likely to trigger individuals to 
gamble to manage distress. 
 
Factors mediating or moderating risk perception  
 
Reinforcement, learning and experience 
 A majority of experts reported that various well-documented learning processes, 
involving exposure to sociocultural representations of gambling, and game reinforcement 
schedules contingent on game structural configurations (Brevers, et al., 2011), have significant, 
often unhelpful influence on gambler risk perception: 
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“We know that [games] are designed to engage people and to keep people playing with 
the intermittent reinforcement that is always present with gambling, and I think people's 
expectations become very distorted.” Expert 1 
 
“I think the single biggest factor seems to be exposure.” Expert 4 
 
Experts noted evidence of maladaptive distortion of risk perception processes with 
exposure to reinforcement, observed in neurophysiological (Brevers et al., 2011), cognitive 
(Toplak, Liu, MacPherson, Toneatto, & Stanovich, 2007), and behavioural change (Griffiths, 
1995), results in decreased volitional control (Toplak et al., 2007), attentional biases for positive 
and negative outcomes (Stanovich & West, 2008), and hypersensitivity to mental states and 
environmental triggers associated with gambling (Baudinet & Blaszczynski, 2012). In turn, the 
increasing automaticity of play decreases the mindfulness with which gamblers make choices, 
and leads to myopic life focus and approach to problem solving (Stanovich & West, 2008; 
Toplak et al., 2007). 
Participants argued that long term, repeated exposure to gambling is likely to lead to net 
loss based on structural configurations of commercially available games (Walker, 1998), and 
therefore also experience and awareness of negative game contingencies. Such experience was 
expected to be protective if it results in decreased motivation to gamble, or an increased risk 
management focus. However, gamblers may increase vulnerability to harm by avoiding 
responsibility for losses, suppressing negative perceptions, or focusing on non-monetary, 
‘emotional’ reasons for gambling. 
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Decisional context and available choice 
 A majority of experts made reference to evidence, that: (1) individuals’ sensitivity to 
contextual cues, along with the (2) contextual cues available to individuals, each influence risk 
perception in significant, often harmful ways (Baudinet & Blaszczynski, 2012). First, dispositional 
or learned sensitivities to internal and external contextual cues may trigger fluctuations in 
perceptions that increase vulnerability to harm. That is, gamblers exposed and sensitive to 
vulnerable emotional states, or other internal or environmental cues, are likely to make greater 
use of incidental information in decision-making, or give in to fantasies or urges to gamble, 
resulting in riskier choices:  
 
“Hope can initiate a session. I mean if things are looking dire for somebody financially, if 
their depression is related to a financial situation, then initiating a session based on the 
hope of winning can occur, and then certainly within session there would still be that 
factor of the hope of winning.” Expert 10 
  
 Second, the availability of gaming services and other environmental triggers, along with 
in-game structural configurations, influence the salience and motivational valence of risk 
perceptions that promote gambling. With exposure this may reinforce risk perceptions 
promoting continued gambling (Productivity Commission, 2010). Decisional context was 
therefore represented as potentially important to shaping and motivating increased or 
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continued gambling involvement, not only through the availability of behavioural options and 
triggers, but also by increasing individuals’ preoccupation and sensitivity to environmental cues 
and mental states with exposure.  
 
Implicit versus explicit cognition 
 Several experts cited the importance of implicit risk perception within gambling 
reasoning and decision-making. Gamblers may leave themselves vulnerable to harm not only 
via explicit reasoning errors (e.g., underestimating risk), but also by misapplying ‘automatic’ 
reasoning (e.g., applying ‘pattern recognition’ heuristics to random events), or ineffectively 
managing implicit processes with explicit reasoning (e.g., failing to inhibit implicit motivation or 
failing to correct implicit reasoning errors) (Coventry & Norman, 1998).  
 For example, common reasoning processes such as pattern recognition enable adaptive, 
quick judgment, but apply automatic reasoning prone to error dependent on correction by 
higher analyses. Gamblers that fail to apply, or: 
 
“…suppress the natural checking and controls, or oversight, imposed by high level 
cognitive, cortical processes are more susceptible just to that basic instinctual low level 
processing, which tends to be associated with forming false associations. You know, 
taking unrepresentative information as being more important than it really is and those 
sorts of things.” Expert 9 
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 How gamblers apply and resolve conflict between implicit and explicit risk perception 
has important implications for accurate risk estimation, and therefore for the riskiness of 
decisions and behaviour.  
 
Ambivalence and manipulation of risk data 
A majority of experts outlined ways that repeated, long term gambling provides a mix of 
positive and negative contingencies, particularly a tendency towards overall loss interrupted 
intermittently by wins. Long-term gamblers responses to ambivalent or dissonant experiences 
and perceptions of gambling were believed to have significant implications for risky decision-
making. Dominant negative perceptions motivate change or decreased gambling, likely to 
protect against harm. However, dominant positive perception, or difficulty accepting negative 
experiences, may trigger implicit or explicit strategies that amplify positive perceptions, reduce 
negative perceptions, or both. Gamblers may engage in mental rehearsal or fantasy around 
experience, blame others, or satisfice short-term goals (getting a bonus feature tonight) over 
long term goals (paying the rent tomorrow), or may adjust and increase the complexity of 
strategies rather than challenge faith in winning. Several experts noted that positive 
manipulation of risk perceptions may be highly motivating for gamblers with negative 
experiences, as a means of “neutralising their anxiety about their losses through the hope that 
they're going to win it back” (Expert 6). Alternatively: 
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“There’s a psychological protection that happens for people, that props up the belief that 
the win is going to happen for them. I think once you take it away it’s really, really scary 
psychological material.” Expert 8 
 
Positive manipulation strategies however, tend to further compound problems, distress, 
and dependence on gambling, by underestimating risk, increasing expenditure and motivation 
to gamble, and de-prioritising risk management strategies, particularly if gambling is an 
important emotion regulation or coping mechanism for individuals. 
 
Innate and developmental individual differences  
All experts discussed evidence that individual differences predispose gamblers to: (1) 
develop risk beliefs, and (2) process data, in ways that are more or less protective. The 
important role of individual differences in shaping risk perception, means that gambler 
presentations are highly idiosyncratic:  
 
“The problem I think generally that I've discovered with problem gamblers is that 
whatever theory you develop the next two or three clients will always disprove it, so I 
think it's very hard to nail it down to any particular population or to any particular 
variable that just happens. I think it's more a combination of variables, features that will 
push them in that direction.” Expert 1 
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Experts argued that evidence suggests “how someone gets culturally indoctrinated into 
a particular stream of gambling” is critical in the development of risk beliefs, and the 
consequent choices that gamblers make (Raylu & Oei, 2004) (Expert 8). Sociocultural 
representations of gambling contain various embedded values and causal explanations that 
shape decision making, by exposing individuals to particular associations with meaning. Socio-
demographic background (e.g., gender, ethnicity, experience of peer and familial interaction, 
mental illness, or socioeconomic hardship) is therefore important in the development of implicit 
and explicit beliefs about gambling causality, meaning, value, and strategic choice (e.g., 
concepts of luck, will, or fate) (Johannson  et al., 2009). 
 Similarly, a number of experiential and dispositional individual differences may 
unhelpfully influence risk perception and vulnerability to harm, according to processing 
differences that shape the salience and meaning of risk data. Experts cited a number of 
attributes that increase risky decision making, supported in the literature, such as: relative 
sensitivity to short-term rewards and punishment, processing biases, ability to delay 
gratification, emotion regulation needs, and vulnerable mental states. Such attributes are likely 
to influence other mediating or moderating risk perception factors, such as: individuals’ 
responsiveness to internal or external contextual cues, the likelihood of giving in to urges, 
fantasy, or deception, changeability of mental states, and the relative influences of implicit and 
explicit volitional control.  
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Discussion 
The current study has several important implications for theory and treatment of gambling 
disorder. Expert participants cited clinical experience and research showing the importance of 
lack of consideration for risk to disordered gambling. Gambling theories, however, commonly 
reduce harmful processes to exaggerated biases or errors, exaggerating overall positive 
expectations (Fortune & Goodie, 2011), or single dimensions (e.g., approach/avoidance) 
(Nussbaum, Honarmand, Govoni, Kalahani-Bargis, Bass, Ni, & LaForge, 2011), without due 
attention to: important risk perception factors, e.g. attention to harmful contingencies 
(Gillespie et al., 2007), variation in decision making across contexts and individuals (Moodie, 
2007), or interplay between perception, value attribution and other processes (Delfabbro, 2004; 
Delfabbro & Winefield 1999). Despite a clear role in literature addressing other risky behaviours 
(Goldberg & Fischhoff, 2000; Smith, Goldman, Greenbaum, & Christiansen, 1995), risk 
perception is referenced in only a handful of gambling studies (Wong & Tsang, 2012). It is likely 
therefore that more thorough investigation and integration into gambling models will improve 
prediction within disordered gambling models (Delfabbro & Winefield 1999).  
The present study also suggests that even the more detailed picture of risk perception 
represented in recent ‘outcome expectancy’ studies (Wickwire, Whelan, & Meyers, 2010), may 
unhelpfully reduce cognitions to ‘positive/negative’ valence, or categorical ‘types’ (e.g., social 
benefit), and thereby fail to completely capture the variable role expectations play in decision 
making. Results suggest that gamblers attribute more personally varied meaning and value to 
risk perceptions, based on complex personal dispositional and experiential factors (e.g., family 
history), and that these varied meanings shape how risk data is used to satisfice complex, 
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multifaceted goals. Therefore, there is clear need for future research to investigate how risk 
perception and meanings vary among individuals and cultural groups. 
In addition, historically, cognitive models of gambling have struggled to reliably and 
validly outline how observed perceptions relate to, or predict decisions. Cognitive gambling 
research, limited by the poor ecological validity of laboratory experiments (Rachlin, 1990; 
Wagenaar, 1988), controversial normative assumptions of naturalistic studies (Delfabbro, 
2004), and limited utility of extant psychometric measurement (Strong, Breen, & Lejuez, 2004), 
nevertheless acknowledges variation in decision making across contexts (Delfabbro & 
Winefield, 1999) and over the short and long term (LaPlante, Nelson, LaBrie, & Shaffer, 2008). 
Future research is needed to explore and model how gamblers satisfy multiple, individually 
varied strategic goals, in the context of complex motivational, environmental, and cognitive 
demands (e.g., decisional context, game structural configurations, personality, implicit and 
explicit processing). 
The findings of this study also have important implications for psycho-educative and 
other interventions for gambling disorder. Gambling assessment and treatment would benefit 
from: expanding treatment models to include multifactorial risk perception concepts; 
identifying and targeting personally-relevant risk belief, motivation, and strategy ‘vulnerability’ 
factors, along with relevant moderating and mediating factors; identifying and amplifying 
individuals’ ‘protection’ factors; and potentially to identify holistic patterns among vulnerability 
and protection factors, such that, critical vulnerability factors are addressed, and protective 
factors are strategically employed to override vulnerability factors.  
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Future directions, limitations 
Mental models theory outlines valuable, future steps for developing a comprehensive 
model of gambling risk perception and decision making, following on from the findings of this 
study. Specifically, expert risk concepts should be tested among lay gamblers using qualitative 
and quantitative methods, and this data should be used to develop tailored intervention 
(Morgan et al., 2002).  
The themes presented in the current study focused primarily on risk perception and 
decision making affecting gambling behaviour, due in part to selection processes for 
participants and research questions. Further research regarding risky gambling decision making 
may also benefit from investigation of how types of factors affecting gambling behaviour that 
were not considered in the current study interact with risk perception and cognition to 
generate harm (e.g., psychobiological, sociological, or actuarial vulnerability factors for 
gambling disorder) (Andrews, Bonta, & Wormith, 2006).  
 
Conclusions 
Findings suggest that perception, evaluation, and utilisation of risk information may play 
an important role in the development of disordered gambling, powerfully mediated or 
moderated by individuals’ location within a dispositional, socio-cultural context. The current 
study is the first to discuss the role of value and meaning in gambling risk perception.  
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CHAPTER 6: Gambler risk perception: A mental model and grounded theory analysis 
 
 
This chapter was accepted for publication in the Journal of Gambling Studies. 
 
Reference: 
Spurrier, M., Blaszczynski, A., & Rhodes, P. (2014b). Gambler risk perception: A mental model 
and grounded theory analysis. Journal of Gambling Studies, DOI 10.1007/s10899-013-
9439-9. 
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Introduction 
Despite the paucity of studies and methodological limitations associated with cross-
sectional and self-report data (Baron & Kenny, 1986; Weinstein, 2007), risk perception research 
suggests that gamblers’ perceptions of negative consequences play an important role in 
decision-making, behaviour, and disordered gambling aetiology (Spurrier & Blaszczynski, 2013). 
Several studies have demonstrated a functional relationship between disordered gambling and 
a mix of positive (‘material gain’, ‘social benefits’) and negative expectations (‘loss of control’) 
(Gillespie, Derevensky, & Gupta, 2007;  Wickwire, Whelan, & Meyers, 2010), along with lower 
overall risk expectancies (Derevensky, Sklar, Gupta, & Messerlian, 2010; Inglin & Gmel, 2011).  
It appears disordered gamblers maintain greater optimism about gambling, despite 
greater experience and expectation of at least some negative consequences (Wong & Tsang, 
2012; Wickwire, Whelan, West, Meyers, McCausland, & Luellen, 2007; Yi & Kanetkar, 2010), 
implying disordered gambling cannot simply be explained by gamblers overestimating positive 
outcomes, or personal control (Fortune & Goodie, 2011; Toneatto, 1999). Instead, both positive 
and negative perceptions independently influence perception of risk (Wickwire, Whelan, West, 
Meyers, McCausland, & Luellen, 2007; Yi & Kanetkar, 2010), and disordered gamblers 
preference or amplify positive representations of gambling, discount negative perceptions, or 
both, to hold more optimistic overall viewpoints consistent with motivation to gamble (Gillespie 
et al., 2007; Wickwire et al., 2010), presenting a picture of gambling risk perception compatible 
with findings in related drug, alcohol, and offending research (Goldstein, Craig, Bechara, 
Garavan, Childress, & Paulus, 2009; Jones, Corbin, & Fromme, 2001; Leigh, 1999; Rinn, Desai, 
Rosenblatt, & Gastfriend, 2002). 
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Study two (chapter five) applied a mental models and grounded theory methodology to 
develop a ‘map’, outlining the role of risk perception on gambling decision making and 
behaviour, based on experts’ evaluation of relevant research and clinical experience (Morgan et 
al., 2002; Strauss & Corbin, 1994, 1998). The expert ‘map’ identified a number of factors 
influencing risky decision-making, relating to risk perception and how context influenced use of 
risk data.  
The current study aimed to test this expert ‘map’, via interviews with regular gamblers 
that: detail lay risk perception concepts, compares lay concepts against expert map content, 
and identifies benign and maladaptive systematic gaps or errors in lay mental models of 
gambling held by recreational versus disordered gamblers.  
 
Method 
 
Participants 
Fifteen regular gamblers participated in a second phase of data collection (5 females, 
Mf=22.40 years, SDf=3.58 years; 10 males, Mm=29.80 years, SDm =16.53 years, t(13)=.972, 
p=.349). Participants were only included if they: spoke fluent English; were over 18 years of age; 
gambled at least once a week for the past two months or for any period greater than five years. 
Participants were invited to participate via face-to-face contact or third party referral. Three 
participants were recruited through gambling treatment clinics, eleven through the University 
of Sydney undergraduate psychology student research participation program, and one was 
referred by a previous participant.  
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Three gamblers accepted initial invitations and completed the first round of interviews. 
Following preliminary interview analysis, ten of thirteen further volunteers were accepted as 
participants based on provided demographics information, with the goal of maximally 
diversifying perspectives within the data. Again, two additional interviews were finally recruited 
at saturation, to check that no new themes or concepts emerged (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). 
Table 6 lists participants’ descriptive information. Pseudonyms were used for all 
participants to protect anonymity.  
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Table 6 
Lay gambler descriptive and demographic information 
Pseudonym Age Sex Identified Ethnicity Relationship status Gambling experience Gambling treatment Recruitment PGSI  Gambling Status 
Tim 54 M Anglo-Australian Single horse racing, EGMs, keno; (>5 years)  Hypnotherapy, cognitive therapy, counselling Clinic  20 Problem  
Marcel 19 M Anglo-Australian Never Married EGMs  Student  3 Moderate  
Simon 19 M Lebanese-Australian Never Married EGMs  Student 2 Low risk 
Colin 19 M Italian-Australian Never Married EGMs  Student 3 Moderate  
Lewis 23 M Anglo-Australian Living with Partner EGMs  Student 12 Problem 
Roger 20 M Ukrainian-Australian Never Married EGMs, lottery  Student 2 Low risk 
Gene 59 M Anglo-Australian Never Married EGMs, keno; (>5 years)  Cognitive therapy Clinic 24 Problem 
Martin 19 M Anglo-Australian Never Married Blackjack, EGMs  Student 13 Problem 
Joslyn 19 F  Anglo-Australian Never Married EGMs  Student 0 Low risk 
Steven 47 M Anglo-Australian Divorced EGMs, horse-racing; (>5 years)  Cognitive behavioural  therapy Clinic 14 Problem 
Sarah   25 F Lebanese-Australian Engaged EGMs, poker; (>5 years)  Snowball 1 Low risk 
Wendy 19 F Chinese Never Married EGMs, pachinko, mahjong (>5 years)  Student 4 Moderate  
Claude 19 M Anglo-Australian Never Married Poker, EGMs  Student 6 Moderate  
Susan 27 F Korean Never Married EGMs  Student 2 Low risk 
Victoria 22 F European-Australian Never Married EGMs  Student 6 Moderate  
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Measures 
Fourteen semi-structured interviews were conducted in person and one by telephone 
(Morgan, Fischhoff, Bostrom, & Atman, 2002; Strauss & Corbin, 1994, 1998). Initial interview 
questions were open-ended and explored participants’ beliefs about the content and influence 
of risk perception cognition (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Coding overlapped with interviews such 
that as analysis developed interview content and participant selection was modified to affirm, 
modify, add, elaborate, clarify, and find exceptions in emerging themes (Strauss & Corbin, 
1994). Interviews lasted 30-90 minutes. With the permission of the participants, all interviews 
were digitally audio-recorded and transcribed.  
Participants also completed a demographics questionnaire and the Problem Gambling 
Severity Index (PGSI; Ferris & Wynne, 2001). The demographics questionnaire gathered details 
about: age, gender, ethnicity, and relationship status, gambling and gambling treatment 
experience. The PGSI is a nine-item self-report subscale of the Canadian Problem Gambling 
Index (CPGI; Ferris & Wynne, 2001) measuring severity of problem gambling (low risk, moderate 
risk, or problem gambling). The CPGI has been found to be reliable (Cronbach’s alpha = .84, test-
retest reliability =.78) (Ferris & Wynne, 2001).  
Following conventions, lay gambler participants were classified into gambling subtypes 
according to their PGSI scores (0-2 = non-problem/low risk gambler; 3-7 = moderate risk 
gambler; ≥8 = problem gambler), with five participants meeting criteria for each subtype (Ferris 
& Wynne, 2001).  
 
 
122 
 
Procedure 
The study combined the Mental Models (MM) approach to risk perception evaluation 
(Morgan et al., 2002), with data collection and interpretation based in Grounded Theory (GT) 
(Strauss & Corbin, 1994, 1998).  
Traditionally, the MM methodology has been applied to hazard evaluation on the 
assumption that: users are entirely motivated by safety; users hold similar mental models 
evaluating risk; and that risk factors follow predictable, consistent physical laws (Morgan et al., 
2002). Gambling differs from hazards typically evaluated using the MM approach (e.g., radon 
gas, nuclear contamination, physical illness) in several important ways (Bostrom, Fischhoff, & 
Morgan, 1992; Maharik & Fischhoff, 1993). Gamblers may hold additional variable motivations 
to notions of safety, for example, winning money (Binde, 2009; Lee, Chae, Lee, & Kim, 2007). 
Gamblers fall into clearly identifiable subgroups of recreational and disordered users, with 
systematic differences in cognitive functioning, and consequently, mental models (Raylu & Oei, 
2002). Similarly, evidence suggests that gambler cognition varies systematically according to: 
preferred game type (Blaszczynski & Nower, 2002); experience (Hodgins, 2001); and other 
individual differences (Johansson, Grant, Kim, Odlaug, & Gotestam, 2009; Raylu & Oei, 2002). 
Strategies were employed to control for the above factors. Participants were selectively 
recruited to reflect a broad range of backgrounds (e.g., gender, age, socio-economic status, 
length of gambling career) and exposure to problems with gambling (i.e., low risk, moderate 
risk, or problem gambling).  
The study followed the step-by-step MM procedure outlined by Morgan et al. (2002), 
following on from study two (chapter five). Lay gamblers completed interviews and 
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questionnaires to: (1) identify the content of lay risk perception, (2) compare lay concepts 
against an expert map (outlined in chapter five), and (3) identify systematic gaps or errors in lay 
mental models of gambling held by recreational versus disordered gamblers, compared to the 
comprehensive expert map. The University of Sydney Human Research Ethics Committee 
approved the conduct of the study. 
 
Data analysis 
NVivo qualitative data analysis software was used to apply open, axial and selective 
coding analyses (QSR International, Version 9; Richards, 2005; Strauss & Corbin, 1994, 1998). 
Coded concepts were arranged chronologically to enable processes to emerge, after which data 
was subject to open coding. As the interviews progressed, recurrent themes were explored in 
subsequent interviews to enable theoretical sampling. Conceptual relationships were 
assembled through a process of axial coding whereby initial categories were linked to 
subcategories along the lines of their properties and dimensions. Finally, selective coding 
integrated and refined final categories, in order to provide a detailed, complete explanation of 
situated gambling risk perception. Two additional participants confirmed that theoretical 
saturation was achieved.  
 
Controlling for bias  
Several strategies were employed to reduce potential researcher bias based on Chiovitti 
and Piran's (2003) recommendations. Interview paradigms were initially based on open 
questions. The author kept notes during interview, transcription, and analysis, to detail 
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emergent concepts and identify potential personal bias. At the same time, participants’ own 
language was used where possible to label and describe concepts. Following initial coding, two 
randomly selected interviews were blind-coded by a co-author, and used to refine coding and 
theory development. Finally, within-interview member checking tested interviewer 
interpretation of participant data.  
 
Results 
 
Overview of lay gambler perspectives on risk perception  
Gamblers’ accounts of risk perception, decision-making and behaviour generally 
supported ‘vulnerability’ and ‘protection’ factors identified as relevant within the expert map 
outlined in chapter five. Table 7 outlines each participant’s vulnerability and protection factors 
based on interview data.  
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Table 7 
Participant vulnerability and protection factors 
Pseudonym 
 
Estimation & 
expectancy 
Meaning & motivation Strategic planning Reinforcement, learning 
& exposure 
Decisional context & 
available choice 
Implicit vs. explicit 
cognition 
Ambivalence & 
manipulation of risk 
data 
Innate & developmental 
individual differences 
Non-problem & low risk gamblers 
 
Roger  Accurate or cautious 
risk estimation  
High value attributed 
to risk management 
Low emphasis or 
negative attributions 
towards gambling  
Consistent, high risk 
management emphasis  
 
 Availability of internal 
or external triggers  
   
Joslyn  Accurate or cautious 
risk estimation  
Low emphasis or 
negative attributions 
towards gambling 
Consistent, high risk 
management emphasis  
 
 Availability of internal 
or external triggers  
 
   
Simon  Accurate or cautious 
risk estimation  
High value attributed 
to risk management 
Low emphasis or 
negative attributions 
towards gambling 
Consistent, high risk 
management emphasis  
 
     
Susan  Accurate or cautious 
risk estimation  
High value attributed 
to risk management 
Low emphasis or 
negative attributions 
towards gambling  
Consistent, high risk 
management emphasis  
 
 
     
Sarah  Inaccurate risk 
estimation  
High value attributed 
to risk management 
Competing gambling-
inconsistent goals  
High value attributed to 
risky gambling goals  
Consistent, high risk 
management emphasis  
Significant exposure to 
reinforcement 
schedules 
 Implicit reasoning 
problems 
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Moderate risk gamblers 
 
Marcel  Inaccurate risk 
estimation  
High value attributed to 
risky gambling goals  
Presence of intense 
urges to gamble 
Insufficient risk 
management emphasis 
 Availability of internal 
or external triggers  
 
Hypersensitivity to 
gambling cues 
  
Colin  Accurate or cautious 
risk estimation  
High value attributed to 
risky gambling goals 
Difficulty resisting 
impulse to gamble  
Consistent, high risk 
management emphasis  
Exposure to high value 
representations of 
gambling  
Availability of internal 
or external triggers  
 
  Individual differences 
amplifying vulnerability 
factors 
Victoria  Inaccurate risk 
estimation  
High value attributed to 
risky gambling goals 
Difficulty resisting 
impulse to gamble  
Consistent, high risk 
management emphasis 
 Availability of internal 
or external triggers  
   
Wendy  Inaccurate risk 
estimation  
High value attributed to 
risky gambling goals 
Insufficient risk 
management emphasis  
Significant exposure to 
reinforcement 
schedules 
Exposure to high value 
representations of 
gambling  
Availability of internal 
or external triggers  
 
Hypersensitivity to 
gambling cues 
 Individual differences 
amplifying vulnerability 
factors 
Claude  Inaccurate risk 
estimation  
High value attributed to 
risky gambling goals 
Insufficient risk 
management emphasis  
Exposure to high value 
representations of 
gambling  
Availability of internal 
or external triggers  
 
Hypersensitivity to 
gambling cues 
 Individual differences 
amplifying vulnerability 
factors 
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Problem gamblers 
 
Tim  *Accurate or cautious 
risk estimation 
*High value attributed 
to risky gambling goals  
Presence of intense 
urges to gamble 
 
*Consistent, high risk 
management emphasis 
Exposure to meaningful 
negative consequences  
Significant exposure to 
reinforcement 
schedules  
Availability of internal 
or external triggers  
Presence of risky 
mental states or 
significant stressors 
Implicit reasoning 
problems  
Increasing automaticity 
of gambling with 
experience 
*Perceptual or 
attentional distortion 
 
Individual differences 
amplifying vulnerability 
factors 
Steven  *Accurate or cautious 
risk estimation  
*High value attributed 
to risk management  
Presence of intense 
urges to gamble 
 
*Consistent, high risk 
management emphasis 
Exposure to meaningful 
negative consequences 
 Significant exposure to 
reinforcement 
schedules  
Availability of internal 
or external triggers  
Presence of risky 
mental states or 
significant stressors 
Increasing automaticity 
of gambling with 
experience 
*Perceptual or 
attentional distortion 
Individual differences 
amplifying vulnerability 
factors  
Gene  *Accurate or cautious 
risk estimation  
*High value attributed 
to risk management  
High value attributed to 
risky gambling goals  
Presence of intense 
urges to gamble 
*Consistent, high risk 
management emphasis 
Exposure to meaningful 
negative consequences  
Significant exposure to 
reinforcement 
schedules  
Availability of internal 
or external triggers  
Presence of risky 
mental states or 
significant stressors 
Increasing automaticity 
of gambling with 
experience 
 Individual differences 
amplifying vulnerability 
factors 
Martin  Inaccurate risk 
estimation 
Low emphasis or value 
attributed to risk 
management  
High value attributed to 
risky gambling goals 
Difficulty resisting 
impulse to gamble  
Presence of intense 
urges to gamble 
Insufficient risk 
management emphasis 
Exposure to high value 
representations of 
gambling  
 
Availability of internal 
or external triggers  
 
 
  Individual differences 
amplifying vulnerability 
factors 
Lewis  Accurate or cautious 
risk estimation  
High value attributed to 
risky gambling goals  
Difficulty resisting 
impulse to gamble  
Presence of intense 
urges to gamble 
Increasing will to 
manipulate risk 
perception 
Insufficient risk 
management emphasis 
Exposure to high value 
representations of 
gambling  
 
Availability of internal 
or external triggers  
Presence of risky 
mental states or 
significant stressors 
 
Increasing automaticity 
of gambling with 
experience 
Perceptual or 
attentional distortion 
Individual differences 
amplifying vulnerability 
factors 
*All three treatment experienced gamblers noted a significant shift in risk beliefs and distortions over the course of treatment from initially highly inaccurate risk perception. 
128 
 
The majority of non-problem/low risk gamblers consistently indicated either absence of 
vulnerability factors, or presence of protection factors, along with few mediating/moderating 
factors. Reciprocally, the majority of problem gamblers described vulnerability factors relevant 
all risk perception and many mediating/moderating factors. Moderate risk gambler 
presentations were more varied than non-problem/low risk or problem gamblers, presenting 
with a mix of vulnerability and protection factors relevant to both risk perception and 
mediating/moderating factors.   
In approximately nine of fifteen cases, vulnerability or protection risk perception factors 
consistently correlated with each other, and matched predicted subgroup membership. That is, 
protective risk beliefs, evaluation, strategic planning and non-problem/low risk gambling 
correlated with each other; with equivalent correlations between risk perception vulnerability, 
and moderate/problem gambler status. In all cases, at least one vulnerability or protection 
factor related to expected group membership. That is, moderate risk and problem gamblers 
held at least one identifiable vulnerability factor, while non-problem/low risk gamblers held at 
least one protection factor. In describing narratives about gambling, all gamblers were able to 
reflect on the causal influences between risk perceptions, the role of risk perceptions in 
decisions, the significance of mediating/moderating factors to risk perception, and the manner 
in which contradictory vulnerability and protection factors overrode each other. 
Gamblers varied considerably both in idiosyncratic descriptions of expert concepts, and 
the vulnerability and protection factors described, even among members of the same clinical 
subgroup. Instead, gamblers across subgroups described one or more, but never all, possible 
vulnerability or protection factors. A personalised ‘profile’ approach, incorporating a limited 
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number of personally relevant factors is therefore likely to be more appropriate than a general 
model, with vulnerability and protection factors applicable to all gamblers, or particular 
subgroups, contrary to common models in the literature.  
 
Non-problem/Low Problem gamblers 
 
Risk perception 
Four of five non-problem/low risk gamblers described risk perception factors with 
consistent, protective or benign influence on decision making: high expectations of negative or 
low expectations of positive outcomes compared to other gambler groups. However, a majority 
of individuals did not present detailed views about possible outcomes, instead conflating 
expectations into a generally pessimistic attitude towards likely outcomes that reciprocally 
influenced meanings, evaluations and strategic planning. For example:  
 
“I didn't really think that much about it. I just, I'm not a big fan of gambling... In the long-
term, if you look at all the money you put in, you probably wouldn't have won it back... 
It's just a chance thing. That's why I think I don't put a lot of money on it, because there 
is no kind of logical way you could win”. Joslyn (19, F)  
 
“The very reason I don’t play them very much is because I don’t think you can really win 
on them.” Simon, (19, M) 
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 In the majority of cases, gamblers causal beliefs, though benign or even protective, were 
inaccurate or vague. For example, Roger (20, M) described vague, erroneous beliefs about 
gaming machine return-to-player percentage underlying pessimistic expectations and low 
expenditure (Harrigan, Dixon, MacLaren, Collins, & Fugelsang, 2011): 
 
“The percentage back is really small. It's, like, under thirty percent or something, around 
thirty percent... It's ridiculous - twenty percent over a period…” Roger (20, M) 
 
 Nevertheless, compared to other gamblers, non-problem/low risk gamblers more 
frequently acknowledged subjectivity or fallibility of personal knowledge, and more clearly 
differentiated hopes as something distinct from expectations. For example: 
 
“I don’t believe in luck. It’s more like hope because it doesn’t seem to have a pattern.” 
Susan (27, F)  
 
Four of five non-problem/low risk gamblers stated that, as a consequence of 
expectations, motivation behind decision making emphasised risk management (e.g., limiting 
losses) over other non-monetary but positive motives (e.g., fun and socialising), based on 
consistent, pre-planned strategies that limit expenditure: 
 
“When I'm walking into the pokies room, I just tell myself, like, ‘this is the limit’. 
Whatever it is, I say, ‘twenty bucks is the max you're going to put in’. Obviously I'm 
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thinking about getting more beers for later. I don't think about, I know a lot of other 
gamblers do, I don't really think about gambling to win. I just think about, ‘alright, we're 
just having some fun on the pokies’, I'm not thinking about trying to, uh, obviously you'd 
like to win, but it's just for a bit of fun - something to do when you're in the pub. I've 
probably gone over a little bit, but it would probably only be like five or ten bucks. That'd 
be quite rare as well.” Roger (20, M) 
 
Overall, non-problem/low risk gamblers presented more similarly to each other than did 
members of other subgroups. Only one individual, Sarah (25, F), described risk perceptions that 
were functionally different to those so far described. Unlike other non-problem/low risk 
gamblers, Sarah (25, F) described an optimistic overall view of gambling, high expectation of 
personal control, skill, and winning, low expectation of negative consequences, with high 
personal importance and arousal attached to winning money and emotional outcomes, and 
strong emphasis on strategies aimed at winning. However, Sarah (25, F) also described strict, 
sustainable spending limits that overrode all other play strategies when limits were reached. 
 
Mediating and moderating factors 
A majority of non-problem/low risk gamblers were relatively less affected than other 
gamblers by mediating factors (that changed the influence of risk perception on decision 
making), or moderating factors (that partitioned risk perception variables according to their 
influence on decision making) (Baron & Kenny, 1986). Non-problem/low risk gamblers took 
greater personal responsibility for losses, with only two of five non-problem/low risk gamblers 
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stating that occasional rule breaking resulted in larger than planned losses, due to alcohol 
consumption, boredom, peer influence or other factors. Again Sarah (25, F), unlike other non-
problem/low risk gamblers, described greater influence on risk perception and decision making 
by mediating/moderating factors, including: evidence of greater exposure to reinforcement, 
memory biased for positive outcomes, and mood states that triggered initiation of gambling.  
 
Moderate risk gamblers 
 
Risk perception 
 Moderate compared to non-problem/low risk gamblers described risk perceptions 
implying greater vulnerability to harm, though vulnerability factors appeared less consistently 
correlated than among problem gamblers. Four of five moderate risk gamblers admitted to 
similar assessments of the likelihood of negative outcomes (e.g., losing money), but also that 
they rarely reflected on this information when making decisions. Overall, moderate risk 
gamblers described more optimistic expectations, along with causal beliefs justifying riskier win-
directed gambling - used in part to justify lack of reflection on negative contingencies.  
Moderate and non-problem/low risk gamblers attributed similar positive qualities and 
goals when justifying motivation to gamble. However, moderate risk gamblers described 
experiences with greater emotional intensity, referring frequently for example, to the “thrill of 
winning” and the excitement, concentration and focus they felt while gambling (Colin, 19, M). 
Similarly, descriptions of mental rehearsal, fantasy or hope were more positive and emotional 
in tone, demonstrating less reflection on the mechanics determining likely outcomes: 
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“I think the risk of it is fun as well. It's not just about making money. It's about surprise, 
that element of surprise, or that element of ‘it's a possibility’.” Victoria (22, F) 
 
Moderate risk gamblers also reported prioritising play strategies associated with 
different motivational goals than non-problem/low risk gamblers, often emphasising shorter 
term, specific, more immediate emotional or monetary goals over long term risk management. 
Like non-problem/low risk gamblers, a majority of moderate risk gamblers used behavioural 
rules to limit spending (e.g., playing only when in the company of peers), though often setting 
higher monetary limits (absolute, and as proportion of income), based on more complex, less 
consistent rules. For example, initially Wendy (19, F) described her strategy to limit spending as:  
 
“Tonight I only want to spend $200, and not spend more. You never take a card with you. 
Otherwise you’re going to lose more.” Wendy (19, F) 
 
Although, later in her interview, she reflected on a more complex method for reaching a 
higher limit, based on her potential pattern of loss: 
 
“The first time I would always take out small amounts of money, like fifties, but after that 
up to two hundred. If I still lose I will take the money up to five hundred. If I still lose, but 
not all of the five hundred, maybe four hundred, I will stop for the night. I will think 
‘tonight is no good’. Nobody wins all their money back all the time, so if you win once at 
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one place, you try a second place to see if you have good luck, but if not, then I change to 
another machine.” Wendy (19, F) 
 
Mediating and moderating factors 
Overall, moderate risk gamblers described less consistent, riskier decision making, both 
in risk perception or interpretation, and in the satisficing of goals or strategies. All moderate risk 
gamblers reported that decision-making may fluctuate with exposure to mental cues (alcohol 
intoxication, feelings of loneliness, confidence and boredom), and external cues (proximity to 
venues or peers, reaching preset spending limits, particular in-game events). Three of five 
moderate risk gamblers reported difficulty resisting the urge to gamble, even when mindful of 
likely negative outcomes. Common cues (alcohol, boredom, reaching spending limits) and 
implicit urges were reported to linger longer and be more influential on the decision making 
among moderate compared to non-problem/low risk gamblers, leading to spontaneous, often 
overwhelming urges to gamble, and prioritisation of  riskier strategies (e.g., increasing bet sizes, 
ignoring preset spending limits, borrowing money): 
 
“Alcohol would be my main influence, big time, especially when you're out and you're 
spending money. You're thinking, ‘well, this is a good idea’, at the time, ‘I might be able 
to make some money’. You also don't really have a bigger picture of how much you're 
actually losing, because you’re under the influence of alcohol, and you're also enjoying 
yourself and having fun at the same time.” Victoria (22, F) 
 
135 
 
Three of five moderate risk gamblers described historical factors associated with 
increased risk of vulnerability to either harmful risk perceptions, or inconsistent decision 
making, such as: an early history of gambling, substantial early career wins, and normalization 
or high valuation of gambling by close family members (Johansson, Grant, Kim, Odlaug, & 
Gotestam, 2009; Raylu & Oei, 2002). Although, only one gambler reported gambling for an 
extended or prolonged period - in this case, more than two years. 
 
Problem gamblers 
 
Risk perception  
All individuals meeting criteria for problem gambling described risk perception and 
mediating/moderating vulnerability factors. Three of five individuals (Tim, 54, M; Gene, 59, M; 
Steven, 47, M) had engaged in cognitive behavioural therapy for gambling, leading to recovery 
from symptoms. Treatment experienced individuals demonstrated similarities distinguishing 
them from other problem gamblers: personally significant problems leading to treatment 
seeking (e.g., suicidality, self-harm, relationship breakdown, large financial debts); beliefs, prior 
to treatment, that were vague or erroneous, supporting overestimation of positive outcomes, 
underestimation of negative outcomes, and overall excessive optimism; and, with treatment, 
significantly reduced positive, and increased negative expectations, decreased explicit valuation 
of gambling, and increased volitional control despite residual urges: 
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“Until [my therapist] explained it all, it was because everybody else was making a noise. 
It was the expectation of winning, thinking, ‘oh well, everything's going off’, not knowing 
how they're programmed, and how they work, and randomness, and probability. So it's 
strange, I could walk into a pub, or a club, or sit at a poker machine by myself and just 
play away merrily.” Tim (54, M) 
 
 Treatment inexperienced problem gamblers (Martin, 19, M; Lewis, 23, M) were 
comparatively younger, and less experienced than other group members. Similar to treated 
gamblers, James described erroneous concepts of causality (overestimation of positive, 
underestimation of negative outcomes) related to consequent high value attributed to 
gambling, and risky strategising. However, Daniel, unlike other problem, and many moderate 
gamblers, endorsed low expectation of winning or positive outcomes, and high expectation of 
losing or negative outcomes. 
Regardless of background and beliefs, all problem gambling group members reported 
gambling to regulate emotions (stimulation, excitement, boredom relief) and to win money, 
describing more intense motivation to play than other participants. Consequently, all problem 
gamblers described using strategies aimed primarily at emotion regulation and winning. 
Although, treatment experienced gamblers noted that they currently prioritised risk 
management strategies developed during treatment. Only one recovered problem gambler 
(Gene, 59, M) described attempting to use spending limits to reduce risk prior to treatment. All 
treated gamblers were currently abstinent or gambling at a low level, sustainable at their 
current income: 
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“The attraction's still there. It's something that I've had there for a long time in my life. I 
don't take drugs or anything like that. I do smoke cigarettes. I don't find myself wanting 
to go and get that extra fifty and go back so much, if you understand what I mean. The 
old [Gene] used to think of ways of going and getting some more money and returning 
straight away. I tend to go with what I've got and leave it at that.” Gene (59, M) 
 
Mediating and moderating factors 
Compared to low and moderate risk gamblers, problem gambling group members 
described greater intensity, number and influence of vulnerability factors associated with risk 
perception mediation/moderation. However, the relevance of particular factors varied 
considerably among individuals. Overall, problem gamblers described similar types of 
contextual influences as moderate risk gamblers (e.g., boredom, loneliness, alcohol, low mood, 
game events, proximity of venues and peers) though with a greater likelihood and intensity of 
arousing urges to gamble, and therefore with more powerful influence over gambling decisions: 
 
“I do a lot of designated driving for my mates. If I’m there as well I might put on $10, 
$20, just because I’m not drinking so I can afford it. I don’t sort of think in my head, ‘I 
don’t need to put it in, I can just save it’, I say, ‘I’ve got the money on me I may as well 
spend it’. It sort of lures you in a little bit. It’s the way, this is the way I always thought of 
it, because I always think of this when I’m at home when I’m bored. Like, the way the 
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machines are set up to look like they’re features, like a fun gaming opportunity. It’s very 
sneaky.” Martin (19, M) 
 
“When you drink it’s the worst. Alcohol just destroys your mind, you just, like, you lose all 
your inhibitions. You’re like, ‘oh, what’s another $20?’” Martin (19, M) 
 
All group members noted changes in gambling cognition and behaviour over time, 
including: increasing exposure to reinforcement and negative consequences, more powerful 
urges to play often competing with conscious motivation, and greater mood, appraisal, and 
volitional fluctuation in response to contextual cues (e.g., intense feelings of regret, shame, or 
suicidality after losing money). Group members described higher rates of background risk 
factors (Johannson et al., 2009), often representative of more significant life problems 
predisposing individuals to vulnerable risk perceptions (e.g., substantial mental illness or 
trauma). Three of five group members also acknowledged that deception or denial of problems 
had had a significant influence over risk perceptions (e.g., amplifying positive, minimizing 
negative expectations), and decision-making: 
 
“I liked the encouraging aspect of the ‘random’ part. I'm not a great fan of the 
‘probability’ part. So, I'll sit there and accept the fact that I randomly I can walk into a 
machine, put a dollar in, and just hit one go for one credit, and the big jackpot would 
come up. The probability of it, being so remote, doesn't occur to me, because I see the 
randomness of it, so as far as you're concerned, I can accidentally trip over and just press 
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a button that's got two coins on it. So, I try to associate, or dis-associate I suppose, the 
probability from the randomness.” Tim (54, M) 
  
 Problem gambler Daniel presented a coherent, detailed narrative outlining his risk 
perceptions and their relationship with problematic gambling, in a similar way to many of the 
treated gamblers. Daniel reported that he had mostly negative memories and expectations of 
gambling. However, if enough time passed since his last gambling session, regret and other 
attributions about losses would dissipate, leaving him vulnerable to particular mental 
(boredom, being alone, perception of the close proximity of venues) and environmental cues 
(seeing gambling images), triggering positive perceptions and fantasies, increasing motivation 
to gamble. Daniel noted that he would then attempt to rationalise gambling, minimising 
negative, and amplifying positive expectations, thereby further increasing his motivation, 
reducing volitional control, often leading to harmful gambling sessions: 
 
“That idea of, “maybe you could win” comes back in. And the negative feeling, maybe I 
push it down subconsciously, deliberately. I'm not sure. But those negative feelings sort 
of dissipate... I usually try and rationalise, ‘it would be good to win this money to do this’. 
I think I use that, more as an excuse too. But I think deep down, it's the idea of winning 
really big that's exciting - getting the actual jackpot or whatever... The temptation to 
keep playing and hopefully win just sort of wins in the end.” Lewis (23, M) 
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Discussion 
 
Positive versus negative risk perceptions 
Perception of ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ consequences conveyed distinct influence on 
decision making and behaviour. Detailed, consistent, heightened expectation of negative 
outcomes (e.g., losing money), and consistent, low erudition, expectation, and emphasis on 
positive outcomes (e.g., excitement, peer interaction), contributed independently to fewer 
gambling problems, while reciprocal, equivalent expectations contributed to problematic 
gambling. Strength of convictions was associated with level of problems, or lack thereof. A 
majority of gamblers outlined coherent narratives outlining content and reciprocal causal 
influence between gambling risk perceptions, mediating/moderating factors, decision-making, 
behaviour, and consequences.  
Mental models and grounded theory analysis identified important between individual, 
and between group differences. Equivalent with the findings of this study, a number of drug and 
alcohol studies support the independent influence of positive and negative outcome 
expectancies and preferences in riskier behaviour and substance dependence, and in the 
reciprocal influence of substance use experience on risk perception (Aarons, Brown, Stice, & 
Coe, 2001; Leigh, 1999; Smith, Goldman, Greenbaum, & Christiansen, 1995). Gambling risk 
perception research has been limited to date, though is also broadly consistent with the current 
findings, and findings in related disciplines (Derevensky, et al., 2010; Inglin & Gmel, 2011; 
Gillespie, et al. 2007).  
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However, the current findings also suggest gamblers attribute meaning to risk 
perception in individually and contextually varied ways, incompatible with normative views of 
rationality (Delfabbro, 2004; Delfabbro & Winefield, 1999). Gamblers across groups described 
varied interpretations of behaviours, events, outcomes, causation, thought processes and 
content - relating interpretations to context-dependent, personally meaningful, short or long 
term goals. For example, Victoria (22, F, moderate risk gambler) described risk under 
uncertainty as exciting and positively motivating, while another gambler, Tim (54, M, problem 
gambler), ashamed of earlier life events, described gambling losses and problems as a means of 
deserved, self-inflicted punishment. Nevertheless, many gamblers noted risk and loss as 
important disincentives justifying careful spending limits (e.g., Joslyn, 19, F, low risk gambler). 
Therefore, even ‘risk’ itself, or loss of money, was not seen universally as an inherently 
‘negative’ outcome. However, in the few gambling studies investigating outcome expectancy 
(Wong & Tsang, 2012), outcomes were typically pre-categorised, according to normative 
assumptions about motivational value, rather than reflecting idiosyncratic interpretation 
(Mischel, 2004; Moodie, 2007). Here, findings suggest that difficulties in predicting real world 
gambling behaviour according to current gambling decision making theories (Fortune & Goodie, 
2011) may be due to unrealistic reduction, or generalisation, or that it is incorrect to assume all 
disordered gamblers adhere to a common set of irrational, biased or erroneous risk cognitions 
(Delfabbro, 2004; Rachlin, 1990). 
Gamblers in the current study reported multiple, inconsistent perceptions and goals - 
considered simultaneously - satisficing perceived negatives (e.g., loss, financial difficulties, 
interpersonal conflict, guilt and shame) and perceived positives (e.g., excitement, hope, 
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stimulation, peer approval), to navigate multifaceted, subjective goals and scenarios. However, 
while research agrees gamblers may have multiple motivations for gambling (Binde, 2009), the 
processes by which gamblers satisfice or negotiate multiple perceptions has been largely 
neglected in the mental models and gambling literature (Breakwell, 2007). In contrast, here, 
gamblers presented coherent narratives to explain gambling behaviour under competing 
constraints and conditions, or else provided data that compiled into plausible formulations, 
even in the case of harmful or inconsistent choices, or decision making confounded by 
perceptual suppression or bias. For, example, non-problem/low risk gamblers tended to explain 
limited gambling according to conscious prioritisation of risk management over entertainment, 
social, winning or other goals, with the equivalent reverse situation true for more disordered 
gamblers.  
 
Idiosyncratic gambler profiling 
Participants’ risk perception/decision making profiles were complex and idiosyncratic, 
with differences, even within groups, in: risk beliefs, meanings and strategizing; predisposing, 
experiential, or contextual factors influencing the use of risk data; and patterns of dominance 
among risk perception and mediating/moderating factors. Many moderate risk, and some non-
problem/low risk gamblers described milder problems, and less severe vulnerabilities, while 
more problematic gamblers described more harmful patterns of decision making according to a 
broader range of more powerfully influential vulnerability factors.  
Individuals’ motivations and behaviours also varied across contexts, and over the course 
of gambling careers. For example, gamblers explained decision making variation based on 
143 
 
boredom, hope, guilt, uncontrollable urges, or alcohol consumption (e.g., Lewis, 23, M, problem 
gambler; Tim, 54, M, problem gambler), while treatment experienced gamblers reported shifts 
in estimation and consequent motivation, with downward spiral into problem gambling, and 
with recovery.  
Findings suggest different predisposing and experiential factors lead individuals to make 
different decisions in different contexts - over time, or if gambling problems become more 
severe, problematic decision making processes may multiply and merge, compounding 
difficulties and making it difficult to tease apart cognitive processes responsible for problematic 
gambling. Current findings are consistent with research showing substantial exposure to 
reinforcement or problems and harmful decision making processes may interact, exacerbating 
and compounding problematic decision making over time, in turn leading to more 
comprehensive, intense problematic cognitions (Holtgraves, 2009). Meanwhile, less severe 
gambling problems result from fewer, less intense, more diverse risk perception vulnerabilities.  
Individually varied and context dependent decision making observed here supports 
research highlighting, both, multiple pathways in and out of problem gambling (LaPlante, 
Nelson, LaBrie, & Shaffer, 2008; Milosevic & Ledgerwood, 2010), as well as probable decision 
making differences among disordered gamblers (Grant, Schreiber, Odlaug, & Kim, 2010; 
Holtgraves, 2009). The current findings suggest that these two research areas may potentially 
be usefully linked in an integrative understanding of gambling disorder: adding valuable 
decision making explanation to subtyping models (Blaszczynski & Nower, 2002), and helping to 
overcome the theoretical limitations of biopsychological theories of gambling (e.g., low level 
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gambling problems without neurophysiological biases, or lack of gambling problems with 
biases) (Moscrop, 2011).  
 
Limitations and future directions 
Despite following evidence-based methodological principles (Chiovitti & Piran, 2003; 
Morgan et al., 2002; Strauss & Corbin, 1998), it is difficult to generalise conclusions from this 
study, due to inevitable bias in participant and researcher viewpoints. Sampling, for example, 
was likely biased towards younger, university-educated, recreational gamblers, and more 
gambling experienced, treatment experienced, older, male problem gamblers. Analyses may 
also potentially over-explain uncertainty in the data (Burgess, Rhodes, & Wilson, 2013), despite 
analysis following an evidence based theory of gambling risk perception (outlined in detail in 
the previous study) (Morgan, et al., 2002). Gambler explanations throughout the study related 
to decision-making relationships, without control for combinatory effects among all relevant 
variables. Without psychometrically validated, quantitative measurement, it is difficult to 
reasonably infer which variables influence each another, or decisions, particularly when 
variables reportedly played different roles for different gamblers. Future research is therefore 
clearly needed to validate factors outlined here. Specifically, larger samples and mixed 
qualitative-quantitative data collection methods should be employed to further expand and test 
the findings of this study.  
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Conclusion  
This project represents early, exploratory research, limited by the available qualitative 
methodology. The current study suggests development of disordered gambling may be heavily 
influenced by relative underestimation of risk and overvaluation of gambling, based on explicit 
and implicit analysis, and deliberate, innate, contextual, and learned processing evaluations and 
biases. Theoretical models or corrective interventions addressing estimation, expectation and 
evaluation of gambling may be beneficial, though researchers should be mindful of factors 
impinging on gamblers’ capacities to accurately process risk, and explicitly control behaviour.  
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CHAPTER 7: Development of the Gambling Risk Decisions Questionnaire and a Risk Decision 
Model of Gambling Disorder 
 
 
The following chapter is a reproduction of an article prepared for publication as an empirical 
article by Michael Spurrier, Alex Blaszczynski, and Carolyn MacCann. It has been formatted in 
accordance with American Psychological Association guidelines and includes some additional 
linking sentences and tables in order to aid comprehension in relation to other chapters of this 
thesis, as well as to comprehensively report findings.  
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Introduction 
By definition, gambling involves engagement with risk, with the potential for harmful 
outcomes, since wagers may potentially result in loss of stakes (Walker, 1998). Common 
commercially available forms of gambling are typically designed so individuals do not win over 
long term play except in unusual circumstances (Walker, 1998) resulting in net long term losses 
for the majority of non-professional gamblers (Arnold, 1978; Stewart, 1989). For a subgroup of 
gamblers there appears to be a recurrent, persistent disconnect between positive expectations 
(Toneatto, Blitz-Miller, Calderwood, Dragonetti, & Tsasnos, 1997) and experience of negative 
outcomes (Australian Government Productivity Commission, 2010).  The implication of this 
phenomenon is that risk perception and risky decision making is of central importance to 
development of a gambling disorder. Yet, despite this apparent link, understanding of the 
relationship between risky decision making and gambling disorder is limited by both scarcity of 
specifically relevant research (Spurrier & Blaszczynski, 2013) and significant methodological 
issues (Delfabbro, 2004; Rachlin, 1990).  
Controlled laboratory experiments (Floyd, Whelan, & Meyers, 2006; Ladouceur & 
Sévigny, 2005) and psychometric self-report studies (Wood & Clapham, 2005; Raylu & Oei, 
2004) for example, show a clear link between vulnerability to harm and cognitive errors or 
biases overestimating wins (Delfabbro 2004, Fortune & Goodie 2011). However, these studies 
typically reduce decision making to an unrealistically limited range of variables (Steenbergh, 
Meyers, May, & Whelan, 2002; Wood & Clapham, 2005). Except in a handful of instances (Wong 
& Tsang 2012; Gillespie, Derevensky, & Gupta, 2007b), studies ignore risk perception or 
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ecological influence on decision making (e.g., the impact of arousal differences between 
laboratory and real world wagering) (Walker, 1998).  
Alternatively, naturalistic studies (Moodie, 2007; Coventry & Norman, 1998) 
demonstrate that gamblers utilise a diverse range of beliefs, interpretations, rationalizations, 
and strategies, depending heavily on mental states, game cues and other contextual data. 
However, typically these studies impose unreasonable normative demands on rationality 
(Stanovich, 1999), such as assuming homogeneity among the goals and convictions of 
participants (Delfabbro & Winefield, 1999).  
Further, while a number of theoretical paradigms and models have addressed gambling 
disorder, clinically relevant risk decision concepts are typically either missing (Blanco, Ibanez, 
Saiz Ruiz, & Nunes, 2000; Bergler, 1957), incompletely considered (Toneatto et al., 1997), or 
presented in a manner inconsistent with functional clinical application (Goudriaan, Oosterlaan, 
de Beurs, & Van den Brink, 2004). 
A large body of drug and alcohol research shows evaluation of harm versus benefit is 
critical to development and maintenance of risky behaviours (Breakwell, 2007; Oei & Jardim, 
2007; Aarons, Brown, Stice, & Coe, 2001). Individuals negotiate multiple, varied, complex and 
conflicting goals and perceptions when making decisions about potential risks (Oei & Jardim 
2007; Lipkus, Eissenberg, Schwartz-Bloom, Prokhorov, & Levy, 2011). Similarities between 
substance and gambling dependence in particular (e.g., cravings, highs, heredity, comorbidity, 
treatment) highlight the relevance of substance risk concepts to improving understanding and 
treatment of gambling disorder (Kessler, Hwang, LaBrie, & Petukhova, 2008; Holden, 2010; APA, 
2013).  
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The current study therefore aimed to comprehensively test and extend previous 
research about risk decision making in gambling disorder (Spurrier, et al. 2013; Spurrier, et al., 
2014a). Specifically, data collected in this study was used for dual purposes: 
(i) Refinement of a Gambling Risk Decisions Questionnaire assessing gambling risk 
decision domains and important related concepts (part 1), and  
(ii) Development of a Gambling Risk Decision Model, integrating factors associated 
with disordered gambling, centered on concepts of risky decision making (part 
2). 
  
Method 
 
Participants  
An invitation to participate, the questionnaire protocol, and information about the study 
were placed online (LimeSurvey, Version 1.91+) at a publically accessible URL address. The URL 
for the study was disseminated via: media release, Facebook page, posts on online gambling 
forums, and email invitations to universities and gambling treatment clinics in the USA, 
Australia, UK and Canada. First year psychology students at the University of Sydney were 
invited to take part in the study as part of coursework research participation requirements. A 
passive snowball method of recruitment was also employed. A paper version of the protocol 
was produced and disseminated through local gambling clinics, and made available upon 
request. 
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650 English-speaking individuals (Mage=23.5, SDage=9.3, Rangeage=17-66; nmale=234 
[36.0%], nfemale=416 [64%]) completed the Problem Gambling Severity Index (PGSI) and 181-
item Gambling Risk Decisions Questionnaire. Seven of the participants recruited via gambling 
clinics completed the paper version of the questionnaires, and 487 students, and 156 other 
participants completed the protocol online.  
Questionnaires were completed anonymously. Participants were offered the 
opportunity to receive an AUD$50 grocery voucher, allocated randomly to individuals who 
provided contact details. Participants were allocated to one of five groups based on PGSI scores, 
and whether or not they gambled. Table 1 lists participants’ descriptive data. 
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Table 8 
Participant demographic data by group  
 Non-gamblers Gamblers 
  No problems Low risk Hazardous Problem All gamblers 
N 248 243 114 12 33 402 
Age       
M 
SD 
Range 
19.5 
4.8 
17-58 
26.8 
11.1 
17-66 
22.8 
7.1 
17-52 
28.8 
13.6 
17-55 
29.8 
12.6 
17-60 
25.9 
10.5 
17-66 
 % % % % % % 
Gender       
Male 
Female 
26.2 
73.8 
35.0 
65.0 
46.5 
53.5 
66.7 
33.3 
69.7 
30.3 
42.0 
58.0 
Ethnicity / country of origin       
Australia, Paciific  
Other Asia 
Americas 
Europe, Mid-east, other 
33.9 
37.9 
2.0 
26.2 
62.6 
16.9 
1.6 
19.0 
50.9 
25.4 
1.8 
21.9 
66.7 
33.3 
0.0 
0.0 
57.6 
12.1 
3.0 
27.3 
59.0 
19.4 
1.7 
19.8 
Education       
High School 
Technical college 
University 
38.3 
1.2 
60.4 
23.9 
5.3 
77.7 
30.7 
36.8 
22.5 
41.7 
8.3 
50.0 
21.2 
21.2 
57.6 
27.1 
7.0 
66.9 
Employment       
Unemployed 
Casual, part-time 
Full-time 
48.0 
48.8 
3.2 
22.2 
56.0 
21.8 
26.3 
54.4 
19.3 
41.7 
16.7 
41.7 
30.3 
39.4 
30.3 
24.6 
53.0 
22.4 
Diagnosis mental health 20.6 29.2 26.3 8.3 57.6 30.1 
Alcohol (standard drinks/wk)       
0 
1-5 
6+ 
59.6 
31.0 
9.4 
24.5 
43.2 
56.8 
19.6 
50.5 
29.9 
45.5 
27.3 
27.3 
32.1 
28.6 
39.3 
24.3 
43.7 
56.3 
Gambling pattern       
No gambling 
Limited to a few events 
Decreased 
Remained constant 
Increased 
Clusters, binges, fluctuated 
100.0 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
62.5 
18.5 
14.4 
1.6 
2.9 
- 
48.3 
14.9 
15.8 
4.4 
16.7 
- 
0.0 
33.3 
16.7 
25.0 
16.7 
- 
9.1 
12.1 
6.1 
33.3 
39.5 
- 
51.6 
17.6 
14.4 
5.8 
10.6 
Ever tried to stop gambling - 12.0 13.0 33.3 51.5 16.6 
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Measures 
 
The Problem Gambling Severity Index (PGSI; Ferris & Wynne, 2001)  
The PGSI nine-item self-report subscale of the Canadian Problem Gambling Index (CPGI; 
Ferris & Wynne, 2001) was used to assess the severity of problems associated with gambling. 
The CPGI has been found to be reliable (Cronbach’s alpha = .84, test-retest reliability =.78) 
(Ferris & Wynne, 2001). Participants were classified into gambling subtypes according to their 
PGSI scores (0 = non-problem gambler; 1-4 = low risk gambler; 5-7 = hazardous gambler; ≥8 = 
problem gambler) based on conventions set out by Currie, Casey & Hodgins (2010).  
Currie and colleagues (2010) demonstrated this scoring procedure improved clinical 
discrimination compared to previous PGSI scoring rules outlined by Ferris and Wynne (2001), 
better capturing the gradient of problem gambling severity ranging from non-problem to 
problem (Holtgraves, 2009). 
 
The Gambling Risk Decision Questionnaire (GRDQ) 
To assess gambling risk decision making, a self-report instrument was developed by the 
researchers. The GRDQ aimed to extensively identify, test and confirm concepts identified as 
important by the authors through prior research addressing gambling risk perception and 
decision making (Spurrier & Blaszczynski, 2013; Spurrier, et al., 2014a, 2014b).  
The GRDQ was constructed in the following manner. An initial pool of 211 draft items 
were compiled targeting concepts identified through systematic review of the gambling 
literature (Spurrier & Blaszczynski, 2013), and two qualitative studies by the authors (Spurrier, 
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et al., 2014a, 2014b). Draft items were submitted to 14 content reviewers to examine face and 
content validity, completion time, clarity, comprehensibility, logical flow, appropriateness, and 
utility (Spurrier & Blaszczynski, 2013; Spurrier, et al., 2014a, 2014b). Reviewers included a 
convenience sample of lay gamblers and non-gamblers, and professional researchers with 
expertise in research methods, assessment tool design, and statistical modelling. Reviewer 
feedback suggested  58 items were ineffectively worded, and 54 items were redundant. 
Consequently, 44 items were dropped, 68 items modified, 14 items added, and question order 
rearranged, reducing the questionnaire to 181 items. Five key areas were evaluated by the 
questionnaire (described below). 
 
Gambling behaviour (frequency or intensity)  
Initial screening indicated that two items assessing behaviour, current gambling 
frequency and length of sessions, had moderate to strong relationships with PGSI score (r=.547, 
p<.001 and r=.493, p<.001, respectively), and with each other (r=.604, p<.001). Individual 
question scores were therefore combined as a mean score indicating current gambling 
involvement (α=.75). 
 
Background individual differences   
Twenty forced-choice items assessed the presence or absence of several well-
established dynamic or static risk factors for gambling disorder, including both demographic risk 
factors (age, gender, ethnicity, level of education, job status, income, mental health diagnostic 
and treatment history, alcohol and drug use, offending history), and exposure and type of 
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gambling experiences (length gambling career, early wins or losses, preferences for types of 
wagering, sources of gambling beliefs).  
 
Stability of decision making across time and context 
Thirteen questionnaire items assessed participants’ anticipated responses to common 
gambling situations, events, and mental states (Baudinet & Blaszczynski, 2012). Responses were 
used to calculate how much individuals’ decision making changed based on contextual 
information (Toplak, et al., 2007). 
 
Insight and self-monitoring 
Individuals’ self-monitoring accuracy was estimated in the study by four items 
comparing individuals’ reported gambling-related problems and spending, with individuals’ 
perceptions of how their problems and spending related to the problems and spending of other 
gamblers (Toplak, et al., 2007; Productivity Commission, 2010). 
 
Decision making content and processes 
One hundred and thirty one items examined seven conceptually distinct aspects of the 
overt content of decisions, and the way that information is processed by individuals when 
making decisions, including:  
(1) estimation of outcome likelihood,  
(2) perception of the temporal impact of outcomes,  
(3) the perceived influence of outcomes on decision making,  
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(4) personal and game causal attributions and rationalizations,  
(5) endorsement of play or risk management strategies, 
(6) the salience, frequency, and influence of thoughts, urges, biases and difficulty 
managing urges, and  
(7) perceived vulnerability to environmental or mental cues. 
Seven separate Exploratory Factor Analyses (EFA) reduced the structure of each decision 
making domain. Independent Confirmatory Factor Analyses (CFA) substantiated factor 
structures. Factor analyses are outlined in part 1 below.  
 
Procedure 
Participants were presented with the PGSI and the 181-item GRDQ, and information 
outlining the purpose, format and consent for the study. The University of Sydney Human 
Research Ethics Committee approved the study. Data analyses and model development was 
conducted using the SPSS and AMOS (Version 21) software packages.  
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Data analysis and results 
 
Part 1: Factor analysis refinement of decision making content and process items in the 181-
item GRDQ 
 
Exploratory factor analyses 
An initial item-level screen was conducted to reduce the item pool for the seven 
identified decision making content and process domains. One hundred and thirty-nine items 
across these seven domains were drafted, each with 5-point Likert scale responses. Each 
construct was examined independently. Items that were unreliable (i.e., had low item-total 
correlations, or low factor loadings in an exploratory factor analysis) were removed. Principal 
axis factoring with oblimin rotation analysis was applied. Solutions were resolved according to 
parallel analysis and scree plot identification of potential number of factors. All possible 
solutions, including plus and minus one factor, were run (Preacher & MacCallum, 2003). Final 
solutions were selected based on conceptual integrity of factor item content, low correlations 
between factors, high item primary loadings (>.30), and low cross loadings (<.20) (Fabrigar, 
Wegener, MacCallum, & Strahan, 1999; Floyd & Widaman, 1995). Through this process, the 
initial pool of 139 items was reduced to 85 items loading on ten content and eight process 
factors (presented in table 9 below).  
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Table 9 
Factor analysis solutions for seven decision making content and process domains 
Domain / item Factor Communalities 
Decision making ‘content’     
(Domain a) estimation of outcome likelihood 1 2  
LIKELIHOOD (Financial, work, or legal problems) .899 -.083 .762 
LIKELIHOOD (Relationship difficulties, losing respect or approval from others) .896 -.054 .772 
LIKELIHOOD (Losing control ) .850 .054 .248 
LIKELIHOOD  (Stress, depression, anxiety, or other bad feelings) .834 .012 .703 
LIKELIHOOD  (Feeling guilt, shame, or bad about who I am) .809 -.057 .625 
LIKELIHOOD (Losing money) .475 .057 .248 
LIKELIHOOD (Having fun, socializing) -.256 .774 .525 
LIKELIHOOD  (Reducing boredom) .083 .684 .515 
LIKELIHOOD (Feeling excitement, feeling a 'rush') .259 .629 .578 
LIKELIHOOD  (Feeling powerful, proud, or confident) .156 .617 .473 
LIKELIHOOD (Winning money) -.195 .535 .250 
LIKELIHOOD (Gaining respect or approval from others) .134 .493 .308 
(Domain b) perception of the temporal impact of outcomes 3 4  
IMMEDIACY OF IMPACT (Financial, work, or legal problems) .968 -.094 .853 
IMMEDIACY OF IMPACT (Relationship difficulties, losing respect or approval from others) .919 -.036 .812 
IMMEDIACY OF IMPACT (Losing control ) .866 .023 .771 
IMMEDIACY OF IMPACT (Stress, depression, anxiety, or other bad feelings) .929 -.031 .834 
IMMEDIACY OF IMPACT (Feeling guilt, shame, or bad about who I am) .899 -.039 .773 
IMMEDIACY OF IMPACT (Losing money) .639 .129 .510 
IMMEDIACY OF IMPACT (Having fun, socializing) -.155 .765 .487 
IMMEDIACY OF IMPACT (Reducing boredom) .045 .669 .481 
IMMEDIACY OF IMPACT (Feeling excitement, feeling a 'rush') -.052 .704 .461 
IMMEDIACY OF IMPACT (Feeling powerful, proud, or confident) .299 .521 .522 
IMMEDIACY OF IMPACT (Winning money) -.009 .611 .368 
IMMEDIACY OF IMPACT (Gaining respect or approval from others) .317 .443 .443 
(Domain c) the perceived influence on outcomes in decision making 5 6  
INFLUENCE  (Financial, work, or legal problems) .841 -.007 .705 
INFLUENCE (Relationship difficulties, losing respect or approval from others) .848 .046 .737 
INFLUENCE (Losing control ) .816 -.013 .661 
INFLUENCE (Stress, depression, anxiety, or other bad feelings) .854 -.010 .725 
INFLUENCE (Feeling guilt, shame, or bad about who I am) .818 .042 .684 
INFLUENCE (Losing money) .605 -.116 .353 
INFLUENCE (Having fun, socializing) -.183 .742 .532 
INFLUENCE (Reducing boredom) -.016 .705 .493 
INFLUENCE (Feeling excitement, feeling a 'rush') .004 .781 .611 
INFLUENCE (Feeling powerful, proud, or confident) .118 .706 .544 
INFLUENCE (Winning money) -.111 .635 .388 
INFLUENCE (Gaining respect or approval from others) .193 .595 .436 
(Domain d) personal and game causal attributions and rationalizations 7 8  
I know the correct strategies to win .822 -.129 .624 
I win at gambling due to my skill at gambling .749 -.040 .544 
I can predict game outcomes when I am tuned in or observant .744 -.088 .519 
I am a skilled gambler .740 -.169 .497 
I win at gambling due to factors related to myself .697 .001 .486 
Correct strategies will make someone win .694 .075 .524 
I win at gambling due to knowing/following the right strategy or set of rules .677 .114 .520 
I can control the outcome of games .665 -.046 .424 
I am luckier than most people .549 .029 .312 
A gambler can win over the long term .543 .093 .336 
if you lose, you are more likely to win next time .540 -.006 .290 
You usually need to invest a certain amount before you win .392 .170 .225 
Gambling has predictable outcomes .348 .237 .230 
Losing profit from gambling is not really losing money .345 .092 .148 
I win at gambling, due to the laws of probability .006 .671 .452 
I win at gambling, due to factors not related to myself -.075 .661 .411 
I win at gambling, due to the house advantage, or book-keeper’s profit margin .239 .466 .345 
Most gambling is designed so that the punter loses -.064 .319 .093 
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Domain / item   Factor    
Decision making ‘content’ 9 10    Communalities 
(Domain e) endorsement of play or risk management strategies       
I leave credit cards at home  .772 -.012    .594 
I set an overall spending limit for each gambling session .827 .052    .697 
I set bet limits, e.g., small bets .836 .022    .704 
I use thinking strategies, e.g., reminding myself I cannot win .812 .006    .661 
I self-exclude from venues .812 -.035    .654 
I avoid particular places, e.g., clubs .859 -.027    .732 
I avoid particular triggers, e.g., drinking alcohol .820 .015    .676 
I use other rules .790 .008    .626 
I look for patterns among gambling outcomes -.085 .736    .534 
I apply different strategies depending on my instincts, or my gut feeling -.039 .788    .616 
My strategies for winning have changed a lot since I began gambling .046 .567    .330 
I follow rules or strategies to win .006 .699    .489 
I follow rules or set limits to avoid losing too much .134 .493    .278 
I follow my instincts and gut feelings to make gambling decisions -.002 .685    .469 
Decision making ‘processes’  11 12 13 14 15  
(Domain f) the salience, frequency, and influence of thoughts, urges, biases, discomfort and difficulty managing urges 
Right at this moment, how strong is your urge to gamble .996 .049 .018 -.034 -.073 .911 
Right at this moment, how strong is your intent to gamble .934 -.082 -.011 .015 .019 .870 
How difficult is it to follow your own rules or plans during gambling sessions? -.032 .715 .091 -.066 -.019 .472 
How difficult is it to ignore or dismiss thoughts about gambling? -.011 .744 -.109 .070 .099 .690 
How difficult is it to resist the urge to gamble? .034 .823 -.111 .075 .002 .732 
How uncomfortable do you find conflict between goals related to gambling? -.037 .564 .277 -.103 -.078 .346 
How frequently do you think about negative effects of gambling on your life? .032 .079 .723 .032 -.035 .575 
How frequently do you focus on the bad aspects of gambling? -.022 -.108 .834 -.036 .126 .672 
How frequently do you try to forget about the good aspects of gambling? .015 .061 .629 .111 -.072 .477 
How frequently do you have competing urges or goals related to gambling? -.039 .129 .049 .557 .136 .596 
How frequently do you focus on the good things about gambling? .003 -.076 .039 .733 .095 .600 
How frequently do you try to forget about the bad aspects of gambling? -.009 .034 .043 .862 -.174 .614 
How much time each week do you think or fantasize about good gambling outcomes? -.075 .033 .012 -.044 .905 .738 
How much of your spare time do you spend gambling? .123 .112 -.039 .204 .455 .589 
How often do you have thoughts about gambling without any prompting?  .210 .142 .067 .019 .431 .495 
(Domain g) perceived vulnerability to environmental or mental cues 16 17 18    
you're alone at home .682 .022 .150   .651 
you had an argument with your partner, friend, or family member .832 -.046 .013   .667 
you feel low or depressed .951 .017 -.088   .811 
you feel anxious, stressed, or on edge .895 -.015 -.047   .732 
you feel bored .495 .076 .329   .654 
you see an advertisement, or sign for gambling .231 .619 -.075   .522 
you're at a casino, race track, or other gambling venue -.171 .909 .043   .723 
you're at a sporting event, or a venue where gambling may be available -.003 .762 .053   .625 
you had a recent, large gambling win .066 .745 -.045   .573 
you're socializing with friends -.018 .117 .651   .504 
you feel excited .154 -.013 .747   .728 
you feel content and happy -.054 -.068 .895   .678 
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Confirmatory factor analysis  
Eighty-five items addressing 18 factors, were subjected to seven confirmatory factor 
analyses (CFA), using the Maximum-Likelihood estimation method (Stevens, 1996). Model fit 
was assessed using the Chi-square test of Goodness of Fit, the Root-Mean-Square Error of 
Approximation (RMSEA), the Comparative Fit Index (CFI), the Goodness of Fit Index (GFI), and 
the Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI). The Chi-squared statistic tends to provide unrealistic 
values for large sample sizes; therefore additional fit indices were included (Khasawneh, 
Alrjoub, & Al Zawarhreh, 2010).  
Requirements for correlation quality were met. Data provided Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
Measure of Sampling Adequacy values ranging from meritorious (MSA=.863) to marvellous 
(MSA=.938), and significant values for all Bartlett’s Tests of Sphericity (p<.001) (Dzuiban & 
Shirkey, 1974; Preacher & MacCallum, 2003).  
Seventy-seven items from the original 85 items were retained following CFA, reducing 
the GRDQ to 173 items. Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for final scales demonstrated adequate to 
excellent internal reliability across factors (α=.77-.95). Initial model fit to data varied from poor 
to good (RMSEA = .07 to .27; CFI = .88 to .95; GFI = .87 to .93; AGFI = .82 to .89). Modification 
indices suggested addition or removal of several latent factor-item paths, resulting in 
rearrangement of factor loadings, and removal of cross-loading items and one poorly identified 
factor. Following recommended modifications, model fit of all models was adequate to good 
(RMSEA = .05 to .08; CFI ≥ .96; GFI ≥ .95; AGFI ≥ .90), explaining 50.65 and 74.76% of variance in 
data, with generally moderate to high loading factors (.38 to .95) and communalities (.18 to 
.83), low cross-loadings (.00 to .27) and mostly low correlations between factors (.02 to .66). 
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Taken together, these final analyses suggest eighteen distinct latent variables across the seven 
factor analyses were identified (Preacher & MacCallum, 2003).  
CFA solutions are presented in tables 10 and 11, categorized according to decision 
making content and processes respectively, with bold text denoting item factor loadings onto 
primary factors. Tables 12 and 13 show model fit and variance statistics for CFAs, and inter-
correlations between factors, respectively.  
Latent variables were included as summed scale scores of items during part 2 of the 
study involving development of a gambling decision making model using path analysis. 
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Table 10 
Communalities, factor loadings, and reliability of factors by domain for five confirmatory factor analyses addressing decision making content using Principal Axis Factoring with Promax 
rotation  
 Decision making ‘content’ 
 Estimation of outcome likelihood Estimation of outcome impact Estimation of outcome influence 
Cronbach’s α .77 .91 .85 .78 .95 .91 .82 .91 .84 
Item  Factor 1 Factor 2 Communalities Factor 1 Factor 2 Communalities Factor 1 Factor 2 Communalities 
Feeling excitement, feeling a ‘rush’ .645 .043 .441 .738 -.124 .456 .787 -.096 .571 
Reducing Boredom .745 -.069 .516 .689 -.041 .444 .653 -.073 .395 
Feeling powerful, proud, or confident .728 .003 .531 .689 .122 .586 .760 .103 .648 
Gaining respect or approval from others .598 .047 .383 .568 .166 .458 .557 .241 .471 
Winning money - - - - - - .595 -.177 .304 
Financial, work, or legal problems -.009 .813 .656 -.085 .946 .810 -.020 .812 .647 
Relationship difficulties, losing respect or approval from others .010 .830 .695 -.014 .895 .787 .054 .818 .706 
Stress, depression, anxiety, or other bad feelings .033 .823 .700 .028 .892 .826 -.067 .880 .732 
Feeling guilt, shame or bad about who I am -.023 .836 .683 -.004 .877 .765 .054 .823 .714 
Losing control - - - .086 .804 .733 -.021 .864 .734 
Losing money - - - - - - -.144 .493 .209 
 
Decision making ‘content’ 
Personal & game causal attribution, explanation, rationalization Play & risk management strategies & rules 
Cronbach’s α .87 .79 .84  .90 .82 .92 .83 
Item Factor 1 Factor 2 Commun. Item Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Commun. 
I win at gambling due to following the right strategy or set of rules .826 -.060 .617 Rules: avoiding particular places, e.g., club .938 -.022 -.076 .794 
I win at gambling due to my skill at gambling .925 -.099 .735 Rules: self-exclusion from venues .753 -.019 -.011 .549 
I win at gambling due to factors related to myself .671 .097 .552 Rules: avoiding particular triggers, e.g., drinking alcohol .661 .046 .080 .526 
I am a skilled gambler .461 .266 .456 Rules: leave credit cards at home  .598 .008 .084 .424 
Gambling has predictable outcomes .076 .378 .189 I apply different strategies based on my instincts, or my gut feelings -.021 .829 -.072 .638 
A gambler can win over the long term .214 .398 .324 I look for patterns among gambling outcomes .005 .711 .027 .524 
I can predict game outcomes when I am tuned in or observant .241 .516 .499 I follow rules or strategies to win .075 .706 -.034 .514 
I can control the outcome of games .169 .525 .430 I follow my instincts and gut feelings to make gambling decisions -.071 .680 .064 .471 
I am luckier than most people .066 .550 .358 My strategies for winning have changed a lot since I began gambling .021 .605 .031 .390 
You usually need to invest a certain amount before you win .003 .495 .247 Rules: setting an overall spending limit for each gambling session .041 .043 .791 .694 
Losing profit from gambling is not really losing money -.001 .423 .178 Rules: setting bet limits, e.g., small bets .018 -.031 .870 .754 
If you lose, you are more likely to win next time -.150 .763 .443      
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Table 11 
Communalities, factor loadings, and reliability of factors by domain for two confirmatory factor analyses addressing decision making ‘processes’ 
using Principal Axis Factoring with Promax rotation 
Decision making ‘processes’ 
Salience, frequency, and influence of thoughts, urges, & biases 
Cronbach’s α .94 .81 .80 .81 .79 .88 
Item Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 Communalities 
Right at this moment, how strong is your urge to gamble .911 -.050 .093 -.040 .021 .829 
Right at this moment, how strong is your intent to gamble .872 .074 -.104 .048 -.013 .797 
How much time each week do you think or fantasize about good gambling outcomes? .018 .766 .114 -.045 .038 .713 
How much of your spare time do you spend gambling? .065 .409 .245 .157 -.028 .598 
How often do you have thoughts about gambling without any prompting?  .109 .508 .214 -.005 .025 .577 
How difficult is it to follow your own rules or plans during gambling sessions? .027 -.050 .810 -.137 .099 .543 
How difficult is it to ignore or dismiss thoughts about gambling? -.036 .168 .702 .096 -.123 .705 
How difficult is it to resist the urge to gamble? .034 .021 .818 .076 -.141 .735 
How uncomfortable do you find conflict between goals related to gambling? -.062 -.053 .652 -.046 .202 .439 
Frequency: Have competing urges or goals related to gambling? -.030 .202 .218 .376 .113 .603 
Frequency: Focus on the good things about gambling? .040 .092 -.078 .749 .037 .652 
Frequency: Try to forget about the bad aspects of gambling?  -.007 -.139 .087 .787 .085 .639 
Frequency: Think about negative effects of gambling on your life? .061 -.020 .122 -.036 .736 .601 
Frequency: Focus on the bad aspects of gambling?  -.063 .219 -.131 -.056 .767 .586 
Frequency: Try to forget about the good aspects of gambling?  .023 -.152 .041 .197 .636 .524 
 
Short & long-term stability or change in decision making 
Perceived vulnerability to specific contextual cues 
Cronbach’s α .91 .85 .83 .91 
Item Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Communalities 
you feel low or depressed .908 .001 -.025 .798 
you feel anxious, stressed, or on edge .898 -.014 -.012 .781 
you had an argument with your partner, friend, or family member .831 -.001 -.061 .631 
you're alone at home .704 .028 .187 .724 
you're at a casino, race track, or other gambling venue -.117 .893 .009 .705 
you're at a sporting event, or a venue where gambling may be available -.017 .754 .038 .589 
you had a recent, large gambling win .060 .747 -.032 .582 
you see an advertisement, or sign for gambling .182 .596 -.013 .496 
you feel content and happy -.041 -.099 .950 .761 
you feel excited .079 .039 .779 .730 
you're socializing with friends -.011 .175 .586 .484 
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Table 12 
Factor extractions, rotations, variance accounted for, fit indices, reliability, communalities, factor loadings, and factor descriptions by decision making domain for seven 
confirmatory factor analyses  
 Decision making ‘content’ ‘Decision making processes’ 
 Estimation of outcome 
likelihood 
Perception of the 
temporal impact of 
outcomes  
Perceived influence of 
outcomes 
Personal & game causal 
attributions and 
rationalizations 
Endorsement of play & 
risk management 
strategies 
Salience, frequency, and 
influence of thoughts, 
urges, & biases 
Perceived vulnerability 
to environmental and 
mental cues 
Variance accounted for (%) 69.03 74.58 65.20 50.65 73.17 74.26 74.76 
X2 133.86 (19), p<.001 135.82 (26), p<.001 192.45 (43), p<.001 160.71 (53), p<.001 171.98 (41), p<.001 228.27 (80), p<.001 173.25 (41), p<.001 
CFI .96 .98 .96 .96 .97 .97 97 
GFI .95 .95 .95 .96 .95 .95 .95 
AGFI .90 .92 .92 .94 .92 .93 .92 
RMSEA .09, p<.001 .08, p<.001 .07, p<.001 .06, p=.15 .07, p=001 .05, p=.234 .07, p=.001 
 
Table 13 
Inter-correlations between factors 
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Likelihood (positive outcomes) 1 .418** .652** .318** .119** .142** .121** .232** -.259** .194** -.358** .259** -.238** .215** .113** .038 .301** .160** .109** 
Likelihood (negative outcomes) .418** 1 .394** .537** -.009 .456** .420** .408** -.001 .459** -.035 .303** .077 .131** .293** .172** .256** .430** .331** 
Immediacy (positive outcomes) .652** .394** 1 .524** .008 .238** .125** .197** -.219** .227** -.311** .236** -.230** .238** .068 -.002 .215** .201** .115** 
Immediacy (negative outcomes) .318** .537** .524** 1 .053 .323** .327** .356** -.015 .351** -.116** .284** .009 .171** .217** .165** .329** .255** .329** 
Influence (positive outcomes) .119** -.009 .008 .053 1 .223** -.009 .118** .058 -.033 -.039 .128** .056 -.018 .101* .133** .161** .038 .116** 
Influence (negative outcomes) .142** .456** .238** .323** .223** 1 .250** .249** .073 .323** .048 .186** .168** .053 .224** .169** .248** .340** .259** 
Belief in skill and personal control .121** .420** .125** .327** -.009 .250** 1 .573** .019 .654** -.016 .436** .132** .240** .490** .379** .391** .486** .487** 
Belief in luck .232** .408** .197** .356** .118** .249** .573** 1 .024 .656** -.023 .451** .088* .265** .447** .341** .425** .353** .468** 
Risk avoidance strategies -.259** -.001 -.219** -.015 .058 .073 .019 .024 1 .075 .573** .073 .600** .005 .175** .199** .011 .058 .120** 
Win strategies .194** .459** .227** .351** -.033 .323** .654** .656** .075 1 .087* .418** .120** .317** .456** .312** .334** .523** .425** 
Risk limit strategies -.358** -.035 -.311** -.116** -.039 .048 -.016 -.023 .573** .087* 1 -.035 .557** -.012 .145** .166** -.091* .126** .059 
Motivation to gamble .259** .303** .236** .284** .128** .186** .436** .451** .073 .418** -.035 1 .246** .294** .572** .589** .626** .451** .550** 
Obsession -.238** .077 -.230** .009 .056 .168** .132** .088* .600** .120** .557** .246** 1 -.057 .342** .498** .174** .190** .253** 
Lack of impulse control .215** .131** .238** .171** -.018 .053 .240** .265** .005 .317** -.012 .294** -.057 1 .405** .240** .287** .281** .274** 
Positive bias .113** .293** .068 .217** .101* .224** .490** .447** .175** .456** .145** .572** .342** .405** 1 .606** .515** .430** .525** 
Negative bias .038 .172** -.002 .165** .133** .169** .379** .341** .199** .312** .166** .589** .498** .240** .606** 1 .559** .419** .520** 
Cue sensitivity (emotional) .301** .256** .215** .329** .161** .248** .391** .425** .011 .334** -.091* .626** .174** .287** .515** .559** 1 .476** .580** 
Cue sensitivity (venue) .160** .430** .201** .255** .038 .340** .486** .353** .058 .523** .126** .451** .190** .281** .430** .419** .476** 1 .465** 
Cue sensitivity (social) .109** .331** .115** .329** .116** .259** .487** .468** .120** .425** .059 .550** .253** .274** .525** .520** .580** .465** 1 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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Eighteen final factors emerged from the seven decision making CFAs examining 
estimation of outcome likelihood, impact, and influence, causal attributions, strategies, salience 
of urges and biases, and cue sensitivity respectively. The eighteen factors included:  
(1) expectancy of negative outcomes (individuals’ estimation of the likelihood of 
negative gambling events),  
(2) expectancy of positive outcomes (estimation of the likelihood of positive 
gambling events),  
(3) immediacy of negative outcomes (perception of the immediacy versus long 
term impact of potential negative outcomes),  
(4) immediacy of positive outcomes (perception of the immediacy versus long 
term impact of potential positive outcomes),  
(5) influence of negative outcomes (personal preference for potential negative 
outcomes),  
(6) influence of positive outcomes (personal preference for potential positive 
outcomes),  
(7) belief in skill (confidence in personal skill and strategies enabling gamblers to 
win),  
(8) belief in luck and personal control (confidence in game predictability, personal 
control of outcomes, and personal luck),  
(9) risk management strategizing (individuals’ attempts to avoid triggers or pre-
set limits to manage risk),  
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(10) win strategizing (individuals’ use of intuition, perceived patterns, and personal 
rules to win),  
(11) motivation to gamble (urge or intention to gamble),  
(12) lack of impulse control (difficulty and discomfort controlling gambling related 
urges or thoughts),  
(13) negative bias (negative biases in gambling related thought processes),  
(14) positive bias (positive biases in gambling related thought processes),  
(15) obsession (intensity & frequency of prompted or spontaneous thoughts about 
gambling),  
(16) emotional cue sensitivity (sensitivity to negative emotional mental states),  
(17) venue cue sensitivity (sensitivity to environmental situations or states), and  
(18) social cue sensitivity (sensitivity to social cues and positive emotional states).  
 
Part 2: Development of a gambling risk decision model 
 
Data analysis 
A model of gambling risk decision making was developed, based on the 173-item GRDQ 
data, through multiple regression, relative importance analysis, path modelling, and correlation 
analysis procedures. Non-gambler participants were excluded from analyses. Model analyses 
tested expectation (1) that both individuals’ gambling involvement, and decision making would 
explain significant variance in negative gambling consequences, (2) that involvement and 
decision making would contribute both unique and shared explanation of this variance, and also 
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(3) that gambling decision making factors would mediate the impact of background risk factors 
for disorder. 
To address the first hypothesis, negative gambling consequences (based on PGSI 
subgroup classification) were regressed onto scale scores measuring individuals’ decision 
making (content, process, and stability). Non-significant scales were then removed one by one 
in further repeated regressions until only significant predictors remained, such that explanation 
of PGSI variance was maximized. Significant predictors were subjected simultaneously to 
Relative Importance Analysis (RIA) (using pairwise deletion, 10,000 bootstrap replications, 
α=.05; Tonidandel & LeBreton, 2011) to determine the size and significance of each factor’s 
unique contribution to explanation of PGSI variance (Tonidandel, LeBreton, & Johnson, 2009). 
PGSI group was then regressed onto individuals’ current gambling involvement. 
To address the second hypothesis, mediation was tested by gambling involvement of the 
relationship between each significant decision making predictor and gambling consequences.  
To address the third hypothesis, PGSI group was regressed onto the group of common, 
background individual differences. Next, mediation was tested by the group of significant 
decision making factors of the relationship between background individual differences and 
consequences. Mediation was tested using the bootstrapping method with bias-corrected 
confidence estimates, using 95% confidence intervals for indirect effects, with 5000 bootstrap 
resamples (Preacher & Hayes, 2004; 2008).  
Current gambling involvement and significant decision making and background 
predictors were retained in a final 48-item version of the GRDQ. Significant decision making 
factors, behaviour and consequences were included in the final gambling decision making 
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model. Significantly correlating decision making factors (see table 13) included in the final 
model were covaried in the final AMOS model.  
Test-retest correlations were computed for the final GRDQ scales for a subset of 51 
respondents completing the 48-item GDRQ two months after first completing the original 
questionnaire study.  
 
 
Significant predictors of gambling consequences 
When PGSI group was regressed against gambling decision making factors, ten 
significant factors emerged, explaining 55% of variance in PGSI scores (ΔR2 = .549, F[10,379] = 
44.96, p<.001).  
Significant factors included: expectancy of negative outcomes, perceived immediacy of 
positive outcomes, belief in luck and control of outcomes, motivation to gamble, lack of impulse 
control, cue sensitivity (emotional), cue sensitivity (venue), self-monitoring deficit (problems), 
self-monitoring deficit (spending), and variance across contexts. Cue sensitivity (venue) and 
belief in luck contributed significantly lower explained variance than other significant 
predictors. All significant PGSI predictors are listed by domain in table 14, along with: the 
proportion of group variance in PGSI scores accounted for by each variable; β, t, df, and p 
values; and normative descriptive statistics for each participant group.  
Several decision making factors did not have significant relationships with PGSI scores 
(p>.05) and were consequently excluded from the final model and GRDQ, including: expectancy 
of positive outcomes, perceived immediacy of negative outcomes, perceived influence of 
positive outcomes, perceived influence of negative outcomes, belief in skill, risk avoidance 
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strategies, win strategies, risk limit strategies, obsession, positive bias, negative bias, cue 
sensitivity (social).   
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Table 14 
Normative data for decision making and risk factor scales for gambler and non-gambler subgroups  
 
Predictors 
% variance explained  
(by domain) 
t df p β  Non-gamblers All gamblers 
N       248 402 
       M SD Range M SD Range 
Behaviour factors             
Gambling involvement (current) 100 -11.32 359 .000 .52  0 0 0-0 1.48 .78 1-5 
             
Decision making factors             
Risk decision content             
Expectancy of negative outcomes 11.93 5.41 386 .000 .21  12.33 3.86 4-19 7.86 3.74 4-20 
Perceived immediacy of positive outcomes 7.86 3.06 384 .000 .12  9.31 2.37 4-20 7.69 2.70 4-16 
Belief in Luck and control of outcomes 1.68 -4.76 400 .002 -.21  15.48 5.02 0-29 13.43 5.56 0-28 
Risk decision processes             
Motivation to gamble 22.53 7.83 400 .000 .32  0 0 0-0 2.67 1.83 0-10 
Lack of impulse control 12.85 3.72 400 .000 .20  7.41 3.05 0-15 6.28 3.46 0-20 
Cue sensitivity (emotional) 12.65 3.30 400 .001 .17  5.94 3.30 0-20 5.06 3.06 0-20 
Cue sensitivity (venue) 1.85 -3.60 400 .001 -.17  11.27 4.87 0-20 10.63 5.12 0-20 
Self-monitoring deficit (problems) 11.66 9.09 400 .000 .34  -.86 .96 -5.89–0 .59 .79 -3.96-3.32 
Self-monitoring deficit (spending) 14.21 -5.67 400 .000 -.23  0 0 0-0 -.13 1.24 -4.36–14.09 
Risk decision stability             
Variance across contexts 2.77 2.13 400 .000 .09  .97 1.16 0-5.67 1.08 1.20 0-6.92 
Total  100            
             
Background individual differences             
Demographic / Individual differences             
Gender 22.30 -4.032 400 .000 -.20  1.26 .44 1-2 1.32 .49 1-2 
Mental health issues 13.58 3.737 400 .000 .19  .31 .65 0-2 .48 .78 0-2 
Gambling experience and exposure             
Experience of early wins or losses 29.48 -3.716 360 .000 -.19  0 0 0-0 2.15 .90 1-3 
Gambling involvement (long term) 18.09 3.963 400 .000 .26  5 0 5-5 1.96 1.23 1-5 
Gambling career length 9.11 -3.608 400 .000 -.23  0 0 0-0 10.01 12.50 0-63 
Total  100            
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 Gamblers 
 No problem Low risk Hazardous Problem 
N 243 114 12 33 
 M SD Range M SD Range M SD Range M SD Range 
Behaviour factors             
Gambling involvement (current) 1.22 .49 1-5 1.59 .69 1-4 2.08 .97 1-3.5 2.61 1.26 1-5 
             
Decision making factors             
Risk decision content             
Expectancy of negative outcomes 7.09 3.49 4-20 8.21 3.17 4-18 7.64 3.93 4-17 12.44 3.97 4-20 
Perceived immediacy of positive outcomes 6.87 2.53 4-15 8.73 2.35 4-16 9.45 2.73 6-16 9.63 2.70 6-16 
Belief in Luck and control of outcomes 12.47 5.00 0-27 14.81 5.37 0-28 16.25 6.89 0-24 14.73 7.84 0-28 
Risk decision processes             
Motivation to gamble 2.09 1.25 0-8 2.96 1.68 0-8 4.08 2.61 2-10 5.24 2.73 2-10 
Lack of impulse control 5.21 2.36 0-14 7.06 2.94 0-14 7.92 4.42 0-15 10.85 6.09 0-20 
Cue sensitivity (emotional) 4.18 1.39 0-11 5.52 3.13 0-18 7.25 3.74 0-14 9.15 6.09 0-20 
Cue sensitivity (venue) 9.51 4.68 0-20 12.25 4.82 0-20 12.33 5.80 0-20 12.64 6.71 0-20 
Self-monitoring deficit (problems) .35 .38 -3.59-.42 1.09 .709 -3.96-1.39 1.15 1.17 -.32-2.35 .38 1.74 -2.03-3.32 
Self-monitoring deficit (spending) .16 1.08 -3.17–14.09 -.26 1.06 -4.29-.55 -.52 1.00 -1.98-.40 -1.68 1.71 -4.36-.40 
Risk decision stability             
Variance across contexts .84 1.00 0-4.25 1.43 1.36 0-6.92 1.50 1.58 0-3.58 1.52 1.40 0-4.25 
             
Background individual differences             
Demographic / Individual differences             
Gender 1.35 .48 1-2 1.46 .50 1-2 1.67 .49 1-2 1.70 .47 1-2 
Mental health issues .45 .75 0-2 .43 .76 0-2 .08 .29 0-1 1.06 .97 0-2 
Gambling experience and exposure             
Experience of early wins or losses 2.32 .88 1-3 2.05 .90 1-3 1.83 .84 1-3 1.48 .76 1-3 
Gambling involvement (long term) 1.86 1.35 1-5 1.95 .97 1-5 2.21 .84 1-3.5 2.70 1.01 1-4.5 
Gambling career length 11.24 13.47 0-63 6.86 9.96 0-52 12.42 14.53 0-47 11.03 10.62 0-42 
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PGSI regression onto gambling involvement (current) explained 27% of variance in PGSI 
scores (ΔR2 = .268, F[1,350] = 128.08, p<.001) (see table 14). When PGSI group was regressed 
onto background individual differences, five significant factors explained 16% of variance in 
PGSI scores (ΔR2 = .163, F[5,344] = 13.73, p<.001): gender, mental health issues, experience of 
early wins or losses, gambling involvement (long term), gambling career length (see table 14).  
RIA revealed gender, experience of early win or loss, and gambling involvement (long 
term) each explaining significantly more variance than mental health issues and gambling 
career length. Non-significant background individual differences excluded from the final model 
and GRDQ (p>.05), included: age, ethnic background, highest level of education, current 
income, history of offending, current level of drug use, current level of alcohol use, current 
employment status, main type of gambling (skilled or unskilled), and source of gambling 
knowledge. 
 
Mediation 
Bootstrap estimates confirmed the mediating role of gambling involvement (current) in 
eight of ten relationships between decision making predictors and gambling consequences. 
Results indicated gambling involvement (current) fully mediated relationships between 
gambling consequences and cue sensitivity (venue), and partially mediated relationships with 
expectancy of negative outcomes, perceived immediacy of positive outcomes, motivation to 
gamble, lack of impulse control, cue sensitivity (emotional), self-monitoring deficit (problem), 
and variance across contexts).  
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Similarly, decision making variables fully mediated the relationship between 
consequences and three of five significant background variables (gender, mental health issues, 
and experience of early wins or losses). Indirect effect size estimates and bias corrected 
confidence intervals are shown in table 15 for all significant mediators/mediated relationships. 
Figure 1 shows the final model of gambling risk decision making, including significant 
predictors, direct and indirect pathway coefficients, and model fit statistics.  
 
Test-retest reliability of the revised 48-item GRDQ  
Test-retest reliability analyses between the first and retested samples revealed 
strong correlations for all sixteen factors of the final 48-item GRDQ (gambling involvement 
(current), r=.77, p<.001; expectancy of negative outcomes, r=.90, p<.001; perceived 
immediacy of positive outcomes, r=.86, p<.001; belief in luck and control of outcomes, 
r=.91, p<.001; motivation to gamble, r=.82, p<.001; lack of impulse control, r=.85, p<.001; 
cue sensitivity (emotional), r=.88, p<.001; cue sensitivity (venue), r=.92, p<.001; self-
monitoring deficit (problems), r=.96, p<.001; self-monitoring deficit (spending), r=.90, 
p<.001; variance across contexts, r=.93, p<.001; experience of early wins and losses, r=.91, 
p<.001, gambling involvement (long term), r=.90, p<.001) (Dancey & Reidy, 2004). Retest of 
static variables showed very strong or perfect correlations (age, r=1.00, p<.001, mental 
health diagnosis and treatment, r=1.00, p<.001, gender, r=1.00, p<.001; gambling career 
length, r=.99, p<.001) (Dancey & Reidy, 2004). 
The final 48-item, 16-factor GRDQ therefore measured current gambling involvement, 
ten significant decision making predictors and five background individual differences. 
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Normative data for the current sample is included in table 14. The 48-item GRDQ questionnaire 
and scoring protocol are presented in appendices C and D. 
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Table 15 
Indirect effect size estimates, including 95% confidence interval bias correction, for significant mediators between gambling factor relationships  
Factor–consequence relationship Mediator / mediator group 
 
 
 
Gambling 
involvement 
(current) 
      
Expectancy of negative outcomes .02  (.01; .03)       
Perceived immediacy of positive 
outcomes 
.04 (.02; .06)       
Motivation to gamble .12 (.07; .17)       
Lack of impulse control .04 (.03; .07)       
Cue sensitivity (emotional) .05 (.03; .07)       
Cue sensitivity (venue) .02  (.01; .04)       
Self-monitoring deficit (problems) -.11 (-.26;-.01)       
Variance across contexts .06 (.02;.11)       
  Estimation of 
negative 
outcomes 
Motivation to 
gamble 
Lack of impulse 
control 
Cue sensitivity 
(emotional) 
Self-monitoring 
deficit (problems) 
Self-monitoring 
deficit (spending) 
Gender   -.09 (-.18:-.03) -.10 (-.18:-.03) -.07 (-.14:-.03)  -.07 (-.15:-.00) 
Mental health issues  -.02 (-.04:-.00) -.04 (-.09:-.01) -.06 (-.12:-.03) -.05 (-.10:-.02)  -.05 (-.08:-.02) 
Experience of early wins or losses   .03(.00:.09) .08 (.02:.16) .06 (.01-.12) .15 (.06:.27)  
N.B. Relationships and numerals in bold identify fully mediated relationships, all other relationships identified in the table were significantly partially mediated 
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Discussion 
 
The current study highlights the importance of risk perception and decision making in 
gambling. Decision making factors fully mediated relationships between three of five 
significant risk factors and disordered gambling. In addition, differences across ten gambling 
decision making variables predicted a majority of variance in disordered gambling. Further, 
decision making and behaviour explained substantial variance in disordered gambling, both 
uniquely, and when decision making was mediated by gambling involvement, suggesting 
that while decision making influenced gambling involvement, it did not completely predict 
how frequently or for how long individuals gambled. Hence, both the amount people 
gamble and how people gamble appear critical to gambling consequences. Taken together, 
the findings of the current study support the relevance and plausibility of a gambling model 
with a central focus on risk decisions.  
The composition of the ten core decision making factors of the model provides a 
number of further insights into gambling decision making, discussed below.  
 
Perceptions of the likelihood of negative outcomes and the immediacy of positive 
outcomes 
All three factor analyses addressing outcome estimations (perceived likelihood, 
immediacy and preference) split similarly into loadings onto ‘positive’ versus ‘negative’ 
outcomes. Such a duality has previously been assumed, but not tested in the literature 
(Spurrier & Blaszczynski, 2013). These findings therefore suggest that a positive/negative 
division is common and meaningful among gamblers.  
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This duality is not absolute, however, with some items apparently more ambiguous 
than others. For example, ‘switching off, escaping’ cross-loaded onto both positive and 
negative factors in each of the three factor analyses, and was consequently removed from 
final scales, whereas other items loaded highly and more unitarily onto either positive or 
negative scales (e.g., ‘financial, work, or legal problems’). Therefore, outcomes have 
positive/negative perceptual qualities of varying intensity; individuals perceive outcomes in 
idiosyncratically varied ways, or both. 
Other findings suggested individuals attribute other important perceptual qualities 
to gambling outcomes. Both, the perceived immediacy of positive outcomes (but not 
negative outcomes), and underestimation of the likelihood of negative outcomes (but not 
positive) were significant in predicting harmful gambling outcomes. Differences in the way 
gamblers interpret the value, meaning, or immediacy of potential outcomes has not 
previously been examined in the gambling literature (Spurrier & Blaszczynski, 2013), though 
several studies have shown the relevance of outcome interpretation in substance use 
(Aarons, et al., 2001; Goldberg & Fischhoff, 2000). 
 
Belief in luck and personal control of gambling outcomes 
Model factors also addressed content relevant to other cognitive constructs 
common in the gambling literature, specifically disordered gamblers’ overestimation of 
winning (Wohl, 2008; Wood & Clapham, 2005, Joukhador, Blaszczynski, & Maccallum, 2004), 
and overestimation of control (Jacobsen, Knudsen, Krogh, Pallesen, & Molde 2007; Murseth, 
Brunborg, & Eidem, 2010). In the current study however, variation in these beliefs or biases 
loaded onto a single significant factor. Nonetheless, one that explained only a small amount 
of variance in disordered gambling overall. In addition, while belief in luck correlated weakly 
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to moderately with several other decision making constructs, other aspects of decision 
making each explained significantly greater unique variance in gambling consequences. This 
finding therefore highlights both the importance of gamblers’ beliefs about game causality, 
as well as the need for expansion of cognitive gambling models to incorporate other aspects 
of risky decision making identified in this study.   
 
Motivation to gamble and lack of behavioural control  
Gamblers’ motivation and control were identified as important predictors of 
gambling involvement and consequences. The presence of urges difficult to resist, and 
identification of a lack of control over behaviour, implies that individuals are using, or being 
dominated by, implicit, automatic reasoning processes in preference to analytic, systematic 
reasoning (Toplak, Liu, MacPherson, Toneatto, & Stanovich, 2007). A number of studies 
have identified that gamblers may leave themselves vulnerable to harm not only via explicit 
reasoning errors (e.g., holding erroneous beliefs about luck and control), but also by 
misapplying ‘automatic’ reasoning (e.g., applying ‘pattern recognition’ heuristics to random 
events), or ineffectively managing implicit processes with explicit reasoning (e.g., failing to 
inhibit implicit motivation, or failing to correct implicit reasoning errors) (Toplak, et al., 
2007; Stewart, 1999). Results of the current study therefore indicate that lower decision 
making processes explained an important and significant portion of behavioural outcomes, 
distinct from problematic systematic decision making. Hence, the process by which 
gamblers resolve conflict between, or apply implicit versus explicit risk decision making has 
important implications for accurate risk estimation, and vulnerability to harm. 
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Poor insight regarding problems and spending 
As expected, riskier gambling was associated generally with greater discrepancy 
between reported versus actual problems and spending. Such results indicate poorer 
monitoring, greater minimization, or both. For example, individuals may rationalize 
problems as being typical in the community, thereby downplaying their significance and 
justifying continued gambling.  
At the most extreme ends of the PGSI scale, however, the accuracy of problem self-
monitoring was comparable. That is, problem gamblers acknowledged higher levels of 
problems, with problem monitoring accuracy similar to non-problem gamblers. This may be 
the result of greater exposure and severity of issues faced by this more disordered gambler 
subgroup being more difficult to ignore or rationalize, suggesting more harmful gamblers 
must maintain gambling involvement through alternate decision making mechanisms 
(Delfabbro, 2004). 
Overall more disordered gamblers also tended to estimate their spending as higher 
relative to other people. An explanation for this apparent discrepancy between patterns of 
perceived spending and perceived problems may be that monitoring of spending represents 
an ‘extension’ of a general underestimation of problems. That is, problematic gamblers may 
overestimate how much others spend on gambling, due to poor insight or effort to minimize 
their own spending.  
Future research may clarify these issues, for example, through examination of the 
origins of inaccurate self-perceptions, in erroneous or incomplete beliefs, biased self-
monitoring, or a combination of both (Engwall, Hunter, & Steinberg, 2004; Brown, 1998). 
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Cue sensitivity and variance across contexts  
As expected, more hazardous gamblers reported greater variance in behaviour 
across contexts, as well as greater sensitivity to particular contextual cues associated with 
negative consequences, specifically negative mental states and gambling related 
environmental cues (Baudinet & Blaszczynski, 2012). Moderate correlations between 
decision variance and cue sensitivity suggest sensitivity to cues is associated with 
destabilization of decision making processes, responsible for greater risk taking and harm.  
In addition, sensitivity to emotional cues was a stronger predictor of gambling 
problems than venue cues. This may be reflective of more widespread sensitivity to 
emotional cues, or the greater influence of emotional cues in decision making. Again, 
further research may clarify this situation, as well as whether sensitivity originates from 
innate individual differences versus conditioning processes, or both, as has been suggested 
in the literature (Blaszczynski & Nower, 2002; Baudinet & Blaszczynski, 2012). 
 
Limitations of the study 
Several limitations of the current study are noted. The study included a contingent of 
university psychology students, potentially limiting generalizability of findings. However, to 
reduce sampling bias, the sample included a large number of both treatment experienced 
and inexperienced gamblers, and individuals ranging in exposure from minimal to high-
intensity, long-term gambling. In addition, many students were non-gamblers used for 
questionnaire validation procedures, but excluded from model analyses.  
Measurement issues also potentially limited the strength of findings. Due to the 
substantial number of items evaluated in the study, no additional questionnaires were 
included except the PGSI (Ferris & Wynne, 2001). While the validity and reliability of the 
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PGSI is well established (Holtgraves, 2009), diagnostic accuracy may have been improved by 
inclusion of clinical interviews, or additional self-report measures, such as the South Oaks 
Gambling Scale (SOGS) or the Victorian Gambling Screen (VGS) (Lesieur & Blume, 1987; 
Wenzel, 2004).  
Self-report may also have been confounded by rationalization or minimization of 
harms and behaviour (Peretti-Watel, 2003; Schneider & Wright, 2004; Rebelo, 1999). 
However, attempts were made to ensure the questionnaire and model was extensively 
evaluated via a large selection of evidence-based and reliable items and constructs with 
good final model fit, including items specifically evaluating accuracy of self-report data (e.g., 
insight regarding problems and spending).  
Nevertheless, inclusion of few validated measures may have contributed to a small 
number of non-decision making risk factor variables being identified in the study, and the 
high level of mediation observed. Validation evidence for the questionnaire and model, and 
understanding of gambling disorder would therefore likely benefit from further evaluation 
and integration of data around the central focal point of risk decision making, inclusive of 
other variables (e.g., social, biological, behavioural), and other methodological approaches 
(e.g., longitudinal measurement) (Johannson, et al., 2009). 
 
Practical applications and future directions 
The value of clinical models comes not only from the cohesiveness, 
comprehensiveness, or accuracy of representation of observations, but also through 
capacity to effectively guide adaptive change (Quine, 1951). While many models of gambling 
addiction and disorder draw from and cohere rich and detailed gambling research (Redish, 
Jensen, & Johnson, 2008), their theoretical perspectives are not necessarily mindful of 
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relationships between clinician and patient. Translation of abstract concepts such as 
neurophysiological processes, are therefore left dependent on the varied perspectives and 
training of clinicians, thereby contributing to error and unreliability.  
The methodology used to identify and describe core factors of the risk decision 
model was not only based on thorough review of the literature and mixed qualitative and 
psychometric analyses, but also deliberately grounded in the shared language of both 
clinicians and lay gamblers (Chiovitti & Piran, 2003). Such a model enables clinicians to 
explain core concepts in real world terms.  
As such, the ten core risk decision factors identified in the current study, by design, 
constitute valid, reasonable and important targets for assessment, formulation and 
treatment. It is suggested therefore that the GRDQ may be a valuable tool when used in 
conjunction with other diagnostic measures (such as the PGSI or SOGS), for building 
individual decision making vulnerability profiles, identifying relevant treatment targets, and 
acting as a guide for intervention via public policy or clinical tools (Cowlishaw, et al., 2012; 
Thomas, et al., 2011).  
 
Conclusion 
The research presented here yielded various clinically valuable insights regarding 
Gambling Disorder. Findings identify the importance of gamblers’ perception and 
interpretation of game causal operations, and negative versus positive potential outcomes, 
along with other factors affecting use of gambling data, such as sensitivity to mental and 
contextual cues. Development of individualized assessment, formulation and treatment 
methods addressing specific risk decision making factors, and the expansion of the risk 
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decisions model through integration of data from across the gambling literature, represent 
two important topics for future research.  
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CHAPTER 8: Discussion 
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Summary of major findings 
Cognitive and biopsychological research has identified a significant relationship 
between perception, decision making and the negative consequences associated with 
sustained gambling (Raylu & Oei, 2002). Drug and alcohol research has further suggested 
that how individuals navigate decisions involving motivating but risky activities involves 
several important, distinct but interrelated aspects of cognition (Aarons, Brown, Stice, & 
Coe, 2001). Remarkably, despite the clear importance, investigation of gambler risk 
perception and decision making has been rare (Spurrier & Blaszczynski, 2013). While there 
has been some limited recent interest in perceptions of negative versus positive outcomes, 
risk perception and other key risk decision constructs remain a largely overlooked area of 
the gambling literature.  
The broad aim of this thesis therefore was to investigate risk perception in gambling, 
and to present a model of gambling decision making that extensively examined and 
included important risk perception concepts.  
The thesis presented four studies that followed sequential steps in the Mental 
Models methodology (Morgan, Fischhoff, Bostrom, & Atman, 2002). First, existing evidence 
about the potential hazard was reviewed, next, qualitative methods examined expert and 
lay concepts about the hazard, and finally, a model of important factors impacting on 
exposure to the hazard was outlined, including means by which these factors could be 
systematically measured.  
Study one (reported in chapter four) involved systematic review of the literature on 
risk perception in gambling. The review aimed to identify all extant evidence about how 
gamblers perceive risk, and to outline what evidence revealed about the relationship 
between gambling risk perception and behaviour.  
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 Study two (reported in chapter five) involved qualitative interviews with gambling 
expert clinicians, researchers and policy makers (Nstudy 2= 11), based on Mental Models and 
Grounded Theory methodologies (Strauss & Corbin, 1998; Morgan, et al., 2002). The study 
aimed to construct an extensive ‘map’, based on comprehensive expert opinion, detailing all 
relevant factors mediating gamblers’ exposure to risk of harm.  
The study identified that, unlike in studies investigating other hazards (Bostrom, 
Fischoff, & Morgan, 1992; Gentner & Stevens, 1983), conflicting goals significantly affect 
gamblers’ decision making. That is, gamblers attempt not only to avoid harm, but also to 
gain benefits. As a result, gamblers’ exposure to harm is determined not only by the 
accuracy of risk perception, but also by a number of other decision making processes and 
mechanisms that may potentially conflict with each other, and be unstable over time and 
across different contexts.  
 Study three aimed to test these findings in a lay sample of gamblers, again using 
qualitative interview data (Nstudy 3 = 15) (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). The study compared 
gamblers’ views against the risk decision ‘map’ outlined by experts in study two, to identify 
patterns, similarities, gaps or differences in decision making associated with risky versus 
safe gambling. Individual gamblers were highly idiosyncratic in how they represented 
gambling decision making, but largely confirmed the importance of factors identified by 
experts as the critical arbiters of harm.  
 Study four (reported in chapter seven) aimed to test the findings of studies one, two 
and three in a larger sample (Nstudy 4 = 650), using quantitative methods to develop a model 
of gambling decision making factors mediating risk of harm, along with a systematic 
measure of decision making factors for use by clinicians and researchers (Preacher & Hayes, 
2004; Preacher & MacCallum, 2003). Results indicated that ten core decision making 
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variables: (1) mediated the influence of other factors associated with gambling harm, (2) 
explained a large proportion of negative gambling consequences, and (3) influenced 
whether, how, and how much individuals gambled, each bearing significant consequences 
for gamblers. 
Taken together, these four studies provide strong evidence of the importance of risk 
perception and decision making in gambling. There were a number of significant findings 
from the thesis: (1) Harmful gambling is associated with differences in how some gamblers 
evaluate and manage gambling risk; (2) Problem gamblers sustain motivation to gamble, 
despite higher negative expectancy, via various cognitive processes emphasizing positive, or 
reducing negative aspects of gambling; (3) Cognitive factors impacting on how gamblers use 
risk data include individual differences in: estimation and interpretation of outcomes, 
strategizing and planning, motivation and control of urges, insight or self-monitoring, 
sensitivity to gambling triggers, and inconsistency across contexts; (4) Individual expression 
of vulnerabilities to gambling disorder may vary substantially at an individual or group level, 
but collectively explain a substantial portion of gambling behaviour, its consequences, and 
dependence, and; (5) At the same time, gambling decision making represents an important 
mediator between identified risk factors and gambling disorder, and a valid and meaningful 
focal point for clinical theories of Gambling Disorder (American Psychiatric Association, 
2013).  
The findings across these four studies therefore confirm the importance of 
relationships between decision making, behaviour, consequences, and disorder, with 
disorder largely predictable based on a few core decision making factors, despite individual 
variation in clinical presentation.  
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The following section reviews (1) sampling, (2) design and (3) measurement issues 
within the current thesis, and how potential limitations may be ameliorated by research to 
expand the research findings.  
 
Limitations of the research 
 
(1) Sample selection  
All studies followed evidence-based methodologies aiming for rigour, validity, and 
reliability (Chiovitti & Piran, 2003; Morgan, et al., 2002; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). 
Nevertheless, research presented here was inevitably limited by participant selection. As 
previously discussed, study three sampling was potentially biased towards younger, 
university-educated gamblers, and treatment experienced, older, male gamblers. Study four 
also included a sizeable contingent of university students, despite overall including a diverse 
selection of participants with varied demographic attributes, gambling with little to high 
intensity, with and without treatment experience. Importantly, while students made up a 
substantial proportion of the sample used in questionnaire validation, they made up a 
considerably smaller proportion of the sample used in development of the model, since 
non-gamblers were excluded from these analyses.  
 
(2) Cross-sectional designs 
Practical convenience concerns (high relative recruitment costs, high dropout rates 
among disordered gamblers) led to selection of cross-sectional designs in all studies in the 
current thesis (Melville, Casey, Kavanagh, 2007). This approach is relatively typical in 
gambling research, though it imposes limits on causal inference (Raylu & Oei, 2002). 
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Causal direction and measurement in the model was therefore largely determined 
based on logical evaluation of included variables. For example, life events or demographic 
factors influencing decision making temporally preceded decision making, allowing causal 
direction to be assumed. In turn, decision making processes must precede behaviour 
resulting from these decision making processes, which in turn must precede the 
consequences of these behaviours. 
In addition, some items and constructs in the GRDQ were used to generate quasi-
experimental conditions, also enabling causal inference. For example, participants were 
asked to imagine how they would respond to different scenarios, with variance in responses 
enabling estimation of potentially influential decision making instability (Mischel, 2004).  
 
(3) Measurement issues 
Careful attention was given to choosing the most reliable, valid and appropriate 
measures (Ferris & Wynne, 2001), a task made difficult by the dearth of relevant, reliable 
formal gambling cognition measures (Moodie, 2007). The PGSI was selected as the most 
efficient, nuanced, and sample-appropriate measure of disordered gambling, since it was 
specifically designed for use by non-clinical samples, demonstrating good overall reliability 
(Ferris & Wynne, 2001; Holtgraves, 2009). 
Given that self-report inaccuracy is a potential confound in gambling research, a 
number of additional steps were also included to avoid bias (Peretti-Watel, 2003; Rebelo, 
1999; Schneider & Wright, 2004): (1) study three included flexibility in the interview 
protocol allowing scope for examination of participant reporter accuracy, (2) study four 
included direct measurement of participant reporting accuracy and variability, while (3) the 
overall questionnaire and model included a number of stages of validation overall 
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(systematic literature review, interviews with two distinct samples, exploratory and 
confirmatory factor analysis, path modelling) designed to compare, test and confirm 
findings across the studies (Preacher & MacCallum, 2003).  
Nevertheless, time requirements of the studies led to inclusion of no extraneous 
formal measures other than the PGSI. While, there is no universally agreed gold standard for 
diagnosis of Gambling Disorder (Productivity Commission, 2010), inclusion of additional self-
report measures (e.g., the South Oaks Gambling Screen or Victorian Gambling Screen) in 
studies three and four may have improved diagnostic reliability.  
 
Future research 
The potential limitations of the current studies suggest that the Gambling Risk 
Decisions Questionnaire (GRDQ) and gambling risk decision model may be effectively 
expanded and improved via several processes. Despite reasonable sample diversity relative 
to other gambling research (Johannson, Grant, Kim, Odlaug, & Gotestam, 2009; Gooding & 
Tarrier, 2009), it may be of value to gather further data for comparison across cultural 
groups not targeted in these studies.  
In addition, inter-factor or backwards causation may also be possible among some of 
the variables identified in the model. While not formally tested or represented in the model, 
except as covariance among correlated decision making variables, the investigation of 
further patterns of causation (e.g., between decision making factors) may be a valuable area 
of future research elucidating valuable detail about decision making processes.  
Further, the gambling model may also be expanded through inclusion of additional 
formal measures. In particular, psychobiological, sociological, or actuarial ‘risk factors’ for 
Gambling Disorder may be included, allowing further integration of risk decision making 
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concepts within the broader gambling literature (Johannson, et al., 2009; Andrews, Bonta, & 
Wormith, 2006).  
A number of specific strengths and practical applications flowing from the current 
research are discussed below.  
 
Practical applications and strengths of the research  
 
Clinical profiles and interventions 
The methodology used to develop the GRDQ and model presented in the research 
was deliberately grounded in the shared language of both clinicians and lay gamblers 
(Chiovitti & Piran, 2003). As such, disordered gambling was explained via a model based in 
‘real world’ terminology, referring to cognitive and behavioural experiences common to 
both clinicians and gamblers.  
The central concept and core factors of the risk decision model are therefore 
founded in description both comprehensible and relevant in a clinical treatment setting, 
forming common axes around which adaptive change typically takes place, through 
contemporary evidence-based psychological interventions (Gooding & Tarrier, 2009). For 
this reason, the ten core risk decision factors identified make valid, reasonable and 
important targets for assessment, formulation and treatment. That is, the GRDQ estimates 
areas of critical risk decision vulnerability. In conjunction with diagnostic tools measuring 
gambling problems and disorder, such as clinical interview or psychometric measures (e.g., 
the PGSI), the GRDQ may be used to build an individualized decision making profile for 
clients, identifying specific areas of vulnerability to harm and Gambling Disorder. 
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Conceivably, evidence-based treatment tools may then be matched and applied to address 
these core areas of vulnerability.  
For example, Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT), the current ‘gold standard’ for 
gambling treatment (Cowlishaw, et al., 2012; Thomas, et al., 2011), constitutes a large 
repertoire of clinical ‘tools’, many of which are relevant to the ten core vulnerabilities 
outlined in the model. Exaggerated belief in luck and personal capacity to control game 
outcomes for example represents a maladaptive, erroneous understanding of game causal 
operations likely to lead to negative consequences. A large body of evidence suggests that 
guided clinical interview, cognitive monitoring and cognitive challenging techniques may be 
used to effectively target and correct erroneous beliefs, such as exaggerated overestimation 
of positive outcomes, and may therefore constitute an appropriate component of treatment 
for individuals scoring highly on this scale on the GRDQ (See appendices A and B: Gambling 
Risk Decisions Questionnaire and scoring protocol) (Gooding & Tarrier, 2009).  
Alternatively, imaginal or in situ exposure has been shown to be effective in reducing 
unhelpful sensitivity to environmental cues and mental states - another potential area of 
individual vulnerability identified by the GRDQ, and therefore another target for tailored 
treatment (Cowlishaw, et al., 2012; Thomas, et al., 2011). Similarly, CBT-oriented 
interventions may be applied to other areas of vulnerability identified in the model, while 
factors with low scores may be excluded from clinical intervention. Through such a process, 
treatment may be systematically and efficiently customized around the specific needs of 
individual clients. 
It is suggested therefore that not only should treatment for gambling disorder in 
general include treatment tools specifically addressing the ten important areas of 
vulnerability identified in the risk decision model, but individuals’ personal vulnerability 
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profiles should be used to guide patient formulation and intervention content. Clinical 
interventions addressing vulnerability factors of the risk decisions model therefore 
constitute an important area for future research, not only involving tailored CBT 
interventions, but also other potential avenues for harm reduction, treatment or 
prevention, such as psychoeducative inoculation, public policy, non-CBT psychological or 
medical treatment, or integrative approaches (Productivity Commission, 2010). 
 
Strengths of the model and implications for mental health diagnosis and treatment 
The risk decision model outlined in this thesis expanded on previous cognitive 
literature and avoids many of its methodological and conceptual limitations. The model also 
has a number of other strengths deserving of attention, with implications for mental health 
diagnosis more broadly.  
The mixed qualitative-quantitative method applied in these studies provides solid 
ecological grounding and an extensive review of relevant factors, demonstrated by high 
explained variance and mediation of risk factors (Driscoll, Appiah-Yeboah, Salid, & Rupert, 
2007). The current model therefore effectively integrates and expands on concepts 
identified in controlled but ecologically unrealistic laboratory studies, and psychometric 
cognitive studies. Further, concepts identified in the model expand on previous cognitive 
theories, including heuristic/bias conceptualizations of gambling as the product of a limited 
number of core cognitive biases (Toneatto, Blitz-Miller, Calderwood, Dragonetti, & Tsasnos, 
1997), as well as more recent research addressing expectancy (Wickwire, Whelan, & 
Meyers, 2010; Wong & Tsang, 2012). In contrast to both of these approaches, the risk 
decisions model identifies significant predictors of gambling decisions beyond concepts such 
as exaggerated estimation of winning or control, and expectancy of specific outcomes. 
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Further, the model integrates these concepts within a broader conception of decision 
making that takes into consideration variables that may modify the salience and 
interpretation of perceptions.  
The model avoids the conceptual restrictions of previous cognitive gambling 
theories, such as the unreasonable demands of normative rationality models, instead basing 
core concepts in language comprehensible to key stake holders (Chiovitti & Piran, 2003). 
Further, it preserves individual heterogeneity, while nevertheless reducing Gambling 
Disorder to meaningful core variables, by presenting a model and instrument that produce 
unique profiles of the variation along specific axes of maladaption and change (Gooding & 
Tarrier, 2009). Such an approach de-pathologises and destigmatises the disordered gambler, 
alternatively recognizing hazardous gambling as the result of harmful but changeable 
aspects of choice (Gooding & Tarrier, 2009).  
Finally, concepts are presented in a manner that is integrative, inherently 
expandable, and therefore relevant to the broader gambling literature. That is, not only 
does the model include decision making factors, but it considers the pathways of association 
between decision making and factors bringing about decision making. For example, the 
relationship between comorbid mental health issues and disordered gambling was fully 
mediated in study four by motivation to gamble, lack of impulse control, emotional cue 
sensitivity and deficits in the monitoring of spending, implying that the role of mental health 
issues in Gambling Disorder comes through vulnerability based on these four factors.  
Therefore, the risk decision model may conceivably act as a central focal point from 
which other gambling research can be meaningfully integrated with clinically usable 
concepts. For example, neurophysiological dysfunction may be tested against and explained 
in terms of specific decision making vulnerabilities comprehensible to gambling treatment 
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clients. Hence the model may be gradually expanded to reflect the broader gambling 
literature with further research.  
As a result, the theoretical approach taken in this thesis has a number of advantages 
over previous attempts to model gambling, and may even potentially represent a process by 
which we reconsider the diagnostic systems and clinical models in common usage (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013). The recently published DSM-5, for example, has been 
criticized by a number of researchers. Specifically, DSM conceptualizations of stable versus 
acute aspects of psychological disorder, and reduction of disorders to criteria based 
thresholds fail to represent heterogeneity of disorder presentations in a cohesive, 
meaningful way (Aragona, 2009a, 2009b; New, Triebwasser, & Charney, 2008).  
An alternative and possibly more effective method for assessing and cohesively 
diagnosing disorder may be achievable through: (1) profiling individuals’ mental health 
disorders according to the specifically identified problem (in the case outlined here: 
persistent, recurrent gambling resulting in harm and loss of control), and (2) orienting 
intervention directly towards decision making factors specifically identified as important to 
the maintenance of maladaptive functioning.  
This process might be applied with equivalent effectiveness to other risky or harmful 
behaviour, such as unhealthy eating, social conflict, or intrusive obsessional activity, with 
assessment and treatment of core decision making factors associated with the behaviour, 
such as biased self-evaluations or social values, unhelpful beliefs and expectations, 
sensitivity to cues, or self-regulation strategies. As outlined in this thesis, this approach has 
a number of advantages, such as de-pathologising of the patient through emphasis and 
normalization of clinical problems, functional description of problems in relation to 
treatable psychological variables, potential for integration of the literature around 
 196 
treatment targets, and capacity for meaningful subtyping along axes of change. As such the 
process of theoretical model development outlined here in relation to Gambling Disorder 
might also be effectively applied in other areas of mental health. 
 
Summary and concluding remarks 
This thesis was developed as a response to the clear gap in the literature and logical 
place for risk perception and decision making in Gambling Disorder. Through a series of four 
studies, a number of important findings were made relating to understanding and modelling 
risk perception and decision making in gambling disorder, as well as the relevance of issue-
focused decision making models in mental health.  
The most significant findings are summarized below:  
 
(i) Risk and benefit perception plays an important role in gambling, protecting 
against or increasing vulnerability to harm and disordered gambling. 
Idiosyncratic beliefs among disordered gamblers result in insufficient 
prioritization of needs, planning and implementation of risk management 
strategies.  
 
(ii) Disordered gamblers hold both: more optimistic overall perceptions of risk, and 
a mixture of more positive and more negative specific outcome expectations. 
Disordered gamblers appear able to sustain motivation to gamble, despite more 
negative overall expectation and experience, through cognitive processes 
preferentially emphasising positive over negative outcomes, resulting in 
persistent or recurrent overvaluation of gambling. 
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(iii) Gambling decision making predicts a large proportion of the variance in negative 
behavioural outcomes and disorder, including variance both overlapping and 
distinct from gambling involvement. Gambling decision making therefore 
influences both the amount, and the way individuals gamble, both of which 
significantly influence gambling outcomes. 
 
(iv) Gamblers’ beliefs about causality, meaning, motivation, and strategy may be 
complex and highly idiosyncratic, with differences even within groups regarding 
beliefs, interpretation, planning, sensitivity to cues, or variability across 
contexts.  
 
(v) Nevertheless, more disordered gambling is specifically predicted by: lower 
expectations of negative outcomes, perception of positive outcomes as more 
immediate, and a stronger belief in personal luck, capacity to control game 
outcomes, and overall likelihood of positive gambling outcomes. In addition to 
specific beliefs, disordered gamblers tend to process risk and make decisions 
differently having: stronger impulses to gamble, lower reported control of these 
impulses, greater sensitivity to contextual/environmental and mental/emotional 
cues, making greater use of automatic decision making strategies rather than 
applying systematic reasoning. More risky gambling was also associated with 
over-estimating relative spending, but underestimating relative problems.  
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(vi) Gambling decision making represents an important mediator between identified 
risk factors and gambling disorder, and a valid and meaningful focal point for 
clinical theories of gambling disorder. Socio-cultural and biological individual 
differences influence instantiation of beliefs and cognitive processes affecting 
decision making. 
 
In conclusion, it is clear that the research presented here has yielded various 
clinically valuable insights into the nature of Gambling Disorder. Specifically, the findings 
stress the importance of gamblers’ perception and interpretation of game causal operations 
and negative versus positive potential outcomes, along with factors impacting on how 
gamblers use gambling data. Development of individualized assessment, formulation and 
treatment methods addressing specific risk decision making factors, and expansion of the 
risk decision making model by integrating data from other areas of gambling research are 
likely to be important topics for future research.  
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Abstract Perception of the consequences of risk affects motivation and behaviour. In
gambling, distorted expectations and preferences towards outcomes are associated with
significant social and clinical harms. A systematic review was conducted to examine the
relationship between gambling risk perception and behaviour. Sixteen studies met inclu-
sion criteria. Studies provided evidence that disordered gamblers hold both more optimistic
overall perceptions of risk, and a mixture of more positive and more negative specific
outcome expectations. Preliminary evidence suggests a range of contextual and individual
differences moderate risk perception affecting decision-making. Disordered gamblers
appear to sustain motivation to gamble, despite more negative expectations and experi-
ences, via cognitive processes that result in preferential emphasis on positive over negative
outcomes. Given potential differences in the perception of risk between various categories
of gamblers, clinicians should take into account how gamblers in treatment view gambling
as a risky behaviour. Improving the accuracy of such perceptions may reduce the pro-
pensity for risk-taking behaviours.
Keywords Gambling  Pathological Gambling  Harm  Risk perception  Cognition 
Decision making
Introduction
Gambling is a widely available, commonly accessed hazard, associated with significant
social costs (Productivity Commission 2010). Yet, only some individuals gamble long
enough, or with large enough sums, that they experience significant harm (Walker 2005). A
large body of research argues that attitudes, perceptions and beliefs about risk play an
important role in risky behaviour (Breakwell 2007; Glanz et al. 2008; Binde 2009).
Understanding how gamblers perceive risk is likely to be important in understanding why
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specific subgroups of gamblers expose themselves to gambling-related harm (Johansson
et al. 2009).
Risk Perception, Decision-Making and Gambling Behaviour
A key feature of gambling is that it involves risky choice, in that outcomes are typically
both uncertain, and potentially harmful. Evidence from risk and health behaviour research
suggests that when faced with risky choices, agents’ perceptions of risk play a significant
role in determining intention, and subsequent behaviour (Ajzen 2011; Breakwell 2007;
Morgan et al. 2002; Oei and Jardim 2007; Siegrist et al. 2005). Central to risky choice and
behaviour is how agents perceive critical risk parameters: the range of potential outcomes;
the meaning of potential outcomes; and factors that determine the likelihood of outcomes
(e.g., the agents’ cognition, and behavioural control, or game mechanics determining
probability) (Ajzen 2011; Weber et al. 2002).
In uncertain systems, agents must estimate one or more of the parameters defining
outcomes. By its nature, such estimation is open to error. Estimation may relate to
parameters determining outcomes, e.g., the likelihood of one side of a die facing up instead
of another. However, estimation may also be involved in the interpretation of potential
outcomes (Campbell 2006). That is, individuals may accurately or inaccurately perceive
the potential impact of particular outcomes, such as the harm caused by losing a wager, or
series of wagers.
Risky choice may expose people to harm, via underestimation of risk related to how
outcomes are determined, error in the meaning assigned to outcomes, or through conscious
engagement with risk-bearing systems. However, while agents may knowingly make
choices that carry risk of negative consequences, the accuracy of risk estimation in itself
may have important consequences for behaviour related to hazards (Breakwell 2007).
Understanding how agents estimate risk parameters, and how estimations are used in
decision-making and behaviour, is important in assisting people to safely negotiate haz-
ards. An empirically-based understanding of gambling risk-perception would be useful for
guiding treatment or developing preventative education for individuals who experience
harm as a result of systematic errors in risk estimation. What then does the existing
literature tell us about how individuals perceive gambling-related risk parameters, and the
role of risk perception in choice and behaviour?
Risk and Positive Perception of Gambling
Research suggests that users’ expectations of potential outcomes are important to the
maintenance or moderation of risky behaviours such as alcohol (Oei and Jardim 2007;
Smith et al. 1995); and drug use (Aarons et al. 2001; Julie Goldberg and Fischhoff 2000).
Similarly, cognitive research in gambling has shown that gamblers’ perceptions about risk
play a significant role in gambling behaviour. Gamblers hold preferences (Lee et al. 2007;
Binde 2009) and make predictions (Fortune and Goodie 2011) about particular game
outcomes.
Gamblers report different motivations for engaging in, or avoiding gambling (Clarke
et al. 2007). Preferences for particular outcomes are reflected in idiosyncratic motivation
for gambling. When gambling, individuals or subgroups appear to be differentially moti-
vated by potential outcomes, such as: winning money (Rosecrance 1985); the ‘dream’ of a
substantial win (Cotte 1997); intellectual challenge (Cotte 1997; Lee et al. 2007); emotion
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regulation (Shead et al. 2008); avoiding loss (Hing and Breen 2008); and social rewards
(Cotte 1997; Lee et al. 2007).
In addition, gamblers hold detailed representations of the causality within gambling
systems. Causal representations of gambling operations have been examined in the liter-
ature in the form of explicit beliefs about: luck (Wohl 2008; W. S. Wood and Clapham
2005); determinism (Joukhador et al. 2004); strategies for playing (Luengo et al. 2000);
and the perceived impact that the gambler has on game-play and outcomes (Jacobsen et al.
2007; Myrseth et al. 2010).
Evidence suggests that there is considerable individual variation in perceptions of
gambling-related preference (Clarke et al. 2007; Shead et al. 2008) and causality
(Delfabbro 2004). Further, some types of perceptions about gambling have been explicitly
linked to disordered gambling (Toneatto 1999). For example, more preoccupied, disor-
dered gamblers were both: more likely to perceive gambling as a means of escape from
stress or problems (Clarke et al. 2007) or augmentation of positive mood states (Shead
et al. 2008); and, more likely to overestimate skill (Fortune and Goodie 2011), and the
chance of positive outcomes (Delfabbro 2004). Such research provides evidence of a
relationship between risk perception, motivation, and gambling although it does not pro-
vide sufficient data for a comprehensive model of how individuals think and behave in
relation to perceived gambling risk.
Highly-cited reviews (e.g., Crockford and el-Guebaly 1998; Goudriaan et al. 2004;
Raylu and Oei 2002; Toneatto et al. 1997), and models (e.g., Blaszczynski and Nower
2002; Sharpe 2002) of gambling typically discuss gambling cognitions in relation to:
beliefs or heuristics related to overestimation of either the likelihood of positive outcomes;
the gamblers’ capacity to favourably control outcomes; or both. However, gambling
models have not to date included consideration of gamblers’ explicit perceptions, beliefs or
attitudes about potential negative outcomes. Representing risk perception in this way fails
to include important components of perception and choice, according to many, well-
supported models of risky choice across other disciplines, e.g., the Theories of Planned
Behaviour and Reasoned Action (Ajzen 2011; Albarracin et al. 2001); the Health Belief
Model (Glanz et al. 2008), The Psychometric Paradigm of Perceptions of Hazards (Siegrist
et al. 2005), the Mental Models approach (Morgan et al. 2002); and Choice theory (Skog
2000).
Theories of risky choice highlight several factors warranting further attention in gam-
bling theories such as gamblers’ perceptions of beneficial versus harmful outcomes
(Morgan et al. 2002), the risk of harmful outcomes (Glanz et al. 2008), and the meaning of
outcomes (Ajzen 2011); and influence between risk perception, motivation and behaviour.
The aim of this systematic review was to evaluate existing evidence related to: gamblers’
perceptions of gambling risks and harms; and the relationship between risk perception and
behaviour. Specifically, we attempted to determine what research tells us about: (1) the
harmful outcomes gamblers expect from gambling; (2) the role of gambling outcome
expectations in decision-making and behaviour; and (3) cognitive factors that moderate
relationships between outcome perception and choice behaviour.
Method
A literature search was conducted using the electronic databases MEDLINE, PsycINFO,
Web of Science, and Google Scholar were searched using keywords: ‘risk*’, ‘harm*’, and
‘outcome*’, combined with ‘gambling’. There were no limits placed on the years for
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searched articles. All subject headings were auto-exploded to broaden the search for rel-
evant studies. Article reference lists were reviewed to identify research not captured in the
initial screening process.
Studies were included if they made reference to: perception of negative or harmful
consequences of gambling; perception of risk or likelihood of potentially harmful conse-
quences of gambling; appraisal or comparison of different gambling outcomes.
Studies were excluded if they: did not include human participants; were not published in
English; were not available as full-text (e.g., published conference abstracts with no
associated article); or were not published in a refereed format (excluding government
reports). Studies were not included if they were limited to discussion of only: risks or
harms to society or non-gamblers (e.g., family members of gamblers); perceptions of
purely beneficial consequences of gambling; general attitudes about gambling; non-
gamblers’ perceptions of risks or harms (e.g., expert opinion, general public sample);
examination of past, but not current or future-oriented gambling consequences.
In all, 2,814 articles were identified through the search strategy. Titles and abstracts
were reviewed to determine the relevance of studies to the inclusion and exclusion criteria.
84 articles were read in full. Articles meeting inclusion criteria (as described above) were
retained and reviewed in detail.
Results
Of the 2,814 articles identified, 16 studies met criteria for inclusion, and their character-
istics are summarized in Table 1. Year of publication ranged from 2003 to 2012. Of the 16
articles reviewed, three were carried out in Australia, four in Canada, three in China, one in
Switzerland, one in the UK, and four in the USA. 11 studies included some measure of
gambling behavior (e.g., self-report of gambling activity or spending), psychopathology
(e.g., psychometric measures such as the SOGS (Lesieur and Blume 1987) and DSM-
IV-MR-J (Fisher 2000), or both behaviour and psychopathology. It is noted that Gillespie
et al. (2007a, b) published two papers using the same sample of participants, but reporting
different comparative breakdown of data. Articles were analyzed according to how they
addressed the three aims of the review.
General Limitations of the Gambling Risk Perception Literature
Based on the literature review, very few studies evaluated or made reference to risk
perception, in contrast to the wealth of literature addressing other forms of addiction
(Ajzen 2011; Breakwell 2007; Glanz et al. 2008), and cognitive distortions contributing to
overestimation of winning (Delfabbro 2004; Fortune and Goodie 2011; Jacobsen et al.
2007; Raylu and Oei 2002). Most studies reviewed made only tangential reference to risk
perception, and were limited by several common methodological issues.
First, all reviewed articles reported findings from cross-sectional empirical studies,
meaning that inference could not be made about the causal influence between perception,
intention and behaviour (Baron and Kenny 1986; Weinstein 2007). Several of the studies
included indirect or no measurement of gambling psychopathology (Dean 2011; Gillespie
et al. 2007a; Inglin and Gmel 2011; Li et al. 2010) or gambling behaviour (Dean 2011;
Gillespie et al. 2007a; Li et al. 2010), therefore relationships between risk perception and
behaviour could not be evaluated in many of the studies reviewed.
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w
s
S
tu
d
y
2
:
C
A
G
E
S
(3
8
it
em
s)
S
tu
d
y
3
:
C
A
G
E
S
(1
8
it
em
s)
S
O
G
S
-R
A
S
tu
d
y
1
:
q
u
al
it
at
iv
e
fo
cu
s
g
ro
u
p
in
te
rv
ie
w
s:
ex
p
ec
ta
ti
o
n
s
fr
o
m
g
am
b
li
n
g
,
in
cl
u
d
in
g
b
en
efi
ts
an
d
ri
sk
s.
P
ar
ti
ci
p
an
t
g
am
b
li
n
g
b
eh
av
io
u
r
cl
as
si
fi
ed
b
as
ed
o
n
se
lf
-r
ep
o
rt
S
tu
d
y
2
:
3
8
-i
te
m
(9
fa
ct
o
rs
),
fo
rc
ed
-c
h
o
ic
e
C
h
in
es
e
A
d
o
le
sc
en
t
G
am
b
li
n
g
E
x
p
ec
ta
n
cy
S
ca
le
(C
A
G
E
S
)
m
ea
su
re
d
g
am
b
li
n
g
ex
p
ec
ta
ti
o
n
s
S
tu
d
y
3
:
1
8
-i
te
m
(5
fa
ct
o
rs
)
v
er
si
o
n
o
f
th
e
C
A
G
E
S
S
tu
d
y
1
:
T
w
o
m
ai
n
th
em
es
em
er
g
ed
:
p
o
si
ti
v
e
(m
at
er
ia
l
g
ai
n
,
so
ci
al
b
en
efi
t,
en
jo
y
m
en
t/
ar
o
u
sa
l,
se
lf
-
en
h
an
ce
m
en
t,
te
n
si
o
n
/b
o
re
d
o
m
re
d
u
ct
io
n
)
an
d
n
eg
at
iv
e
g
am
b
li
n
g
co
n
se
q
u
en
ce
s
(r
el
at
io
n
al
co
st
,
o
u
t
o
f
co
n
tr
o
l,
m
o
n
ey
lo
ss
,
b
eh
av
io
u
ra
l
p
ro
b
le
m
s)
S
tu
d
y
2
:
P
ri
n
ci
p
al
C
o
m
p
o
n
en
ts
A
n
al
y
si
s
re
d
u
ce
d
C
A
G
E
S
to
1
8
it
em
s
lo
ad
in
g
o
n
fi
v
e
fa
ct
o
rs
(r
el
at
io
n
al
,
so
ci
al
b
en
efi
t,
m
at
er
ia
l
g
ai
n
,
o
u
t
o
f
co
n
tr
o
l,
m
o
n
ey
lo
ss
)
S
tu
d
y
3
:
C
h
in
es
e
ad
o
le
sc
en
ts
h
el
d
w
el
l-
fo
rm
ed
g
am
b
li
n
g
ex
p
ec
ta
ti
o
n
s.
In
d
iv
id
u
al
s
w
it
h
g
re
at
er
g
am
b
li
n
g
in
v
o
lv
em
en
t
re
p
o
rt
ed
h
ig
h
er
ex
p
ec
ta
ti
o
n
s
o
f
p
o
si
ti
v
e
o
u
tc
o
m
es
(s
o
ci
al
b
en
efi
t
an
d
m
at
er
ia
l
g
ai
n
)
an
d
so
m
e
n
eg
at
iv
e
o
u
tc
o
m
es
(b
ei
n
g
o
u
t
o
f
co
n
tr
o
l)
;
re
p
o
rt
ed
w
ea
k
er
ex
p
ec
ta
ti
o
n
s
o
f
o
th
er
ty
p
es
o
f
n
eg
at
iv
e
o
u
tc
o
m
es
(r
el
at
io
n
al
co
st
s,
m
o
n
ey
lo
ss
)
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n
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A
u
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o
r
S
am
p
le
an
d
st
u
d
y
d
es
ig
n
M
ea
su
re
sa
G
am
b
li
n
g
ri
sk
p
er
ce
p
ti
o
n
an
d
b
eh
av
io
u
ra
l
v
ar
ia
b
le
s
K
ey
fi
n
d
in
g
s
ab
o
u
t
ri
sk
p
er
ce
p
ti
o
n
in
g
am
b
li
n
g
T
ao
et
al
.
(2
0
1
1
)
N
=
7
9
1
(4
2
.2
%
fe
m
al
e)
(A
g
e
=
C
1
8
y
ea
rs
).
C
h
in
es
e-
sp
ea
k
in
g
M
ac
au
re
si
d
en
ts
;
g
am
b
le
d
in
th
e
la
st
1
2
m
o
n
th
s.
T
el
ep
h
o
n
e
n
u
m
b
er
s
ra
n
d
o
m
ly
se
le
ct
ed
fr
o
m
R
es
id
en
ti
al
T
el
ep
h
o
n
e
D
ir
ec
to
ry
.
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
iz
ed
te
le
p
h
o
n
e
se
lf
-r
ep
o
rt
su
rv
ey
G
M
A
B
b
1
1
0
-i
te
m
,
fo
rc
ed
-c
h
o
ic
e
G
am
b
li
n
g
M
o
ti
v
es
,
A
tt
it
u
d
es
an
d
B
eh
av
io
u
r
(G
M
A
B
)
sc
al
e
fo
r
C
h
in
es
e
g
am
b
le
rs
m
ea
su
re
d
:
su
p
er
st
it
io
u
s
b
el
ie
fs
;
te
ch
n
iq
u
es
fo
r
w
in
n
in
g
;
b
eh
av
io
ra
l
co
n
tr
o
l;
ar
o
u
sa
l;
in
v
o
lv
em
en
t;
D
S
M
-I
V
P
G
sy
m
p
to
m
s;
m
o
ti
v
at
io
n
s
to
g
am
b
le
.
G
M
A
B
in
cl
u
d
es
1
0
it
em
s
ab
o
u
t
p
er
ce
iv
ed
n
eg
at
iv
e
co
n
se
q
u
en
ce
s
o
f
g
am
b
li
n
g
;
su
m
m
ed
as
si
n
g
le
fa
ct
o
r
d
en
o
ti
n
g
p
er
ce
iv
ed
u
n
fa
v
o
u
ra
b
il
it
y
o
f
g
am
b
li
n
g
P
er
ce
p
ti
o
n
th
at
g
am
b
li
n
g
h
as
n
eg
at
iv
e
co
n
se
q
u
en
ce
s
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
tl
y
n
eg
at
iv
el
y
co
rr
el
at
ed
w
it
h
:
se
lf
-w
o
rt
h
,
se
n
sa
ti
o
n
-s
ee
k
in
g
,
su
p
er
st
it
io
u
s
b
el
ie
fs
an
d
b
eh
av
io
r;
g
am
b
li
n
g
in
v
o
lv
em
en
t;
p
o
si
ti
v
el
y
co
rr
el
at
ed
w
it
h
:
fe
m
al
e
g
en
d
er
,
in
cr
ea
se
d
ag
e,
b
el
ie
fs
th
at
g
am
b
li
n
g
o
u
tc
o
m
es
ar
e
d
et
er
m
in
ed
b
y
lu
ck
,
ch
an
ce
o
r
fa
te
.
N
o
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
t
re
la
ti
o
n
sh
ip
b
et
w
ee
n
P
G
an
d
p
er
ce
p
ti
o
n
o
f
n
eg
at
iv
e
g
am
b
li
n
g
co
n
se
q
u
en
ce
s
In
g
li
n
an
d
G
m
el
(2
0
1
1
)
N
=
2
5
0
0
(5
1
.2
%
fe
m
al
e)
(M
a
g
e
=
4
3
y
ea
rs
,
R
an
g
e
=
1
5
–
7
4
).
R
an
d
o
m
-q
u
o
ta
sa
m
p
li
n
g
an
d
in
te
rv
ie
w
in
g
u
si
n
g
co
m
p
u
te
r-
as
si
st
ed
te
le
p
h
o
n
e
in
te
rv
ie
w
in
g
;
S
w
it
ze
rl
an
d
A
tt
it
u
d
es
sc
al
eb
S
el
f-
re
p
o
rt
ed
g
a
m
b
li
n
g
a
ct
iv
it
y
a
n
d
sp
en
d
in
g
A
tt
it
u
d
es
sc
al
e
ev
al
u
at
ed
v
ar
io
u
s
at
ti
tu
d
es
to
g
am
b
li
n
g
:
g
am
b
li
n
g
p
o
li
cy
,
p
u
rp
o
se
o
f
g
am
b
li
n
g
,
ty
p
ic
al
g
am
b
le
rs
’
p
er
so
n
al
it
y
.
S
ca
le
in
cl
u
d
es
:
1
it
em
as
se
ss
in
g
p
er
ce
iv
ed
ad
d
ic
ti
v
en
es
s
o
f
g
am
b
li
n
g
,
7
it
em
s
as
se
ss
in
g
p
er
ce
iv
ed
d
an
g
er
o
u
sn
es
s
o
f
v
ar
io
u
s
g
am
es
G
am
b
le
rs
co
m
p
ar
ed
to
n
o
n
-g
am
b
le
rs
ra
te
d
so
m
e
g
am
es
(p
o
k
er
,
v
id
eo
lo
tt
er
y
,
sc
ra
tc
h
ca
rd
s,
lo
tt
er
y
,
sp
o
rt
to
to
)
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
tl
y
le
ss
d
an
g
er
o
u
s.
N
o
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
t
d
if
fe
re
n
ce
s
in
p
er
ce
p
ti
o
n
o
f
ta
b
le
g
am
es
an
d
sl
o
t
m
ac
h
in
es
.
G
am
b
le
rs
co
m
p
ar
ed
to
n
o
n
-g
am
b
le
rs
p
er
ce
iv
ed
g
am
b
li
n
g
an
d
to
b
ac
co
as
le
ss
ad
d
ic
ti
v
e
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u
d
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d
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M
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re
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G
am
b
li
n
g
ri
sk
p
er
ce
p
ti
o
n
an
d
b
eh
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io
u
ra
l
v
ar
ia
b
le
s
K
ey
fi
n
d
in
g
s
ab
o
u
t
ri
sk
p
er
ce
p
ti
o
n
in
g
am
b
li
n
g
D
ea
n
(2
0
1
1
)
N
=
1
0
3
(5
3
.4
%
fe
m
al
e)
(M
a
g
e
=
2
1
.6
y
ea
rs
,
S
D
=
1
.3
).
C
o
n
v
en
ie
n
ce
sa
m
p
le
o
f
u
n
d
er
g
ra
d
u
at
e
b
u
si
n
es
s
st
u
d
en
ts
;
B
2
4
y
ea
rs
;
so
m
e
ex
p
er
ie
n
ce
o
f
b
la
ck
ja
ck
;
A
lb
u
q
u
er
q
u
e,
U
S
A
.
S
el
f-
re
p
o
rt
su
rv
ey
S
o
ci
o
-d
em
o
g
ra
p
h
ic
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
S
el
f-
re
p
o
rt
ed
ri
sk
an
d
sk
il
l
re
la
te
d
to
p
la
y
in
g
b
la
ck
ja
ck
Q
u
es
ti
o
n
n
ai
re
ev
al
u
at
ed
p
er
ce
iv
ed
:
fi
n
an
ci
al
ri
sk
fo
r
an
av
er
ag
e
p
la
y
er
;
p
er
so
n
al
fi
n
an
ci
al
ri
sk
;
en
jo
y
m
en
t
o
f
p
la
y
in
g
;
p
er
so
n
al
ex
p
er
ie
n
ce
;
sk
il
l
at
p
la
y
in
g
A
u
th
o
rs
re
p
o
rt
ed
th
at
p
er
ce
iv
ed
fi
n
an
ci
al
ri
sk
to
se
lf
w
as
b
o
th
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
tl
y
co
rr
el
at
ed
an
d
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
tl
y
d
if
fe
re
n
t
to
p
er
ce
iv
ed
ri
sk
to
an
av
er
ag
e
o
th
er
p
la
y
er
.
S
el
f-
re
p
o
rt
ed
le
v
el
o
f
ex
p
er
ie
n
ce
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
tl
y
as
so
ci
at
ed
w
it
h
sk
il
l,
b
u
t
n
o
t
ri
sk
to
se
lf
.
H
ig
h
er
p
er
ce
iv
ed
v
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
to
lo
ss
as
so
ci
at
ed
w
it
h
p
er
ce
p
ti
o
n
o
f
lo
w
er
sk
il
l
an
d
fu
n
W
ic
k
w
ir
e
et
al
.
(2
0
1
0
)
S
tu
d
y
1
:
N
=
3
5
(5
8
.8
%
fe
m
al
e)
(M
a
g
e
=
1
6
.9
y
ea
rs
,
S
D
=
0
.8
,
R
an
g
e
=
1
6
–
1
9
).
H
ig
h
sc
h
o
o
l
st
u
d
en
ts
;
M
em
p
h
is
,
U
S
A
.
3
3
p
ar
ti
ci
p
an
ts
se
lf
-i
d
en
ti
fi
ed
as
A
fr
ic
an
-A
m
er
ic
an
.
S
el
f-
re
p
o
rt
su
rv
ey
S
tu
d
y
2
:
N
=
1
0
7
6
(5
5
.9
%
fe
m
al
e)
(M
a
g
e
=
1
6
.2
y
ea
rs
,
S
D
=
1
.1
,
R
an
g
e
=
1
3
–
1
9
).
U
rb
an
,
p
u
b
li
c
h
ig
h
sc
h
o
o
l
st
u
d
en
ts
;
M
em
p
h
is
,
U
S
A
.
S
el
f-
re
p
o
rt
su
rv
ey
S
tu
d
y
1
:
O
p
en
-e
n
d
ed
ex
p
ec
ta
n
cy
q
u
es
ti
o
n
n
ai
re
F
ix
ed
-l
is
t
q
u
es
ti
o
n
n
ai
re
D
ra
ft
ex
p
ec
ta
n
cy
it
em
s
G
am
b
li
n
g
A
ct
iv
it
y
S
tu
d
y
2
:
G
am
b
li
n
g
ex
p
ec
ta
n
ci
es
S
O
G
S
-R
A
S
tu
d
y
1
:
P
ar
ti
ci
p
an
ts
li
st
ed
al
l
p
o
te
n
ti
al
o
u
tc
o
m
es
o
f
g
am
b
li
n
g
;
ra
te
d
ex
p
ec
ta
n
cy
o
f
o
u
tc
o
m
es
id
en
ti
fi
ed
in
li
te
ra
tu
re
re
v
ie
w
.
S
tu
d
y
2
:
P
ar
ti
ci
p
an
ts
ra
te
d
ex
p
ec
ta
n
cy
o
f
5
0
sp
ec
ifi
c
g
am
b
li
n
g
o
u
tc
o
m
es
(2
0
it
em
s
fr
o
m
S
tu
d
y
1
,
3
0
it
em
s
fr
o
m
li
te
ra
tu
re
re
v
ie
w
)
A
d
o
le
sc
en
ts
h
o
ld
w
el
l
fo
rm
ed
ex
p
ec
ta
ti
o
n
s
o
f
g
am
b
li
n
g
.
A
ll
fi
v
e
ex
p
ec
ta
n
cy
d
o
m
ai
n
s
ac
co
u
n
te
d
fo
r
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
t
v
ar
ia
n
ce
in
g
am
b
li
n
g
p
ro
b
le
m
s
an
d
fr
eq
u
en
cy
,
an
d
to
g
et
h
er
ac
co
u
n
te
d
fo
r
a
m
aj
o
ri
ty
o
f
v
ar
ia
n
ce
in
g
am
b
li
n
g
fr
eq
u
en
cy
,
an
d
ap
p
ro
x
im
at
el
y
h
al
f
o
f
v
ar
ia
n
ce
in
g
am
b
li
n
g
p
ro
b
le
m
s.
M
o
re
fr
eq
u
en
t
g
am
b
le
rs
an
d
P
ro
b
le
m
G
am
b
le
rs
h
ad
h
ig
h
er
ex
p
ec
ta
ti
o
n
o
f
m
at
er
ia
l
g
ai
n
,
n
eg
at
iv
e
em
o
ti
o
n
s,
se
lf
-e
n
h
an
ce
m
en
t;
an
d
lo
w
er
ex
p
ec
ta
ti
o
n
s
o
f
n
eg
at
iv
e
so
ci
al
co
n
se
q
u
en
ce
s,
p
ar
en
ta
l
d
is
ap
p
ro
v
al
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G
am
b
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g
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p
er
ce
p
ti
o
n
an
d
b
eh
av
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u
ra
l
v
ar
ia
b
le
s
K
ey
fi
n
d
in
g
s
ab
o
u
t
ri
sk
p
er
ce
p
ti
o
n
in
g
am
b
li
n
g
N
o
w
er
an
d
B
la
sz
cz
y
n
sk
i
(2
0
1
0
)
N
=
1
6
0
1
(4
9
.8
%
fe
m
al
e)
(R
an
g
e
=
2
1
–
7
9
y
rs
).
P
ro
b
le
m
g
am
b
le
rs
v
o
lu
n
ta
ri
ly
se
lf
-
ex
cl
u
d
in
g
;
M
is
so
u
ri
ca
si
n
o
s
fr
o
m
2
0
0
1
–
2
0
0
3
A
p
p
li
ca
ti
on
fo
r
se
lf
-
ex
cl
u
si
o
n
A
p
p
li
ca
ti
o
n
fo
r
ex
cl
u
si
o
n
fr
o
m
ca
si
n
o
s
in
cl
u
d
ed
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
ab
o
u
t:
g
am
b
li
n
g
in
v
o
lv
em
en
t
an
d
b
eh
av
io
r
(i
n
cl
u
d
in
g
P
G
st
at
u
s)
;
re
as
o
n
s
fo
r
se
lf
-
ex
cl
u
si
o
n
(i
.e
.,
p
er
ce
iv
ed
n
eg
at
iv
e
co
n
se
q
u
en
ce
s
o
f
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
g
am
b
li
n
g
)
P
ar
ti
ci
p
an
ts
ac
ro
ss
al
l
ag
e
g
ro
u
p
s
en
d
o
rs
ed
h
it
ti
n
g
ro
ck
b
o
tt
o
m
,
n
ee
d
in
g
h
el
p
,
an
d
g
ai
n
in
g
co
n
tr
o
l
as
th
re
e
p
ri
m
ar
y
re
as
o
n
s
fo
r
se
lf
-e
x
cl
u
si
o
n
.
O
ld
er
ad
u
lt
s
w
er
e
le
ss
li
k
el
y
to
se
lf
-e
x
cl
u
d
e
b
ec
au
se
th
ey
h
it
ro
ck
b
o
tt
o
m
,
re
co
g
n
iz
ed
th
ey
n
ee
d
ed
h
el
p
,
o
r
w
an
te
d
to
sa
v
e
th
ei
r
m
ar
ri
ag
e
o
r
jo
b
;
an
d
m
o
re
li
k
el
y
to
se
lf
-e
x
cl
u
d
e
b
ec
au
se
th
ey
w
an
te
d
to
p
re
v
en
t
su
ic
id
e
M
is
h
ra
et
al
.
(2
0
1
0
)
N
=
2
4
0
(5
0
%
fe
m
al
e)
(M
a
g
e
=
2
0
.3
y
ea
rs
,
S
D
=
1
.9
,
R
an
g
e
=
1
8
–
2
5
).
C
an
ad
ia
n
u
n
d
er
g
ra
d
u
at
e
p
sy
ch
o
lo
g
y
st
u
d
en
ts
.
S
el
f-
re
p
o
rt
su
rv
ey
S
S
S
-V
E
IS
R
B
S
C
h
o
ic
e
T
as
k
V
P
T
B
A
R
T
D
O
S
P
E
R
T
P
G
S
I
S
el
f-
re
p
o
rt
ed
g
am
b
li
n
g
ac
ti
v
it
y
5
0
it
em
D
o
m
ai
n
S
p
ec
ifi
c
R
is
k
T
ak
in
g
S
ca
le
(D
O
S
P
E
R
T
;
W
eb
er
,
B
la
is
,
an
d
B
et
z,
2
0
0
2
)
m
ea
su
re
d
ri
sk
at
ti
tu
d
es
ac
ro
ss
fi
v
e
d
o
m
ai
n
s:
fi
n
an
ci
al
,
h
ea
lt
h
/
sa
fe
ty
,
re
cr
ea
ti
o
n
al
,
et
h
ic
al
,
so
ci
al
.
P
ar
ti
ci
p
an
ts
ra
te
d
p
er
ce
iv
ed
:
ri
sk
in
es
s;
b
en
efi
t;
li
k
el
ih
o
o
d
o
f
en
g
ag
in
g
in
ac
ti
v
it
y
.
‘F
in
an
ci
al
’
su
b
sc
al
e
in
cl
u
d
ed
fo
u
r
g
am
b
li
n
g
it
em
s
P
G
an
d
g
am
b
li
n
g
in
v
o
lv
em
en
t
as
so
ci
at
ed
w
it
h
g
re
at
er
g
am
b
li
n
g
ri
sk
-a
cc
ep
ta
n
ce
,
an
d
o
v
er
al
l
ri
sk
-a
cc
ep
ta
n
ce
.
G
am
b
li
n
g
ri
sk
ac
ce
p
ta
n
ce
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
tl
y
as
so
ci
at
ed
w
it
h
ri
sk
ac
ce
p
ta
n
ce
in
m
o
st
o
th
er
d
o
m
ai
n
s
L
i
et
al
.
(2
0
1
0
)
N
=
3
7
3
(5
8
.7
%
fe
m
al
e)
(R
an
g
e
=
1
8
–
5
5
y
rs
).
M
ac
au
U
n
iv
er
si
ty
o
f
S
ci
en
ce
an
d
T
ec
h
n
o
lo
g
y
st
u
d
en
ts
.
S
el
f-
re
p
o
rt
su
rv
ey
P
er
ce
iv
ed
ri
sk
o
f
g
am
b
li
n
g
,
an
ti
ci
p
at
ed
re
g
re
t,
an
d
in
te
n
ti
o
n
to
g
am
b
le
Q
u
es
ti
o
n
s
m
ea
su
re
d
:
p
er
ce
iv
ed
ri
sk
o
f
lo
si
n
g
,
an
ti
ci
p
at
ed
re
g
re
t
at
ta
ch
ed
to
g
am
b
li
n
g
lo
ss
,
in
te
n
ti
o
n
to
g
am
b
le
(a
cr
o
ss
1
3
g
am
e
ty
p
es
).
N
.B
.
N
o
ex
p
li
ci
t
m
ea
su
re
s
o
f
g
am
b
li
n
g
b
eh
av
io
r
o
r
p
sy
ch
o
p
at
h
o
lo
g
y
in
cl
u
d
ed
A
n
ti
ci
p
at
ed
re
g
re
t,
ri
sk
p
er
ce
p
ti
o
n
,
an
d
ty
p
e
o
f
g
am
b
li
n
g
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
tl
y
p
re
d
ic
te
d
in
te
n
ti
o
n
to
g
am
b
le
in
1
2
o
u
t
o
f
1
3
g
am
e
ty
p
es
.
A
n
ti
ci
p
at
ed
re
g
re
t
w
as
m
o
re
p
re
d
ic
ti
v
e
o
f
g
am
b
li
n
g
in
te
n
ti
o
n
s
th
an
g
am
b
li
n
g
ty
p
e,
o
r
ri
sk
p
er
ce
p
ti
o
n
.
H
ig
h
er
ri
sk
p
er
ce
p
ti
o
n
as
so
ci
at
ed
w
it
h
g
re
at
er
re
g
re
t
an
ti
ci
p
at
io
n
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T
ab
le
1
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
A
u
th
o
r
S
am
p
le
an
d
st
u
d
y
d
es
ig
n
M
ea
su
re
sa
G
am
b
li
n
g
ri
sk
p
er
ce
p
ti
o
n
an
d
b
eh
av
io
u
ra
l
v
ar
ia
b
le
s
K
ey
fi
n
d
in
g
s
ab
o
u
t
ri
sk
p
er
ce
p
ti
o
n
in
g
am
b
li
n
g
D
er
ev
en
sk
y
et
al
.
(2
0
1
0
)
N
=
1
1
4
7
(4
9
.9
%
fe
m
al
e)
(R
an
g
e
=
1
2
–
1
9
y
ea
rs
).
S
ec
o
n
d
ar
y
sc
h
o
o
l
st
u
d
en
ts
;
m
id
d
le
-
cl
as
s
re
g
io
n
s
o
f
Q
u
eb
ec
an
d
O
n
ta
ri
o
,
C
an
ad
a.
S
el
f-
re
p
o
rt
su
rv
ey
E
G
A
Q
b
G
A
Q
D
S
M
-I
V
-M
R
-J
E
ff
ec
ts
o
f
G
am
b
li
n
g
A
d
v
er
ti
si
n
g
Q
u
es
ti
o
n
n
ai
re
(E
G
A
Q
)
ev
al
u
at
ed
:
ex
p
o
su
re
,
re
ca
ll
,
an
d
at
ti
tu
d
es
re
la
te
d
to
g
am
b
li
n
g
an
d
g
am
b
li
n
g
ad
v
er
ti
si
n
g
(i
n
cl
u
d
in
g
fi
v
e
p
o
si
ti
v
e
at
ti
tu
d
es
,
o
n
e
g
en
er
al
n
eg
at
iv
e
at
ti
tu
d
e)
P
G
co
m
p
ar
ed
to
n
o
n
-g
am
b
le
rs
an
d
so
ci
al
g
am
b
le
rs
h
el
d
m
o
re
p
o
si
ti
v
e
at
ti
tu
d
es
ab
o
u
t
g
am
b
li
n
g
,
an
d
p
er
ce
iv
ed
g
am
b
li
n
g
as
le
ss
h
ar
m
fu
l.
M
al
es
an
d
o
ld
er
st
u
d
en
ts
h
el
d
m
o
re
p
o
si
ti
v
e
at
ti
tu
d
es
to
g
am
b
li
n
g
,
an
d
p
er
ce
iv
ed
g
am
b
li
n
g
as
le
ss
h
ar
m
fu
l
O
rf
o
rd
et
al
.
(2
0
0
9
)
N
=
8
8
8
0
(R
an
g
e
=
C
1
6
y
ea
rs
).
A
d
d
re
ss
es
ra
n
d
o
m
ly
se
le
ct
ed
b
y
p
o
st
co
d
e
ac
ro
ss
U
K
re
g
io
n
s.
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
iz
ed
te
le
p
h
o
n
e
se
lf
-r
ep
o
rt
su
rv
ey
A
T
G
S
b
S
o
ci
o
-d
em
o
g
ra
p
h
ic
,
h
ea
lt
h
an
d
li
fe
st
y
le
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
F
am
il
y
g
am
b
li
n
g
b
eh
av
io
r
S
el
f-
re
p
o
rt
ed
g
a
m
b
li
n
g
a
ct
iv
it
y
P
G
S
I
D
S
M
-I
V
1
4
-i
te
m
A
tt
it
u
d
e
T
o
w
ar
d
s
G
am
b
li
n
g
S
ca
le
(A
T
G
S
)
m
ea
su
re
d
:
at
ti
tu
d
es
ab
o
u
t
g
am
b
li
n
g
;
p
er
ce
p
ti
o
n
o
f
h
ar
m
s
an
d
b
en
efi
ts
.
It
em
s
su
m
m
ed
as
si
n
g
le
fa
ct
o
r
d
en
o
ti
n
g
g
en
er
al
fa
v
o
ra
b
il
it
y
to
w
ar
d
s
g
am
b
li
n
g
O
v
er
al
l
at
ti
tu
d
e
to
w
ar
d
s
g
am
b
li
n
g
co
rr
el
at
ed
w
it
h
:
so
ci
o
-d
em
o
g
ra
p
h
ic
st
at
u
s
v
ar
ia
b
le
s,
g
am
b
li
n
g
b
eh
av
io
u
r,
h
ea
lt
h
-r
el
at
ed
b
eh
av
io
r,
g
am
b
li
n
g
p
sy
ch
o
p
at
h
o
lo
g
y
.
P
G
,
‘A
t
R
is
k
’
g
am
b
le
rs
,
an
d
m
o
re
fr
eq
u
en
t
g
am
b
le
rs
te
n
d
ed
to
h
o
ld
m
o
re
fa
v
o
ra
b
le
g
en
er
al
at
ti
tu
d
e
to
g
am
b
li
n
g
D
el
fa
b
b
ro
et
al
.
(2
0
0
9
)
N
=
2
6
6
9
(4
9
.2
%
fe
m
al
e)
(M
a
g
e
=
1
4
.6
y
rs
,
S
D
=
1
.4
,
R
an
g
e
=
1
2
–
1
7
).
S
o
u
th
A
u
st
ra
li
an
h
ig
h
-s
ch
o
o
l
st
u
d
en
ts
.
S
el
f-
re
p
o
rt
su
rv
ey
P
er
ce
p
ti
o
n
s
o
f
sk
il
l
U
n
d
er
st
an
d
in
g
o
f
o
b
je
ct
iv
e
o
d
d
s
M
is
p
er
ce
p
ti
o
n
s
o
f
ra
n
d
o
m
n
es
s
A
tt
it
u
d
es
to
w
ar
d
s
g
am
b
li
n
g
G
a
m
b
li
n
g
h
a
b
it
s
D
S
M
-I
V
-J
9
-i
te
m
at
ti
tu
d
es
to
w
ar
d
s
g
am
b
li
n
g
su
b
sc
al
e
ad
ap
te
d
fr
o
m
D
el
fa
b
b
ro
an
d
T
h
ru
p
p
(2
0
0
3
)
(s
ee
b
el
o
w
),
su
m
m
ed
as
si
n
g
le
fa
ct
o
r
d
en
o
ti
n
g
p
er
ce
iv
ed
u
n
p
ro
fi
ta
b
il
it
y
o
f
g
am
b
li
n
g
A
d
o
le
sc
en
ts
h
ad
g
en
er
al
ly
p
o
o
r
k
n
o
w
le
d
g
e
o
f
g
am
b
li
n
g
o
d
d
s,
ch
an
ce
an
d
ra
n
d
o
m
n
es
s.
A
d
o
le
sc
en
t
P
G
re
p
o
rt
ed
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
tl
y
le
ss
‘r
is
k
av
er
si
o
n
’
th
an
‘A
t
R
is
k
’
g
am
b
le
rs
,
w
h
o
in
tu
rn
w
er
e
le
ss
ri
sk
av
er
se
th
an
n
o
n
-
p
ro
b
le
m
g
am
b
le
rs
.
A
d
o
le
sc
en
t
P
G
co
m
p
ar
ed
to
n
o
n
-P
G
:
w
er
e
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
tl
y
le
ss
ac
cu
ra
te
in
es
ti
m
at
io
n
o
f
sk
il
l
in
ch
an
ce
ta
sk
s,
co
in
se
q
u
en
ce
s,
E
G
M
o
u
tc
o
m
es
;
m
o
re
ac
cu
ra
te
ab
o
u
t
ro
u
le
tt
e
o
d
d
s;
n
o
t
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
tl
y
d
if
fe
re
n
t
in
es
ti
m
at
in
g
o
d
d
s
o
f
lo
tt
er
y
,
co
in
to
ss
es
,
d
ie
to
ss
es
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T
a
b
le
1
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
A
u
th
o
r
S
am
p
le
an
d
st
u
d
y
d
es
ig
n
M
ea
su
re
sa
G
am
b
li
n
g
ri
sk
p
er
ce
p
ti
o
n
an
d
b
eh
av
io
u
ra
l
v
ar
ia
b
le
s
K
ey
fi
n
d
in
g
s
ab
o
u
t
ri
sk
p
er
ce
p
ti
o
n
in
g
am
b
li
n
g
W
ic
k
w
ir
e
et
al
.
(2
0
0
7
)
N
=
3
0
2
(6
0
.6
%
fe
m
al
e)
(M
a
g
e
=
2
0
.5
y
ea
rs
,
S
D
=
1
.5
,
R
an
g
e
=
1
8
–
2
5
).
A
d
u
lt
p
sy
ch
o
lo
g
y
u
n
d
er
g
ra
d
u
at
es
.
S
el
f-
re
p
o
rt
su
rv
ey
P
er
ce
iv
ed
av
ai
la
b
il
it
y
o
f
g
am
b
li
n
g
p
ro
d
u
ct
s
an
d
se
rv
ic
es
P
er
ce
iv
ed
li
k
el
ih
o
o
d
o
f
en
g
ag
in
g
in
g
am
b
li
n
g
P
er
ce
iv
ed
b
en
efi
ts
o
f
g
am
b
li
n
g
S
o
ci
o
-d
em
o
g
ra
p
h
ic
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
S
O
G
S
P
er
ce
iv
ed
h
ar
m
fu
ln
es
s
o
f
g
am
b
li
n
g
sc
al
e
m
ea
su
re
d
p
er
ce
p
ti
o
n
o
f
g
en
er
al
h
ar
m
fu
ln
es
s
o
f
g
am
b
li
n
g
N
o
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
t
re
la
ti
o
n
sh
ip
b
et
w
ee
n
p
er
ce
p
ti
o
n
o
f
h
ar
m
an
d
P
G
st
at
u
s;
p
er
ce
p
ti
o
n
o
f
av
ai
la
b
il
it
y
an
d
P
G
st
at
u
s.
P
G
s
h
el
d
g
re
at
er
ex
p
ec
ta
ti
o
n
o
f
b
en
efi
t
fr
o
m
g
am
b
li
n
g
G
il
le
sp
ie
et
al
.
(2
0
0
7
a)
N
=
1
0
1
3
(5
7
.4
%
fe
m
al
e)
(M
a
g
e
=
1
4
.8
y
ea
rs
,
S
D
=
1
.5
,
R
an
g
e
=
1
1
–
1
8
).
H
ig
h
sc
h
o
o
l
st
u
d
en
ts
;
M
o
n
tr
ea
l
an
d
O
tt
aw
a,
C
an
ad
a.
S
el
f-
re
p
o
rt
su
rv
ey
G
E
Q
tr
ia
l
it
em
s
4
8
-i
te
m
G
am
b
li
n
g
E
x
p
ec
ta
n
cy
Q
u
es
ti
o
n
n
ai
re
(G
E
Q
)
as
se
ss
ed
ex
p
ec
ta
ti
o
n
s
o
f
v
ar
io
u
s,
sp
ec
ifi
c
g
am
b
li
n
g
co
n
se
q
u
en
ce
s
P
ri
n
ci
p
al
C
o
m
p
o
n
en
ts
A
n
al
y
si
s
su
g
g
es
te
d
re
te
n
ti
o
n
o
f
2
3
it
em
s:
th
re
e
‘p
o
si
ti
v
e’
fa
ct
o
rs
(e
n
jo
y
m
en
t/
ar
o
u
sa
l,
se
lf
-
en
h
an
ce
m
en
t,
m
o
n
ey
);
tw
o
‘n
eg
at
iv
e’
fa
ct
o
rs
(o
v
er
-
in
v
o
lv
em
en
t,
em
o
ti
o
n
al
im
p
ac
t)
262 J Gambl Stud (2014) 30:253–276
123
T
a
b
le
1
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
A
u
th
o
r
S
am
p
le
an
d
st
u
d
y
d
es
ig
n
M
ea
su
re
sa
G
am
b
li
n
g
ri
sk
p
er
ce
p
ti
o
n
an
d
b
eh
av
io
u
ra
l
v
ar
ia
b
le
s
K
ey
fi
n
d
in
g
s
ab
o
u
t
ri
sk
p
er
ce
p
ti
o
n
in
g
am
b
li
n
g
G
il
le
sp
ie
et
al
.
(2
0
0
7
b
)
S
am
e
sa
m
p
le
as
G
il
le
sp
ie
,
et
al
.
(2
0
0
7
a)
(s
ee
a
b
o
ve
).
S
el
f-
re
p
o
rt
su
rv
ey
G
A
Q
D
S
M
-I
V
-M
R
-J
G
E
Q
2
3
it
em
G
E
Q
,
d
ev
el
o
p
ed
b
y
G
il
le
sp
ie
,
et
al
.
(2
0
0
7
aa
)
(s
ee
a
b
o
ve
)
G
am
b
le
rs
v
er
su
s
n
o
n
-g
am
b
le
rs
re
p
o
rt
ed
d
if
fe
re
n
t
ex
p
ec
ta
ti
o
n
s
ab
o
u
t
al
l
fi
v
e
ty
p
es
o
f
o
u
tc
o
m
e.
P
ro
b
ab
le
P
at
h
o
lo
g
ic
al
G
am
b
le
rs
(P
P
G
s)
an
d
at
-r
is
k
g
am
b
le
rs
m
o
re
st
ro
n
g
ly
an
ti
ci
p
at
ed
p
o
si
ti
v
e
o
u
tc
o
m
es
(w
in
n
in
g
,
en
jo
y
m
en
t,
se
lf
-e
n
h
an
ce
m
en
t)
th
an
so
ci
al
g
am
b
le
rs
,
w
h
o
in
tu
rn
an
ti
ci
p
at
ed
p
o
si
ti
v
e
o
u
tc
o
m
es
m
o
re
th
an
n
o
n
-
g
am
b
le
rs
.
N
o
n
-g
am
b
le
rs
ex
p
ec
te
d
n
eg
at
iv
e
em
o
ti
o
n
al
o
u
tc
o
m
es
m
o
re
th
an
g
am
b
le
rs
.
B
o
th
P
P
G
s
an
d
n
o
n
-
g
am
b
le
rs
an
ti
ci
p
at
ed
lo
si
n
g
co
n
tr
o
l
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
tl
y
m
o
re
th
an
so
ci
al
,
o
r
at
ri
sk
g
am
b
le
rs
.
O
ld
er
ad
o
le
sc
en
ts
m
o
re
st
ro
n
g
ly
en
d
o
rs
ed
th
e
p
o
si
ti
v
e
ex
p
ec
ta
n
cy
sc
al
e
(e
n
jo
y
m
en
t/
ar
o
u
sa
l)
,
an
d
m
o
re
w
ea
k
ly
en
d
o
rs
ed
n
eg
at
iv
e
ex
p
ec
ta
n
cy
sc
al
e
(e
m
o
ti
o
n
al
im
p
ac
t)
.
O
v
er
al
l,
m
al
es
co
m
p
ar
ed
to
fe
m
al
es
m
o
re
st
ro
n
g
ly
en
d
o
rs
ed
tw
o
p
o
si
ti
v
e
ex
p
ec
ta
n
cy
sc
al
es
(e
n
jo
y
m
en
t/
ar
o
u
sa
l
an
d
m
o
n
ey
);
an
d
m
o
re
w
ea
k
ly
en
d
o
rs
ed
o
n
e
n
eg
at
iv
e
ex
p
ec
ta
n
cy
sc
al
e
(e
m
o
ti
o
n
al
im
p
ac
t)
.
F
o
r
m
al
es
,
p
o
si
ti
v
e
(e
n
jo
y
m
en
t/
ar
o
u
sa
l,
se
lf
-e
n
h
an
ce
m
en
t,
m
o
n
ey
)
an
d
n
eg
at
iv
e
(o
v
er
-
in
v
o
lv
em
en
t)
ex
p
ec
ta
n
cy
sc
al
es
al
l
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
tl
y
p
re
d
ic
te
d
g
am
b
li
n
g
se
v
er
it
y
;
w
it
h
en
jo
y
m
en
t/
ar
o
u
sa
l
th
e
st
ro
n
g
es
t
p
re
d
ic
to
r.
F
o
r
fe
m
al
es
,
p
o
si
ti
v
e
ex
p
ec
ta
n
ci
es
(e
n
jo
y
m
en
t/
ar
o
u
sa
l
an
d
m
o
n
ey
)
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
tl
y
p
re
d
ic
te
d
g
am
b
li
n
g
se
v
er
it
y
D
el
fa
b
b
ro
et
al
.
(2
0
0
6
)
N
=
9
2
6
(4
8
.4
%
fe
m
al
e)
(M
a
g
e
=
1
4
.5
y
ea
rs
,
S
D
=
1
.6
,
R
an
g
e
=
1
1
–
1
9
).
S
o
u
th
A
u
st
ra
li
an
h
ig
h
-s
ch
o
o
l
st
u
d
en
ts
.
S
el
f-
re
p
o
rt
su
rv
ey
G
a
m
b
li
n
g
h
a
b
it
s
D
S
M
-I
V
-J
V
G
S
A
tt
it
u
d
es
to
w
ar
d
s
g
am
b
li
n
g
P
er
ce
p
ti
o
n
s
o
f
sk
il
l
U
n
d
er
st
an
d
in
g
o
f
o
d
d
s
an
d
p
ro
b
ab
il
is
ti
c
co
n
ce
p
ts
9
-i
te
m
at
ti
tu
d
es
to
w
ar
d
s
g
am
b
li
n
g
su
b
sc
al
e
ad
ap
te
d
fr
o
m
D
el
fa
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Second, assessment of risk perception in all of the studies relied exclusively on sub-
jective, self-report data. Gambling research has demonstrated that gamblers often delib-
erately misrepresent (Kuentzel et al. 2008; Rosenthal 1986) or have poor insight into
(Kuentzel et al. 2008; Yi and Kanetkar 2010) cognitions and behavior related to gambling.
Further, many of the studies assessed risk perception constructs poorly via single (Der-
evensky et al. 2010; Inglin and Gmel 2011), or small numbers of specifically targeted
questionnaire items (Dean 2011; Li et al. 2010; Wickwire et al. 2007) not checked for
reliability and validity via theoretically-supported statistical methods (Floyd and Widaman
1995). Various risk perception constructs were therefore poorly identified among many of
the studies.
Finally, most studies included specific, non-representative samples due either to
recruitment procedures or research goals, e.g., university students (Li et al. 2010; Mishra
et al. 2010; Wickwire et al. 2007), adolescents (Dean 2011; Delfabbro et al. 2006, 2009;
Delfabbro and Thrupp 2003; Gillespie et al. 2007a, b; Wickwire et al. 2010; Wong and
Tsang 2012), self-excluding problem gamblers (Nower and Blaszczynski 2010), and
blackjack players (Dean 2011). Many of the restrictions placed on samples (e.g., age,
history and experience of gambling problems) relate to well-established risk factors
associated with biased cognition or excessive gambling behaviour (Johansson et al. 2009;
Raylu and Oei 2002), limiting the relevance of research findings to specific subpopulations
in many cases.
Gamblers Expectations About Harmful Outcomes
Expectations about harmful gambling consequences have typically been dichotomized
into: (1) perceptions about relative, overall consequences (e.g., Orford et al. 2009); and (2)
expectations about specific types of outcome (e.g., Gillespie et al. 2007a).
Gamblers’ Relative Expectations of Harm Versus Benefit
Five studies have assessed the relationship between overall negative, or negative-versus-
positive expectations, and gambling behaviour (Derevensky et al. 2010; Inglin and Gmel
2011; Orford et al. 2009; Tao et al. 2011; Wickwire et al. 2007). Each study gathered
relative attitudinal ratings of risks and benefits of gambling (e.g., participant agreement
that ‘gambling can become a problem’ Derevensky et al. (2010)), compiling group mean
scores that represented perception of the general harmfulness of gambling. Overall,
studies provided evidence that heavier and more disordered gamblers hold more positive
relative expectations of gambling. (Orford et al. 2009) found that more favourable atti-
tudes towards gambling were associated with greater time and money spent gambling, as
well as problem and ‘at risk’ gambling status. Similarly, Derevensky et al. (2010) and
Wickwire et al. (2007) reported that pathological gamblers were more likely to perceive
gambling as beneficial, than non-gamblers, or social gamblers. Partial support was pro-
vided by Tao et al. (2011), who found that a perception that gambling carried negative
consequences was associated with less gambling involvement, but not with pathological
gambling status.
Inglin and Gmel (2011) included a single question investigating gamblers’ perceptions
that gambling may be addictive. In line with other ‘relative attitude’ studies, results sug-
gested that gamblers compared to non-gamblers expected gambling to be less addictive,
though expectations did not vary based on proportion of income spent on gambling.
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Gamblers’ Expectations About Specific Types of Outcomes
Four recent studies investigated gambling outcome expectancy with greater specificity than
‘relative attitude’ research (Gillespie et al. 2007a, b; Wickwire et al. 2010; Wong and
Tsang 2012). Each study attempted to comprehensively investigate the full range of spe-
cific outcomes gamblers expect of gambling. Those who gambled excessively whether
responsibly or not at all perceived gambling expectancy differently. Overall, studies
found: heavier and more disordered gamblers expected greater benefits from gambling;
disordered gamblers and non-gamblers expected some harmful outcomes to a greater
degree than less experienced gamblers. All four studies were limited to exclusively
adolescent populations, and followed a similar methodology (related to Gillespie et al.
(2007a)). Each study compiled a questionnaire assessing the most commonly expected
types of outcome (based on literature review, qualitative investigation, and factor anal-
ysis); then used their questionnaire to assess outcome expectancy among groups of
gamblers and non-gamblers.
Gillespie et al. (2007a) classified the most commonly expected gambling outcomes
according to three positive categories (enjoyment or arousal; positive feelings of self-
enhancement; financial gain) and two negative categories (over-involvement or preoccupa-
tion; negative feelings of shame, guilt, and loss of control). Gamblers versus non-gamblers
reported different expectations of all five types of outcome. Probable Pathological Gamblers
(PPGs) and at-risk gamblers more strongly anticipated positive outcomes (winning, enjoy-
ment, self-enhancement) than social gamblers, who in turn anticipated positive outcomes
more than non-gamblers. Non-gamblers expected negative emotional outcomes more than
gamblers. However, both PPGs and non-gamblers anticipated losing control significantly
more than social, or at risk gamblers. All five expectancy scales accounted for significant
variance in gambling involvement, although patterns differed between males and females.
For males, both positive (enjoyment/arousal, self-enhancement, money) and negative (over-
involvement) expectancies significantly contributed to prediction of gambling severity; with
enjoyment/arousal being the strongest predictor of gambling behaviour. For females, the
predictive value of outcome expectancies was weaker. However, positive expectancies
(enjoyment/arousal and money) were significant predictors of gambling severity.
A similar, mixed pattern of expectations was found by Wong and Tsang (2012), and
Wickwire et al. (2010). Chinese Adolescents with greater gambling involvement reported
higher expectations of positive outcomes (social benefit and material gain) and some
negative outcomes (being out of control); but reported weaker expectations of other types
of negative outcomes (relational costs, money loss) (Wong and Tsang 2012). Wickwire
et al. (2010) reported that more frequent and more problematic gambling related to more
positive and negative expectations, including: greater expectancies of material gain, neg-
ative emotions, and self-enhancement; and lower expectations of negative social conse-
quences, and parental disapproval. Wickwire et al. (2010) found that all five expectancy
domains accounted for significant variance in gambling problems and frequency, and
together accounted for a majority of variance in gambling frequency, and approximately
half of variance in gambling problems.
Taken together, these studies suggest a complex pattern of mixed expectations, or
ambivalence, among higher frequency and more disordered gamblers, with stronger
expectations of positive outcomes (e.g., excitement, financial reward) and some nega-
tive outcomes (e.g., loss of control), at least among adolescents. Both positive and
negative expectancies were important predictors of gambling behaviour and problems
(Gillespie et al. 2007b; Wickwire et al. 2010). However, positive expectancies
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(particularly emotional arousal) were more influential in decision making than per-
ception of negative outcomes (Gillespie et al. 2007b), in line with ‘general attitude’
research showing disordered gamblers to be more optimistic overall about their
expectations of gambling.
The Role of Outcome Expectancy in Decision Making and Behavior
Disordered Gamblers Hold more Optimistic Overall Expectations
Despite few studies and poor identification of risk perception in some cases, ‘relative
attitude’ research provided evidence that gamblers’ expectations relate to behaviour.
Specifically, that a more optimistic outlook on gambling is associated with heavier and
more disordered gambling. Several possible explanations are possible for the relationship
between risk perceptions and gambling. Lower relative risk estimation or awareness may
expose individuals to harm, e.g., because attitudes result in poor management and over-
investment of resources (time, money). Alternatively, high investment or disordered
cognition may cause gamblers to under-report or lack insight about risk, based for
example, on a wish to justify behavior, or because of the greater salience of desired
outcomes. Overall, cross-sectional ‘relative-attitude’ research alone allows little more than
speculation about cognitive processes underlying beliefs, or about causal influence
between cognition and behaviour (Weinstein 2007).
Evidence from a range of sources supports the assumption that attitudes influence
behaviour, and vice versa. Research has shown that poor risk estimation increased risk-
taking behaviour, resulting in increased risk of harm (Breakwell 2007). Individuals have
demonstrated several types of estimation error that result in riskier behaviour and higher
rates of harm, e.g., inaccurate calculation of personal vulnerability or likelihood of harmful
outcomes (Jones et al. 2001; Leigh 1999; Lipkus et al. 2011; Weinstein 1987), or exag-
gerated emphasis on low probability outcomes, or vivid, immediate consequences (Leigh
1999; Slovic et al. 1978).
Evidence from drug, alcohol, and offending research also supports the alternative, i.e.,
that riskier behaviour is associated with deception (Hall and Poirier 2001; Magura and
Kang 1996); and leads to denial of harm (Auslander 1999; James et al. 1996) via cognitive
strategies that inhibit risk perception (Howard et al. 2002; Peretti-Watel 2003; Rebelo
1999), and neuro-physiological changes associated with impaired insight and awareness of
risk (Goldstein et al. 2009; Rinn et al. 2002). Although, further research is needed to
clearly elucidate the influence between gambling-risk cognition and behaviour, more
specific outcome expectancy research had provided preliminary evidence that expectations
of gamblers may help to explain gambling behaviour.
Disordered Gamblers Expect a Range of Negative and Positive Outcomes
Outcome expectancy research suggests that not only do disordered gamblers hold more
optimistic expectations overall, they expect a range of both positive and negative specific
outcomes with differing influence on gambling behaviour.
Little research has investigated how disordered gamblers may maintain greater optimism
and continued motivation to gamble, despite ambivalent expectations. Risk and addiction
research suggests that individuals may continue to engage in risky behaviour due to the
greater weighting of positive-over-negative outcome expectancies based on the greater
personal significance or salience of positive outcomes (Goldberg and Fischhoff 2000;
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Leigh 1999; Redish et al. 2008; Slovic et al. 1978). At least one study provided evidence
that gamblers may perceive positive expectancies to be more important than negative
(Gillespie et al. 2007b).
Alternatively, automatic ‘urges’ to gamble may overwhelm attempts to critically
evaluate the potential consequences (Grant et al. 2006; Potenza et al. 2003). How indi-
viduals respond to mental states and environmental cues may therefore influence salience,
and subsequent framing, of positive versus negative expectancies (Goldstein et al. 2009;
Stanovich and West 2008; Toplak et al. 2007).
It is therefore possible that disordered gamblers, exposed to negative gambling expe-
riences, learn to expect more negative outcomes than other gamblers (e.g., preoccupation),
but continue to gamble due to dominant positive expectancies, automatic urges, or some
combination of these factors (Baudinet and Blaszczynski 2012). Similarly, negative
expectancies among low or non-gamblers may protect individuals from gambling prob-
lems, by inhibiting motivation to engage in gambling, and thereby limited exposure to loss,
problems, and conditioning processes (Blaszczynski and Nower 2002; Jessor 1998).
The Meaning of Outcomes is Idiosyncratic and Important to Decision Making
Outcome expectancy research also revealed important idiosyncratic variation in risk per-
ception that may influence decision-making. Despite similarities in sample and method-
ology, outcomes identified among specific outcome studies varied considerably, and
differences between samples appeared to reflect cultural differences related to sample
demographics. For example, Chinese adolescents (Wong and Tsang 2012), unlike their
Canadian (Gillespie et al. 2007a) and African-American counterparts (Wickwire et al.
2010), did not identify affective and self-referent expectancies as discrete gambling
expectancies, but perceived gambling as an activity through which they may impress peers
or gain approval. Such a difference in emphasis follows well-established ‘value’ differ-
ences between Asian and North American populations (Markus and Kitayama 1991;
Morris and Peng 1994).
Demographic profiles of gambler risk perception further support the relevance of per-
sonal experience and individual difference in development of risk perception. Certain static
demographic variables (i.e., younger age, male gender) correlated consistently with more
optimistic risk perception (Derevensky et al. 2010; Gillespie et al. 2007b; Inglin and Gmel
2011; Orford et al. 2009; Tao et al. 2011), in line with established patterns among dis-
ordered gambling (Johansson et al. 2009; Raylu and Oei 2002). Gillespie et al. (2007b) in
particular identified that, while male adolescents exhibit higher rates of disordered gam-
bling than females, there were significant gender differences in expectations above and
beyond those associated with gambling severity. For example, males more strongly
expected some positive outcomes (enjoyment/arousal, money), while females were more
perceptive of some harms (emotional impact).
Perception of lower risk was also associated in at least one study with other static and
dynamic factors: lower education and occupational status; better general health; higher
levels of drinking and smoking; lower family history of gambling problems; higher sen-
sation seeking and self-worth; stronger belief in superstition and luck; superstitious
behaviour (Derevensky et al. 2010; Orford et al. 2009; Tao et al. 2011). Overall, these
findings suggest that risk perception among gamblers is not homogenous in the general
population, and that particular demographic factors (and possibly socio-cultural and cog-
nitive-behavioural factors) predispose gamblers to develop particular beliefs associated
with greater exposure to risk and harm.
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No research to date has directly assessed the value individuals place on gambling
outcomes. Nevertheless, evidence from four other studies further support the assertion that
individual differences and context predispose gamblers to frame outcomes in particular
ways, and that the meaning of outcomes play a role in expectation, motivation and risk-
taking. In a study of self-excluding problem gamblers, participants reported a number of
reasons for self-exclusion from casinos related to perception of the harmful consequences
of gambling (e.g., ‘hitting rock bottom’, loss of control) along with anticipation and desire
to avoid future harm (e.g., wanting to prevent suicide) (Nower and Blaszczynski 2010).
Gamblers’ personal experience therefore informed their anticipation of future emotional or
cognitive states, and thereby acted as a deterrent to future gambling. Similarly, Li et al.
(2010) found that intention to gamble in a lay sample was predicted by both the level of
regret anticipated in relation to losing a day’s wages, and perception that a game was risky;
with regret anticipation more predictive than risk perception of gambling intentions
overall. Likewise, blackjack players found games less fun if they perceived themselves to
be personally vulnerable to financial harm (Dean 2011), while frequent and disordered
gamblers were found to be more tolerant of risk than others, both overall and in relation to
gambling (Mishra et al. 2010). This evidence is consistent with drug and alcohol research
indicating that the meaning of outcomes to individuals is important in the way that
expectations influence motivation and risk-taking. For example, ‘positive’ expectancies are
better predictors of alcohol consumption than ‘negative’ expectancies. (Goldberg et al.
2002; Stacy et al. 1990).
Taken together the research discussed here suggests that gamblers may frame conse-
quences, overall attitudes, and decisions based on what they find important or salient, in
itself influenced by cultural experience (Dhillon et al. 2011; Kim 2012), mental state
(Raylu and Oei 2002), environmental context (Baudinet and Blaszczynski 2012), or other
individual differences.
Given, the heterogeneity of outcome meaning across subgroups, the importance of
meaning in motivation and behaviour, and exclusive use of lay adolescent samples; it is
doubtful that measures developed in outcome expectancy studies comprehensively identify
outcomes meaningful to the decision making of important gambler subgroups (e.g., dis-
ordered gamblers versus long-term, responsible non-problem gamblers). For example
‘parental disapproval’ (Wickwire et al. 2010) is unlikely to be one of the five most easily
identifiable, important or salient outcomes for a 50 year old with a 30 year history of
gambling, and comorbid mood disorder or antisocial personality traits (Milosevic and
Ledgerwood 2010).
Further, the ‘value’ of outcomes identified in expectancy studies may not necessarily
adhere to simple ‘positive–negative’ polarizations, or other categorizations imposed
through factor analytic modeling, and instead may vary dependent on context or individual
preferences. For example, ‘escape’ or tension reduction is a well-established effect or goal
in gambling (Rockloff and Dyer 2006) with both positive and negative potential effects for
mood and behaviour (Wood and Griffiths 2007). Yet, during development of the Gambling
Expectancy Questionnaire, Gillespie and colleagues (Gillespie et al. 2007a) removed six
escape/tension reduction items from their scale, due to loadings on both positive and
negative emotional scales. Such an omission follows well-established statistical guidelines
(Floyd and Widaman 1995), but may have nevertheless preemptively removed important
information that may predict decision-making and behaviour among disordered gamblers
(Lee et al. 2007).
Idiosyncratic variation in risk perception should be taken into account in cognitive-
behavioural and demographic formulations of disordered gambling (Milosevic and
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Ledgerwood 2010; Sharpe 2008). Further, it is important to consider what research sug-
gests are factors that may moderate or influence the role of risk perception in decision
making and behaviour, including factors that influence the meaning of outcomes, as well as
how gamblers resolve conflicting motivations and expectations.
Factors that Influence the Role of Risk Perception in Decision Making and Behaviour
The Perceived Qualities of Gambling Outcomes
Gambling risk perception research has tended to apply positive–negative labels to antic-
ipated outcomes on the basis of assumptions about normative belief (e.g., Gillespie et al.,
2007a; Wong and Tsang 2012). However, research suggests that a number of outcome
qualities may influence what outcomes mean to individuals, such as: the impact of con-
sequences; the likelihood of outcomes occurring; and the presence or absence of particular
environmental cues and mental states.
The Perceived Impact of Consequences A number of researchers have argued that
positive outcomes of addictive (Goldberg et al. 2002) or impulsive behaviours (Ainslie
1975) are often more immediate and direct, and as a result more powerful reinforcers and
predictors of behaviour (Stacy et al. 1990). The immediacy and directness of consequences
is highly relevant in gambling, where consequences vary, in terms of when and how
directly outcomes affect individuals (Hing et al. 2012; Nussbaum et al. 2011; Wardle et al.
2012), and how different aspects of the gambling experience (e.g., sensory stimuli) rein-
force cognition and behaviour (Rockloff et al. 2007). Nevertheless, no studies to date have
looked directly at how gamblers’ perceptions of risk are influenced by the immediacy or
personal relevance of consequences.
The Perceived Likelihood of Outcomes The importance of particular consequences may
also be affected by the perceived likelihood of an event occurring. Several studies have
measured the relationship between perceived risk and gambling activity. All but one of
these studies (Wickwire et al. 2007), provided evidence that lower estimation of likelihood
of harm was associated with higher gambling involvement (Inglin and Gmel 2011) or
psychopathology (Delfabbro et al. 2006, 2009; Delfabbro and Thrupp 2003; Derevensky
et al. 2010), despite comparable risk estimation skills (Delfabbro et al. 2006, 2009).
All six studies considered ‘likelihood’ in a general sense, referring to perception of the
overall likelihood of negative outcomes, similar to ‘general attitude’ research. Therefore,
‘overall likelihood’ studies may in fact be measuring the same conceptual domain as
‘general attitude’ studies. Differentiating ‘likelihood’ from ‘attitude’ constructs is a diffi-
cult task. Few gambling studies have measured more than one risk perception construct
among a single experiment enabling comparison of conceptual constructs; those studies
that did (Derevensky et al. 2010; E. Wickwire et al. 2007) present mixed results. Der-
evensky et al. (2010) for example, included questions that addressed perceived benefits,
risk of long-term problems, and likelihood of beneficial outcomes, and found problem
gamblers to be more optimistic across all factors. Wickwire et al. (2007) measured per-
ceived riskiness distinct from the perceived benefit of gambling, and found problem/
pathological gamblers to expect greater benefit from gambling with no differences from
other groups in perceived riskiness. Therefore, one study showed perceived of the likeli-
hood of harm to be distinct and subordinate to expectations of benefit in predicting problem
270 J Gambl Stud (2014) 30:253–276
123
behaviour (Wickwire et al. 2007), but this distinction was not necessarily consistent
(Derevensky et al. 2010).
Therefore, evidence suggests that lower estimation of risk is associated with greater
gambling involvement and psychopathology, but to date estimation of likelihood has not
been clearly differentiated from other attitudes or beliefs about harm.
The Presence of Perceptual Cues and Mental States Investigators have also suggested
that the salience and meaning of particular expectations may be influenced by subjective
experience, and the presence of particular environmental cues or mental states. Gambling
research highlights the importance of subjective arousal to development of disordered
gambling (Baudinet and Blaszczynski 2012). Gambling triggers states of arousal (e.g.,
through intermittent rewards, and sensory cues (Rockloff et al. 2007)), and individuals
learn to associate arousal with environmental stimuli via classical and operant conditioning
processes (Blaszczynski and Nower 2002). Exposure to environmental stimuli, particularly
when individuals are in vulnerable mood states, may therefore come to trigger particular
expectations, as well as precipitating emotional responses associated with the urge to
gamble (Sharpe 2002; Wood and Griffiths 2007). Hence individual experiences of gam-
bling, in conjunction with the presence or absence of particular environmental cues or
vulnerable mental states is likely to impact on the salience and motivational power of
particular gambling outcomes (Freidenberg et al. 2002). Nevertheless research is yet to
investigate the influence of psychological states or environment on gambling risk
perception.
Therefore, while there is reason to believe that a number of factors may affect the
perceived meaning of gambling consequences, there is limited research about how these
affect gambling risk perception.
Lack of Insight and Resolution of Conflicting Expectations
Although risk assessment may be influenced by various qualities of outcomes, risk per-
ception is also affected by individuals’ knowledge or information processing in relation to
gambling. Evidence suggests that particular individuals are prone to processing gambling
wins and losses differently (Gilovich 1983; Toneatto et al. 1997), and in doing so unre-
alistically enhancing expectations of positive outcomes (Joukhador et al. 2004). Regardless
of individual differences in cognitive biases, all gamblers appear to hold poor under-
standings of the mechanics determining outcomes (Delfabbro 2004; Delfabbro et al. 2009;
Lambos and Delfabbro 2007). It is likely that processing biases that inhibit awareness of
harmful outcomes, along with poor insight about risk, may result in some gamblers
underestimating risk and exposing themselves to risk and harm. However, while research
has explored the range of processing biases and erroneously beliefs of gamblers, no studies
to date have explicitly tested the accuracy of expectations about gambling harm, beyond
tests of mathematical ability.
In addition, it is likely that gamblers further expose themselves to risk through attempts
to justify desire to gamble in the context of distressing expectations or conflicting cog-
nitions. Addiction research suggests that some anticipated outcomes in risky scenarios are
motivating enough that individuals become dependent on substances or activities (Fre-
idenberg et al. 2002; Gawin 1991; Grant et al. 2006; Toplak et al. 2007). Individuals
nevertheless report regret or distress in response to perceived dependence, as well as other
consequences of risky behaviours (Anderson et al. 2011; Li et al. 2010; Yi and Kanetkar
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2011). It is likely that individuals are therefore motivated to both: continue gambling due
to expected positive outcomes, and reduce negative emotions such as regret and cognitive
dissonance.
Research suggests that individuals may appease conflicting motivations through
behavioural change (e.g., by discontinuing gambling (Slutske 2010; Sobell et al. 2001)) or
on a cognitive level (e.g., by altering existing beliefs, adding new beliefs, or reducing the
importance of a cognitive element (Cooper 2012; Jarcho et al. 2011)). This process of
minimising negative expectations, or bolstering positive expectations, may mean that
gamblers do not take adequate steps to avoid risk. In line with these expectations, disor-
dered gamblers have been shown to hold a mix of negative and positive unconscious
expectations, but explicitly report only positive expectations (Yi and Kanetkar 2010),
implying that disordered gamblers are unconsciously denying negative outcomes, or
deceptively reporting expectations.
Conclusions
Despite an extensive focus in the literature on cognitive biases and errors associated with
disordered gambling, there has been a paucity of research addressing gamblers’ percep-
tions of potential harms and risk related to gambling. The extant research provides evi-
dence that disordered gamblers hold both: more optimistic overall perceptions of risk, and
a mix of more positive and more negative specific expectations about outcomes. Despite
holding more negative expectations, disordered gamblers maintain motivation to gamble,
and hence we may assume that this group is discounting risks in some way, such as by
attributing preferential importance to positive outcomes.
Research suggests that risk perception varies based on contextual factors or individual
differences, such as gamblers’ cultural experiences and exposure to gaming. A range of
factors may moderate the role of risk perception in decision-making and behaviour such as
the perceived qualities of anticipated outcomes, awareness of consequences, and responses
to conflicting cognitions. Given potential differences in the perception of risk between
various categories of gamblers, clinicians should take into account how gamblers in
treatment view gambling as a risky behaviour. Improving the accuracy of such perceptions
may reduce the propensity for risk-taking behaviours.
Further research is needed to identify the range of outcomes expected by important
subgroups of gamblers, how gamblers interpret and use information about risk perception,
and the influence of individual differences and context on gambling risk perception and
behaviour.
The current literature is limited in a number of ways, related to sample specificity,
cross-sectional study design, and methodological approach to the identification of risk
perception parameters. Future research should work to address these issues in study design
and implementation.
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Abstract The purpose of the current study was to investigate the moderating or medi-
ating role played by risk perception in decision-making, gambling behaviour, and disor-
dered gambling aetiology. Eleven gambling expert clinicians and researchers completed a
semi-structured interview derived from mental models and grounded theory methodolo-
gies. Expert interview data was used to construct a comprehensive expert mental model
‘map’ detailing risk-perception related factors contributing to harmful or safe gambling.
Systematic overlapping processes of data gathering and analysis were used to iteratively
extend, saturate, test for exception, and verify concepts and emergent themes. Findings
indicated that experts considered idiosyncratic beliefs among gamblers result in overall
underestimates of risk and loss, insufficient prioritization of needs, and planning and
implementation of risk management strategies. Additional contextual factors influencing
use of risk information (reinforcement and learning; mental states, environmental cues,
ambivalence; and socio-cultural and biological variables) acted to shape risk perceptions
and increase vulnerabilities to harm or disordered gambling. It was concluded that
understanding the nature, extent and processes by which risk perception predisposes an
individual to maintain gambling despite adverse consequences can guide the content of
preventative educational responsible gambling campaigns.
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offending, and drug and alcohol use indicates that risk perception plays an important role
in risk taking behaviours (Glanz et al. 2008), few studies have investigated the role played
by an individual’s perceptions of risk and harm in gambling (Spurrier and Blaszczynski
2013).
Data derived from risk perception studies suggests that gamblers’ perceptions of neg-
ative consequences play an important role in decision-making, behaviour, and disordered
gambling aetiology (Spurrier and Blaszczynski 2013). Studies have reported the presence
of a functional relationship between disordered gambling and a mix of positive (‘material
gain’, ‘social benefits’) and negative expectations (‘loss of control’) (Gillespie et al. 2007;
Wickwire et al. 2010), and lower overall risk expectancies (Derevensky et al. 2010; Inglin
and Gmel 2011).
Findings that gamblers maintain greater optimism about gambling, despite the experi-
ence and expectation of negative consequences (Wickwire et al. 2007; Wong and Tsang
2012; Yi and Kanetkar 2010), suggest that disordered gambling cannot be fully explained
by gamblers overestimating positive outcomes or personal control (Fortune and Goodie
2011; Toneatto 1999). Instead, both positive and negative perceptions play independent but
interrelated roles in motivation and risky decision making (Wickwire et al. 2007; Yi and
Kanetkar 2010). Disordered gamblers appear to maintain maladaptive optimism through,
either, dominance in magnitude, salience, or significance of positive over negative per-
ception, or implicit or explicit manipulation of perceptual data (Gillespie et al. 2007;
Wickwire et al. 2010). Yi and Kanetkar (2010) for example, showed disordered gamblers
hold more positive and negative implicit expectations than other gamblers, but explicitly
acknowledge only positive expectations—suggesting implicit or explicit resolution of
tension between conflicting perceptions, via suppression of negative expectations, decep-
tive reporting, or both.
Related drug, alcohol and offending research also suggest that stronger positive and
weaker negative perceptions relate to riskier behaviour, also at times a consequence of
users’ manipulation of risk data. Problematic users and offenders exaggerate emphasis on
low probability outcomes and vivid, immediate consequences (Leigh 1999; Slovic 1978),
and underestimate personal vulnerability, and likelihood of harmful outcomes (Jones 2001;
Lipkus 2011; Weinstein 1987). In addition, harmful users exhibit greater deception of self
and others (Hall and Poirier 2001; Magura and Kang 1996) and denial of harm (Auslander
1999; James 1996), employ cognitive strategies that inhibit risk perception (Howard 2002;
Peretti-Watel 2003; Rebelo 1999) and experience neurophysiological change associated
with impaired risk awareness (Goldstein et al. 2009; Rinn 2002).
Findings in the gambling literature are compatible with drug, alcohol and offending
research. However, comparable conclusions about gambling risk perception are limited
by a paucity of relevant research, and design issues potentially biasing or restricting
results (cross-sectional and self-report designs, limited risk perception construct mea-
surement, non-representative sampling) (Baron and Kenny 1986; Spurrier and Blas-
zczynski 2013; Weinstein 2007). Therefore, despite a clear relationship between risk
perception and gambling, the available research allows only limited inference about
cognitive, behavioural, social, biological or environmental processes underlying risk
perception and risky decision making in gambling (Spurrier and Blaszczynski 2013;
Weinstein 2007).
The aim of this study was to investigate the perspectives of expert gambling clinicians
and researchers about how disordered versus recreational gamblers perceive, interpret and
use risk information in gambling decision making and behaviour.
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Methods
Participants
A convenience sample of eleven experts were invited to participate. Selection criteria
included local and international experts known to the second author, with gambling-
specific research or clinical experience [4 years, and specific expertise in gambler per-
ceptions, beliefs, or appraisals. Eight participants were located in Australia, two in Canada,
and one in the USA.
Three experts accepted an email invitation to participate in the first round of interviews.
Six experts were subsequently recruited after preliminary data analysis was completed in
order to clarify and extend emergent themes until theoretical saturation was achieved
(Strauss and Corbin 1994). Two final interviewees were recruited post-saturation, to check
if any new themes or concepts emerged (Strauss and Corbin 1994).
Table 1 lists expert participants’ descriptive information. Pseudonyms were used for all
participants to protect anonymity.
Measures
A semi-structured interview based on a combination of Grounded Theory and Mental
Models methodologies (Morgan et al. 2002; Strauss and Corbin 1994, 1998) was used to
elicit expert perspectives. Initial interview questions were open-ended and attempted to
explore participants’ beliefs about the content and influence of gambler risk perception
cognition (see ‘‘Appendix 1’’ for sample questions) (Strauss and Corbin 1998). Coding
overlapped with interviews such that as analysis developed interview content and partic-
ipant selection was modified to affirm, modify, add, elaborate, clarify, and find exceptions
in emerging themes (Strauss and Corbin 1994). Interviews lasted 40–90 min. Six inter-
views were conducted in person, four via Skype, and one by telephone. With the per-
mission of the participants, all interviews were digitally audio-recorded and transcribed.
The University of Sydney Human Research Ethics Committee approved the conduct of the
study.
Procedure
The study combined the mental models (MMs) approach to risk perception evaluation
(Morgan et al. 2002), with data collection and interpretation based in grounded theory (GT)
(Strauss and Corbin 1994, 1998).
The MM approach aims to identify incomplete or inaccurate content in lay mental
models associated with the use of specified hazards; where this content is assumed to be
responsible for potentially harmful outcomes among users (Fischhoff 1995). The MM
approach has demonstrated efficacy in the development of effective, evidence-based risk
communication interventions (Jungermann et al. 1988), and was therefore deemed
appropriate for investigating gambling risk perception (gambling as a hazardous activity).
The study followed the step-by-step MM procedure outlined by Morgan et al. (2002).
First, semi-structured interviews were conducted with gambling experts. Second, interview
data was compiled into a comprehensive mental model ‘map’ that detailed vulnerability
and protection factors contributing respectively to harmful or safe gambling. Within each
phase, systematic overlapping processes of data gathering and analysis were used to
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iteratively extend, saturate, test for exception and verify the content of mental model maps
(Strauss and Corbin 1994, 1998; Hayes 1997).
Data Analysis
NVivo qualitative data analysis software was used to apply open, axial and selective
coding analyses (QSR International, Version 9; Richards 2005; Strauss and Corbin 1994,
1998). Coded concepts were linked based on similarity or themes among the concepts
identified, after which data was subject to open coding. As the interviews progressed,
recurrent themes were explored in subsequent interviews to enable theoretical sampling.
Conceptual relationships were assembled through a process of axial coding whereby initial
categories were linked to subcategories along the lines of their properties and dimensions.
Finally, selective coding integrated and refined final categories, in order to provide a
detailed, complete explanation of situated gambling risk perception. Two additional par-
ticipants confirmed that theoretical saturation was achieved. A comprehensive expert
influence map emerged from the coding process (see Fig. 1).
Controlling for Bias
Several strategies were employed to reduce potential researcher bias based on Chiovitti and
Piran’s (2003) recommendations. Interview paradigms were initially based on open
Fig. 1 Expert map of gambling risk perception, decision making, and behavioural operations. Perception
and decision making processes involve both implicit and explicit cognition, and may be subject to deliberate
or automatic distortion or manipulation. Risky operations within the gambler’s cognition or interaction with
the environment may result in disordered gambling
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questions. The author kept notes during interview, transcription, and analysis, to detail
emergent concepts and identify potential personal bias. At the same time, participants’ own
language was used where possible to label and describe concepts. Following initial coding,
two randomly selected interviews were blind-coded by a co-author, and used to refine
coding and theory development. Finally, within-interview member checking tested inter-
viewer interpretation of participant data. Participant statements were selected and included
below to represent either typical, exemplar, or contrasting viewpoints on a particular topic.
Results
Experts’ Model of Risk Perception
Responses were consistent with the hypothesis that experts view gambler perceptions of
risk and value as having adaptive or maladaptive influence on decision-making and
behaviour (Spurrier and Blaszczynski 2013). Coding of interviews with experts revealed
eight major themes (represented in Fig. 1 below). Three of these themes related to the core
functional components of gambler risk perception content and processes:
(1) Estimation and expectancy: beliefs or estimations about how gambling systems
operate and generate outcomes combine with perception of the benefit versus cost of
expected or possible event outcomes.
(2) Meaning and motivation: perception of the meaning or value of gambling and its
consequences combine with individuals’ wants, motivation drives and goal seeking.
(3) Strategic planning: understanding of how operating rules and strategies are
prioritised and integrated according to internal goals.
Five additional themes described environmental and individual factors mediating or
moderating relationships between risk perception, decision making and behaviour:
(4) Reinforcement, learning and experience: exposure to gambling reinforcement
schedules, and resultant cognitive changes.
(5) Decisional context and available choice: availability, salience and sensitivity to
internal and external cues.
(6) Implicit versus explicit cognition: the comparative application and control of
implicit versus explicit cognitive processes.
(7) Ambivalence and manipulation of risk data: perception and implicit or explicit
suppression or amplification of positive and negative perceptions.
(8) Innate and developmental individual differences: experiential or dispositional
differences between individuals.
Themes are presented here as modular schema to enable meaningful discussion of
decision-making processes. However, it is important to bear in mind that individual risk
perceptions had referential overlap, that is, perceptions related concurrently to multiple
themes, with aspects of risk perception potentially occurring simultaneously, sequentially,
and/or with reciprocal influence during sessions of play.
Certain types of risk perception content relating to key themes were believed by experts
to either increase or decrease risk of harm (summarised respectively as ‘vulnerability’ and
‘protection factors’ in Table 2 below). In the following sections, expert accounts of each of
the key themes will be summarised and contrasted.
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Functional Components of Gambler Risk Perception
Estimation and Expectancy
Two experts (Experts 9 and 10) argued that common, contemporary models (e.g., Fortune
and Goodie 2011; Toneatto 1999) of disordered gambling cognition lack concepts of risk
perception, and only a handful of studies explicitly address outcome expectancy (see
Spurrier and Blaszczynski 2013). As a result, attempts to predict outcomes are based on
only a partial picture of disordered gamblers’ excessive optimism about specific aspects of
gambling, such as luck, or the controllability of outcomes, without due attention to
independent positively versus negatively motivating content, or contextual factors influ-
encing decisions. Current models therefore remain ‘‘controversial’’, because commonly
discussed gambling cognitions (e.g., the gamblers’ fallacy, the availability heuristic)
remain ‘‘circular’’ (Expert 9) or descriptive rather than predictive, because they lack clear
guidelines for when gamblers apply particular principles.
Several experts cited evidence that gamblers hold highly idiosyncratic mental models of
causality, outcome, and game structural configurations, used to estimate outcomes and
make decisions (Moodie 2007). A majority of experts cited either clinical experience or
research showing the influence of both positive and negative perceptions on decision-
making (e.g., Aarons et al. 2001).
High attention or importance, along with accurate or overestimated estimation of risks
was interpreted to lead to protective gambling choices and behaviours:
People who are not convinced of winning, of course approach gambling, as: ‘‘I’m
going to lose this, so can I afford it, and what will happen if I do?’’ Assessment of risk
is more practiced, likely to be more accurate, and certainly more realistic in its con-
clusion that ‘‘I am likely to lose and therefore am I OK with losing it?’’ (Expert 2).
In contrast, experts reported problem and disordered gamblers place low emphasis on risk
evaluation, underestimate likelihood or magnitude of negative outcomes, or both:
Problem gamblers do not put a great deal of well-considered effort into risk man-
agement (Expert 1).
There’s a naive view out there that the rules of probability don’t actually operate the
way mathematicians think they do (Expert 4).
Experts also reported that low prioritisation of risk or underestimation of risk, may be,
but is not always due to over-prioritisation, or over-estimation of positive outcomes. That
is, any or all of these four factors may independently contribute to increased vulnerability
to harmful gambling. However, how these factors combine as overall optimism or pessi-
mism about gambling is critically important to predicting gamblers’ vulnerability to
harm—this importantly relates to the meaning or value gamblers attribute to cognitions,
goal-prioritisation and planning.
Meaning and Motivation
The majority of expert perspectives described overvaluation of gambling and gambling
outcomes as intrinsically risky, and a core, or the core feature of gambling disorder:
Not many things are true for every single person who gambles, but I think one is they
overvalue gambling as an activity. I think every single person who has a gambling
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problem has their perception of themselves in the world somehow out of line with
reality, like their value as people… I think part of what that thinking—that cognitive
distortion is—about their own values, is they over-attribute how much better they
will feel about themselves if they were good at this gambling thing. I think that’s true
for everybody (Expert 8).
Over-valuation of gambling was referenced by a majority of experts who discussed two
aspects of gamblers’ cognition: (1) evaluation or interpretation of gambling information,
including the value and importance attributed to perceived benefits and costs (discussed
above), and (2) motivation, or the goals and needs of individuals, and how this motivation
related to the value attributed to anticipated outcomes. That is, how gambling outcomes are
perceived to help or hinder individuals from attaining goals, and how needs or goals are
prioritised by individuals ultimately determines how much motivation individuals have to
gamble. Hence, evaluation and motivation were represented by experts as highly influential
aspects of risk perception.
Participants argued that evaluation and motivation may influence risk perception, and
hence decision making, in several harmful or protective ways. For example, evaluation of
outcomes and intrinsic motivational drives lead gamblers to attend to, or value particular
outcomes as important or insignificant, and based on this, prioritise particular goals in
strategic planning within gambling systems—increasing vulnerability or protection from
risk, depending on the type of goals prioritised.
Experts cited a number of specific examples, increasing or decreasing vulnerability to
problematic or disordered gambling. Overall, high value or importance attributed to risk-
management, and non-gambling life goals are likely to protect individuals from harm by
leading gamblers to limit time and money expenditure. Alternatively, high value attributed
to goals that failed to prioritise risk management (e.g., winning money), particularly if
goals were achieved through gambling but were independent of monetary outcomes (e.g.,
emotion regulation), are likely to increase vulnerability to harm and disordered gambling,
since these goals respectively lead gamblers to perceive expenditure on gambling as an
important priority, increase sensitivity to risky cues, or gamble with low attention or
importance attributed to spending.
Strategic Planning
Experts cited evidence that gamblers make gambling decisions according to personal
compilations of cognitive-behavioural ‘if…then…’ imperatives—labelled ‘‘stratagems’’ by
one expert (Expert 2). Stratagem imperatives derive from causal understanding, estimation,
meaning, and motivation. Stratagems aim to achieve goals, according to gamblers
understanding of outcome determination. Reciprocally, strategic planning may influence
attention and importance attributed to risk data.
Experts typically described stratagems as dynamic and flexible, since gamblers must
often unify, satisfice (attempt to meet a threshold of acceptability rather than find an
optimal solution), or switch between competing or contradictory motivations, beliefs, and
contextual demands. Like other aspects of risk perception, the salience and composition of
stratagem content may change over the short- or long-term, according to how experiential
and contextual input affects perception, motivation, and available choice.
A majority of experts made reference to at least three significant themes when dis-
cussing stratagem goals that differentiated recreational from disordered gamblers: (1) risk
management, (2) winning, and (3) emotional or self-regulation.
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Experts argued that preferential, consistent emphasis on risk exposure management is
associated with protection from harm and disordered gambling. Gamblers may achieve this
through specific strategies such as setting firm, realistic, consistent, and sustainable
spending limits:
Most people enjoy playing the pokies, but don’t appear to be experiencing harm, or
experience it only sporadically. They manage their risk by managing their exposure
to that risk, they almost religiously refuse to get any money out, and when that’s
gone they go and have a drink and go home, or whatever (Expert 4).
In contrast, experts stated that gamblers leave themselves vulnerable to harm and dis-
ordered gambling if: stratagems contain erroneous, inconsistent or contradictory content;
are easily influenced by contextual demands or mental states; or prefer strategic goals other
than risk management—particularly ‘winning’ or short term monetary goals, or emotional
or self-regulation. Prioritisation of non-risk-management strategies, even if only for short
periods, leaves gamblers vulnerable to harm, since goal-directed behaviour becomes
detached from monetary outcomes associated with gambling problems. Further, decisions
may be reinforced by outcomes despite losses. For example, gamblers are likely to
experience intermittent wins and motivating emotional outcomes regardless of overall loss,
sustaining motivation to gamble. Emotional and self-regulation goals in particular are
likely to contribute to downward spiralling into disordered gambling, since exposure to
loss and problems are likely to trigger individuals to gamble to manage distress.
Factors Mediating or Moderating Risk Perception
Reinforcement, Learning and Experience
A majority of experts reported that various well-documented learning processes, involving
exposure to sociocultural representations of gambling, and game reinforcement schedules
contingent on game structural configurations (Brevers et al. 2011), have significant, often
unhelpful influence on gambler risk perception:
We know that [games] are designed to engage people and to keep people playing
with the intermittent reinforcement that is always present with gambling, and I think
people’s expectations become very distorted (Expert 1).
I think the single biggest factor seems to be exposure (Expert 4).
Experts noted evidence of maladaptive distortion of risk perception processes with
exposure to reinforcement, observed in neurophysiological (Brevers et al. 2011), cognitive
(Toplak et al. 2007), and behavioural change (Griffiths 1995), results in decreased voli-
tional control (Toplak et al. 2007), attentional biases for positive and negative outcomes
(Stanovich and West 2008), and hypersensitivity to mental states and environmental
triggers associated with gambling (Baudinet and Blaszczynski 2012). In turn, the
increasing automaticity of play decreases the mindfulness with which gamblers make
choices, and leads to myopic life focus and approach to problem solving (Stanovich and
West 2008; Toplak et al. 2007).
Participants argued that long term, repeated exposure to gambling is likely to lead to net
loss based on structural configurations of commercially available games (Walker 1998),
and therefore also experience and awareness of negative game contingencies. Such
experience was expected to be protective if it results in decreased motivation to gamble, or
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an increased risk management focus. However, gamblers may increase vulnerability to
harm by avoiding responsibility for losses, suppressing negative perceptions, or focusing
on non-monetary, ‘emotional’ reasons for gambling.
Decisional Context and Available Choice
A majority of experts made reference to evidence, that: (1) individuals’ sensitivity to
contextual cues, along with the (2) contextual cues available to individuals, each influence
risk perception in significant, often harmful ways (Baudinet and Blaszczynski 2012). First,
dispositional or learned sensitivities to internal and external contextual cues may trigger
fluctuations in perceptions that increase vulnerability to harm. That is, gamblers exposed
and sensitive to vulnerable emotional states, or other internal or environmental cues, are
likely to make greater use of incidental information in decision-making, or give into
fantasies or urges to gamble, resulting in riskier choices:
Hope can initiate a session. I mean if things are looking dire for somebody finan-
cially, if their depression is related to a financial situation, then initiating a session
based on the hope of winning can occur, and then certainly within session there
would still be that factor of the hope of winning (Expert 10).
Second, the availability of gaming services and other environmental triggers, along with
in-game structural configurations, influence the salience and motivational valence of risk
perceptions that promote gambling. With exposure this may reinforce risk perceptions
promoting continued gambling (Productivity Commission 2010). Decisional context was
therefore represented as potentially important to shaping and motivating increased or
continued gambling involvement, not only through the availability of behavioural options
and triggers, but also by increasing individuals’ preoccupation and sensitivity to envi-
ronmental cues and mental states with exposure.
Implicit Versus Explicit Cognition
Several experts cited the importance of implicit risk perception within gambling reasoning
and decision-making. Gamblers may leave themselves vulnerable to harm not only via
explicit reasoning errors (e.g., underestimating risk), but also by misapplying ‘automatic’
reasoning (e.g., applying ‘pattern recognition’ heuristics to random events), or ineffectively
managing implicit processes with explicit reasoning (e.g., failing to inhibit implicit
motivation or failing to correct implicit reasoning errors) (Coventry and Norman 1998).
For example, common reasoning processes such as pattern recognition enable adaptive,
quick judgement, but apply automatic reasoning prone to error dependent on correction by
higher analyses. Gamblers that fail to apply, or:
…suppress the natural checking and controls, or oversight, imposed by high level
cognitive, cortical processes are more susceptible just to that basic instinctual low
level processing, which tends to be associated with forming false associations. You
know, taking unrepresentative information as being more important than it really is
and those sorts of things (Expert 9).
How gamblers apply and resolve conflict between implicit and explicit risk perception may
have important implications for accurate risk estimation, and therefore for the riskiness of
decisions and behaviour.
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Ambivalence and Manipulation of Risk Data
A majority of experts outlined ways that repeated, long term gambling provides a mix of
positive and negative contingencies, particularly a tendency towards overall loss inter-
rupted intermittently by wins. Long-term gamblers responses to ambivalent or dissonant
experiences and perceptions of gambling were believed to have significant implications for
risky decision-making. Dominant negative perceptions motivate change or decreased
gambling, likely to protect against harm. However, dominant positive perception, or dif-
ficulty accepting negative experiences, may trigger implicit or explicit strategies that
amplify positive perceptions, reduce negative perceptions, or both. Gamblers may engage
in mental rehearsal or fantasy around experience, blame others, or satisfice short-term
goals (getting a bonus feature tonight) over long term goals (paying the rent tomorrow), or
may adjust and increase the complexity of strategies rather than challenge faith in winning.
Several experts noted that positive manipulation of risk perceptions may be highly moti-
vating for gamblers with negative experiences, as a means of ‘‘neutralising their anxiety
about their losses through the hope that they’re going to win it back’’ (Expert 6).
Alternatively:
There’s a psychological protection that happens for people, that props up the belief
that the win is going to happen for them. I think once you take it away it’s really,
really scary psychological material (Expert 8).
Positive manipulation strategies however, tend to further compound problems, distress, and
dependence on gambling, by underestimating risk, increasing expenditure and motivation
to gamble, and de-prioritising risk management strategies, particularly if gambling is an
important emotion regulation or coping mechanism for individuals.
Innate and Developmental Individual Differences
All experts discussed evidence that individual differences predispose gamblers to: (1)
develop risk beliefs, and (2) process data, in ways that are more or less protective. The
important role of individual differences in shaping risk perception, means that gambler
presentations are highly idiosyncratic:
The problem I think generally that I’ve discovered with problem gamblers is that
whatever theory you develop the next two or three clients will always disprove it, so
I think it’s very hard to nail it down to any particular population or to any particular
variable that just happens. I think it’s more a combination of variables, features that
will push them in that direction (Expert 1).
Experts argued that evidence suggests ‘‘how someone gets culturally indoctrinated into
a particular stream of gambling’’ is critical in the development of risk beliefs, and the
consequent choices that gamblers make (Raylu and Oei 2002) (Expert 8). Sociocultural
representations of gambling contain various embedded values and causal explanations that
shape decision making, by exposing individuals to particular associations with meaning.
Socio-demographic background (e.g., gender, ethnicity, experience of peer and familial
interaction, mental illness, or socioeconomic hardship) is therefore important in the
development of implicit and explicit beliefs about gambling causality, meaning, value, and
strategic choice (e.g., concepts of luck, will, or fate) (Johansson et al. 2009).
Similarly, a number of experiential and dispositional individual differences were
believed to unhelpfully influence risk perception and vulnerability to harm, according to
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processing differences that shape the salience and meaning of risk data. Experts cited a
number of attributes that increase risky decision making, supported in the literature, such
as: relative sensitivity to short-term rewards and punishment, processing biases, ability to
delay gratification, emotion regulation needs, and vulnerable mental states. Such attributes
were considered likely to influence other mediating or moderating risk perception factors,
such as: individuals’ responsivity to internal or external contextual cues, the likelihood of
giving into urges, fantasy, or deception, changeability of mental states, and the relative
influences of implicit and explicit volitional control.
Discussion
The current study has several important implications for theory and treatment of gambling
disorder. Expert participants cited clinical experience and research showing the importance
of lack of consideration for risk to disordered gambling. Gambling theories, however,
commonly reduce harmful processes to exaggerated biases or errors, exaggerating overall
positive expectations (Fortune and Goodie 2011), or single dimensions (e.g., approach/
avoidance) (Nussbaum et al. 2011), without due attention to: important risk perception
factors, e.g. attention to harmful contingencies (Gillespie et al. 2007), variation in decision
making across contexts and individuals (Moodie 2007), or interplay between perception,
value attribution and other processes (Delfabbro 2004; Delfabbro and Winefield 1999).
Despite a clear role in literature addressing other risky behaviours (Goldberg and Fischhoff
2000; Smith et al. 1995), risk perception is referenced in only a handful of gambling
studies (Wong and Tsang 2012). It is likely therefore that more thorough investigation and
integration into gambling models will improve the predictivity of disordered gambling
models (Delfabbro and Winefield 1999).
The present study also suggests that even the more detailed picture of risk perception
represented in recent ‘outcome expectancy’ studies (Wickwire et al. 2010), may unhelp-
fully reduce cognitions to ‘positive/negative’ valence, or categorical ‘types’ (e.g., social
benefit), and thereby fail to completely capture the variable role expectations play in
decision making. Results suggest that gamblers attribute more personally varied meaning
and value to risk perceptions, based on complex personal dispositional and experiential
factors (e.g., family history), and that these varied meanings shape how risk data is used to
satisfice complex, multifaceted goals. Therefore, there is clear need for future research to
investigate how risk perception and meanings vary among individuals and cultural groups.
In addition, historically, cognitive models of gambling have struggled to reliably and
validly outline how observed perceptions relate to, or predict decisions. Cognitive gam-
bling research, limited by the poor ecological validity of laboratory experiments (Rachlin
1990; Wagenaar 1988), controversial normative assumptions of naturalistic studies (Del-
fabbro 2004), and limited utility of extant psychometric measurement (Strong et al. 2004),
nevertheless acknowledges variation in decision making across contexts (Delfabbro and
Winefield 1999) and over the short and long term (LaPlante et al. 2008). Future research is
needed to explore and model how gamblers satisfy multiple, individually varied strategic
goals, in the context of complex motivational, environmental, and cognitive demands (e.g.,
decisional context, game structural configurations, personality, implicit and explicit
processing).
The findings of this study also have important implications for psycho-educative and
other interventions for gambling disorder. Gambling assessment and treatment would
benefit from: expanding treatment models to include multifactorial risk perception
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concepts; identifying and targeting personally relevant risk belief, motivation, and strategy
‘vulnerability’ factors, along with relevant moderating and mediating factors; identifying
and amplifying individuals’ ‘protection’ factors; and potentially to identify holistic patterns
among vulnerability and protection factors, such that, critical vulnerability factors are
addressed, and protective factors are strategically employed to override vulnerability
factors.
Future Directions, Limitations
Mental models theory outlines valuable, future steps for developing a comprehensive
model of gambling risk perception and decision making, following on from the findings of
this study. Specifically, expert risk concepts should be tested among lay gamblers using
qualitative and quantitative methods, and this data should be used to develop tailored
intervention (Morgan et al. 2002).
The themes presented in the current study focused primarily on risk perception and
decision making affecting gambling behaviour, due in part to selection processes for
participants and research questions. Further research regarding risky gambling decision
making may also benefit from investigation of how types of factors affecting gambling
behaviour that were not considered in the current study interact with risk perception and
cognition to generate harm (e.g., psychobiological, sociological, or actuarial vulnerability
factors for gambling disorder) (Andrews et al. 2006).
Conclusions
Findings suggest that perception, evaluation, and utilisation of risk information may play an
important role in the development of disordered gambling, powerfully mediated or moder-
ated by individuals’ location within a dispositional, socio-cultural context. The current study
is the first to discuss the role of value and meaning in gambling risk perception.
Conflict of interest The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.
Appendix 1: Sample Interview Questions
1. How do people scan, filter and interpret information about gambling risks and prob-
lems (particularly in relation to their own vulnerability to or experience of harm)?
2. Do beliefs and thoughts mediate how people measure benefits/problems associated
with gambling? If so do these beliefs therefore mediate how vulnerable people are to
harm? How?
3. Do beliefs/thoughts about gambling risks change during the process of gambling?
How? Why? How do these beliefs/thoughts influence gambling behaviour?
4. What do people do to address or compensate for gambling risks or problems?
5. Does experience mediate people’s schema/beliefs about gambling risk? How?
6. Do disordered gamblers have patterns of significantly different:
• Experiences
• Evaluations of those experiences
• Cognitions while gambling
• Stable beliefs about the nature of gambling, risks and hazards
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Abstract Few studies have investigated how gamblers perceive risk or the role of risk
perception in disordered gambling. The purpose of the current study therefore was to obtain
data on lay gamblers’ beliefs on these variables and their effects on decision-making,
behaviour, and disordered gambling aetiology. Fifteen regular lay gamblers (non-problem/
low risk, moderate risk and problem gamblers) completed a semi-structured interview fol-
lowing mental models and grounded theory methodologies. Gambler interview data was
compared to an expert ‘map’ of risk-perception, to identify comparative gaps or differences
associated with harmful or safe gambling. Systematic overlapping processes of data gathering
and analysis were used to iteratively extend, saturate, test for exception, and verify concepts
and themes emerging from the data. The preliminary findings suggested that gambler
accounts supported the presence of expert conceptual constructs, and to some degree the role
of risk perception in protecting against or increasing vulnerability to harm and disordered
gambling. Gambler accounts of causality, meaning, motivation, and strategy were highly
idiosyncratic, and often contained content inconsistent with measures of disordered gam-
bling. Disordered gambling appears heavily influenced by relative underestimation of risk
and overvaluation of gambling, based on explicit and implicit analysis, and deliberate, innate,
contextual, and learned processing evaluations and biases.
Keywords Gambling  Pathological gambling  Gambling disorder  Risk
perception  Grounded theory  Mental models
Introduction
Despite the paucity of studies and methodological limitations associated with cross-sec-
tional and self-report data (Baron and Kenny 1986; Weinstein 2007), risk perception
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research suggests that gamblers’ perceptions of negative consequences play an important
role in decision-making, behaviour, and disordered gambling aetiology (Spurrier and
Blaszczynski 2013). Several studies have demonstrated a functional relationship between
disordered gambling and a mix of positive (‘material gain’, ‘social benefits’) and negative
expectations (‘loss of control’) (Gillespie et al. 2007; Wickwire et al. 2010), along with
lower overall risk expectancies (Derevensky et al. 2010; Inglin and Gmel 2011).
It appears disordered gamblers maintain greater optimism about gambling, despite greater
experience and expectation of at least some negative consequences (Wong and Tsang 2012;
Wickwire et al. 2007; Yi and Kanetkar 2010), implying disordered gambling cannot simply
be explained by gamblers overestimating positive outcomes, or personal control (Fortune and
Goodie 2011; Toneatto 1999). Instead, both positive and negative perceptions independently
influence perception of risk (Wickwire et al. 2007; Yi and Kanetkar 2010), and disordered
gamblers preference or amplify positive representations of gambling, discount negative
perceptions, or both, to hold more optimistic overall viewpoints consistent with motivation to
gamble (Gillespie et al. 2007; Wickwire et al. 2010), presenting a picture of gambling risk
perception compatible with findings in related drug, alcohol, and offending research
(Goldstein et al. 2009; Jones et al. 2001; Leigh 1999; Rinn et al. 2002).
Spurrier et al. (Submitted) applied a mental models (MM) and grounded theory (GT)
methodology to develop a ‘map’, outlining the role of risk perception on gambling decision
making and behaviour, based on experts’ evaluation of relevant research and clinical
experience (Morgan et al. 2002; Strauss and Corbin 1994, 1998). The expert ‘map’
identified a number of factors influencing risky decision-making, relating to risk perception
and how context influenced use of risk data.
The current study aimed to test this expert ‘map’, via interviews with regular gamblers
that: detail lay risk perception concepts, compares lay concepts against expert map content,
and identifies benign and maladaptive systematic gaps or errors in lay MM of gambling
held by recreational versus disordered gamblers.
Methods
Participants
Fifteen regular gamblers participated in a second phase of data collection (5 females,
Mf = 22.40 years, SDf = 3.58 years; 10 males, Mm = 29.80 years, SDm = 16.53 years,
t(13) = .972, p = .349). Participants were only included if they: spoke fluent English;
were over 18 years of age; gambled at least once a week for the past 2 months or for any
period greater than 5 years. Participants were invited to participate via face-to-face contact
or third party referral. Three participants were recruited through gambling treatment
clinics, eleven through the University of Sydney undergraduate psychology student
research participation program, and one was referred by a previous participant.
Three gamblers accepted initial invitations and completed the first round of interviews.
Following preliminary interview analysis, ten of thirteen further volunteers were accepted
as participants based on provided demographics information, with the goal of maximally
diversifying perspectives within the data. Again, two additional interviews were finally
recruited at saturation, to check that no new themes or concepts emerged (Strauss and
Corbin 1998).
Table 1 lists participants’ descriptive information. Pseudonyms were used for all par-
ticipants to protect anonymity.
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Measures
Fourteen semi-structured interviews were conducted in person and one by telephone
(Morgan et al. 2002; Strauss and Corbin 1994, 1998). Initial interview questions were
open-ended and explored participants’ beliefs about the content and influence of risk
perception cognition (Strauss and Corbin 1998). Coding overlapped with interviews such
that as analysis developed interview content and participant selection was modified to
affirm, modify, add, elaborate, clarify, and find exceptions in emerging themes (Strauss and
Corbin 1994). Interviews lasted 30–90 min. With the permission of the participants, all
interviews were digitally audio-recorded and transcribed.
Participants also completed a demographics questionnaire and the Problem Gambling
Severity Index (PGSI; Ferris and Wynne 2001). The demographics questionnaire gathered
details about: age, gender, ethnicity, and relationship status, gambling and gambling
treatment experience. The PGSI is a nine-item self-report subscale of the Canadian
Problem Gambling Index (CPGI; Ferris and Wynne 2001) measuring severity of problem
gambling (low risk, moderate risk, or problem gambling). The CPGI has been found to be
reliable (Cronbach’s a = .84, test retest reliability = .78) (Ferris and Wynne 2001).
Following conventions, lay gambler participants were classified into gambling subtypes
according to their PGSI scores (0–2 = non-problem/low risk gambler; 3–7 = moderate
risk gambler; C8 = problem gambler), with five participants meeting criteria for each
subtype (Ferris and Wynne 2001).
Procedure
The study combined the MM approach to risk perception evaluation (Morgan et al. 2002),
with data collection and interpretation based in GT (Strauss and Corbin 1994, 1998).
Traditionally, the MM methodology has been applied to hazard evaluation on the
assumption that: users are entirely motivated by safety; users hold similar MM evaluating
risk; and that risk factors follow predictable, consistent physical laws (Morgan et al. 2002).
Gambling differs from hazards typically evaluated using the MM approach (e.g., radon gas,
nuclear contamination, physical illness) in several important ways (Bostrom et al. 1992).
Gamblers may hold additional variable motivations to notions of safety, for example,
winning money (Binde 2009). Gamblers fall into clearly identifiable subgroups of recre-
ational and disordered users, with systematic differences in cognitive functioning, and
consequently, MM (Raylu and Oei 2002). Similarly, evidence suggests that gambler
cognition varies systematically according to: preferred game type (Blaszczynski and
Nower 2002); experience (Hodgins 2001); and other individual differences (Johansson
et al. 2009; Raylu and Oei 2002).
Strategies were employed to control for the above factors. Participants were selectively
recruited to reflect a broad range of backgrounds (e.g., gender, age, socio-economic status,
length of gambling career) and exposure to problems with gambling (i.e., low risk,
moderate risk, or problem gambling).
The study followed the step-by-step MM procedure outlined by Morgan et al. (2002),
following on from the study by Spurrier et al. (Submitted). Lay gamblers completed
interviews and questionnaires to: (1) identify the content of lay risk perception, (2)
compare lay concepts against an expert map (outlined in Spurrier et al., Submitted), and (3)
identify systematic gaps or errors in lay MM of gambling held by recreational versus
disordered gamblers, compared to the comprehensive expert map. The University of
Sydney Human Research Ethics Committee approved the conduct of the study.
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Data Analysis
NVivo qualitative data analysis software was used to apply open, axial and selective
coding analyses (QSR International, Version 9; Richards 2005; Strauss and Corbin 1994,
1998). Coded concepts were arranged chronologically to enable processes to emerge, after
which data was subject to open coding. As the interviews progressed, recurrent themes
were explored in subsequent interviews to enable theoretical sampling. Conceptual rela-
tionships were assembled through a process of axial coding whereby initial categories were
linked to subcategories along the lines of their properties and dimensions. Finally, selective
coding integrated and refined final categories, in order to provide a detailed, complete
explanation of situated gambling risk perception. Two additional participants confirmed
that theoretical saturation was achieved.
Controlling for Bias
Several strategies were employed to reduce potential researcher bias based on Chiovitti and
Piran’s (2003) recommendations. Interview paradigms were initially based on open
questions. The author kept notes during interview, transcription, and analysis, to detail
emergent concepts and identify potential personal bias. At the same time, participants’ own
language was used where possible to label and describe concepts. Following initial coding,
two randomly selected interviews were blind-coded by a co-author, and used to refine
coding and theory development. Finally, within-interview member checking tested inter-
viewer interpretation of participant data.
Results
Overview of Lay Gambler Perspectives on Risk Perception
Gamblers’ accounts of risk perception, decision-making and behaviour generally supported
‘vulnerability’ and ‘protection’ factors identified as relevant within the expert map outlined
in Spurrier et al. (Submitted). Table 2 outlines each participant’s vulnerability and pro-
tection factors based on interview data.
The majority of non-problem/low risk gamblers consistently indicated either absence of
vulnerability factors, or presence of protection factors, along with few mediating/moder-
ating factors. Reciprocally, the majority of problem gamblers described vulnerability
factors relevant all risk perception and many mediating/moderating factors. Moderate risk
gambler presentations were more varied than non-problem/low risk or problem gamblers,
presenting with a mix of vulnerability and protection factors relevant to both risk per-
ception and mediating/moderating factors.
In approximately nine of fifteen cases, vulnerability or protection risk perception factors
consistently correlated with each other, and matched predicted subgroup membership. That
is, protective risk beliefs, evaluation, strategic planning and non-problem/low risk gam-
bling correlated with each other; with equivalent correlations between risk perception
vulnerability, and moderate/problem gambler status. In all cases, at least one vulnerability
or protection factor related to expected group membership. That is, moderate risk and
problem gamblers held at least one identifiable vulnerability factor, while non-problem/low
risk gamblers held at least one protection factor. In describing narratives about gambling,
all gamblers were able to reflect on the causal influences between risk perceptions, the role
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of risk perceptions in decisions, the significance of mediating/moderating factors to risk
perception, and the manner in which contradictory vulnerability and protection factors
overrode each other.
Gamblers varied considerably both in idiosyncratic descriptions of expert concepts, and
the vulnerability and protection factors described, even among members of the same
clinical subgroup. Instead, gamblers across subgroups described one or more, but never all,
possible vulnerability or protection factors. A personalised ‘profile’ approach, incorpo-
rating a limited number of personally relevant factors is therefore likely to be more
appropriate than a general model, with vulnerability and protection factors applicable to all
gamblers, or particular subgroups, contrary to common models in the literature.
Non-problem/Low Problem Gamblers
Risk Perception
Four of five non-problem/low risk gamblers described risk perception factors with con-
sistent, protective or benign influence on decision making: high expectations of negative or
low expectations of positive outcomes compared to other gambler groups. However, a
majority of individuals did not present detailed views about possible outcomes, instead
conflating expectations into a generally pessimistic attitude towards likely outcomes that
reciprocally influenced meanings, evaluations and strategic planning. For example:
I didn’t really think that much about it. I just, I’m not a big fan of gambling… In the
long-term, if you look at all the money you put in, you probably wouldn’t have won
it back… It’s just a chance thing. That’s why I think I don’t put a lot of money on it,
because there is no kind of logical way you could win. Joslyn (19, F)
The very reason I don’t play them very much is because I don’t think you can really
win on them. Simon, (19, M)
In the majority of cases, gamblers causal beliefs, though benign or even protective, were
inaccurate or vague. For example, Roger (20, M) described vague, erroneous beliefs about
gaming machine return-to-player percentage underlying pessimistic expectations and low
expenditure (Harrigan et al. 2011):
The percentage back is really small. It’s, like, under thirty percent or something,
around thirty percent… It’s ridiculous - twenty percent over a period… Roger (20,
M)
Nevertheless, compared to other gamblers, non-problem/low risk gamblers more
frequently acknowledged subjectivity or fallibility of personal knowledge, and more
clearly differentiated hopes as something distinct from expectations. For example:
I don’t believe in luck - it’s more like hope because it doesn’t seem to have a pattern.
Susan (27, F)
Four of five non-problem/low risk gamblers stated that, as a consequence of expectations,
motivation behind decision making emphasised risk management (e.g., limiting losses)
over other non-monetary but positive motives (e.g., fun and socialising), based on
consistent, pre-planned strategies that limit expenditure:
When I’m walking into the pokies room, I just tell myself, like, ‘this is the limit’.
Whatever it is, I say, ‘twenty bucks is the max you’re going to put in’. Obviously I’m
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thinking about getting more beers for later. I don’t think about, I know a lot of other
gamblers do, I don’t really think about gambling to win. I just think about, ‘alright,
we’re just having some fun on the pokies’, I’m not thinking about trying to, uh,
obviously you’d like to win, but it’s just for a bit of fun - something to do when
you’re in the pub. I’ve probably gone over a little bit, but it would probably only be
like five or ten bucks. That’d be quite rare as well. Roger (20, M)
Overall, non-problem/low risk gamblers presented more similarly to each other than did
members of other subgroups. Only one individual, Sarah (25, F), described risk perceptions
functionally different than those so far described. Unlike other non-problem/low risk
gamblers, Sarah (25, F) described an optimistic overall view of gambling, high expectation
of personal control, skill, and winning, low expectation of negative consequences, with
high personal importance and arousal attached to winning money and emotional outcomes,
and strong emphasis on strategies aimed at winning. However, Sarah (25, F) also described
strict, sustainable spending limits that overrode all other play strategies when limits were
reached.
Mediating and Moderating Factors
A majority of non-problem/low risk gamblers were relatively less affected than other
gamblers by mediating factors (that changed the influence of risk perception on decision
making), or moderating factors (that partitioned risk perception variables according to their
influence on decision making) (Baron and Kenny 1986). Non-problem/low risk gamblers
took greater personal responsibility for losses, with only two of five non-problem/low risk
gamblers stating that occasional rule breaking resulted in larger than planned losses, due to
alcohol consumption, boredom, peer influence or other factors. Again Sarah (25, F), unlike
other non-problem/low risk gamblers, described greater influence on risk perception and
decision making by mediating/moderating factors, including: evidence of greater exposure
to reinforcement, memory biased for positive outcomes, and mood states that triggered
initiation of gambling.
Moderate Risk Gamblers
Risk Perception
Moderate compared to non-problem/low risk gamblers described risk perceptions implying
greater vulnerability to harm, though vulnerability factors appeared less consistently cor-
related than among problem gamblers. Four of five moderate risk gamblers admitted to
similar assessments of the likelihood of negative outcomes (e.g., losing money), but also
that they rarely reflected on this information when making decisions. Overall, moderate
risk gamblers described more optimistic expectations, along with causal beliefs justifying
riskier win-directed gambling—used in part to justify lack of reflection on negative
contingencies.
Moderate and non-problem/low risk gamblers attributed similar positive qualities and
goals when justifying motivation to gamble. However, moderate risk gamblers described
experiences with greater emotional intensity, referring frequently for example, to the
‘‘thrill of winning’’ and the excitement, concentration and focus they felt while gambling
(Colin, 19, M). Similarly, descriptions of mental rehearsal, fantasy or hope were more
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positive and emotional in tone, demonstrating less reflection on the mechanics determining
likely outcomes:
I think the risk of it is fun as well. It’s not just about making money. It’s about surprise,
that element of surprise, or that element of ‘it’s a possibility’. Victoria (22, F)
Moderate risk gamblers also reported prioritising play strategies associated with dif-
ferent motivational goals than non-problem/low risk gamblers, often emphasising shorter
term, specific, more immediate emotional or monetary goals over long term risk man-
agement. Like non-problem/low risk gamblers, a majority of moderate risk gamblers used
behavioural rules to limit spending (e.g., playing only when in the company of peers),
though often setting higher monetary limits (absolute, and as proportion of income), based
on more complex, less consistent rules. For example, initially Wendy (19, F) described her
strategy to limit spending as:
Tonight I only want to spend $200, and not spend more. You never take a card with
you. Otherwise you’re going to lose more. Wendy (19, F)
Although, later in her interview, she reflected on a more complex method for reaching a
higher limit, based on her potential pattern of loss:
The first time I would always take out small amounts of money, like fifties, but after
that up to two hundred. If I still lose I will take the money up to five hundred. If I still
lose, but not all of the five hundred, maybe four hundred, I will stop for the night. I
will think ‘tonight is no good’. Nobody wins all their money back all the time, so if
you win once at one place, you try a second place to see if you have good luck, but if
not, then I change to another machine. Wendy (19, F)
Mediating and Moderating Factors
Overall, moderate risk gamblers described less consistent, riskier decision making, both
in risk perception or interpretation, and in the satisficing of goals or strategies. All
moderate risk gamblers reported that decision-making may fluctuate with exposure to
mental cues (alcohol intoxication, feelings of loneliness, confidence and boredom), and
external cues (proximity to venues or peers, reaching preset spending limits, particular
in-game events). Three of five moderate risk gamblers reported difficulty resisting the
urge to gamble, even when mindful of likely negative outcomes. Common cues (alcohol,
boredom, reaching spending limits) and implicit urges were reported to linger longer and
be more influential on the decision making among moderate compared to non-problem/
low risk gamblers, leading to spontaneous, often overwhelming urges to gamble, and
prioritisation of riskier strategies (e.g., increasing bet sizes, ignoring preset spending
limits, borrowing money):
Alcohol would be my main influence, big time, especially when you’re out and
you’re spending money. You’re thinking, ‘well, this is a good idea’, at the time,
‘I might be able to make some money’. You also don’t really have a bigger
picture of how much you’re actually losing, because you’re under the influence of
alcohol, and you’re also enjoying yourself and having fun at the same time.
Victoria (22, F)
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Three of five moderate risk gamblers described historical factors associated with increased
risk of vulnerability to either harmful risk perceptions, or inconsistent decision making,
such as: an early history of gambling, substantial early career wins, and normalization or
high valuation of gambling by close family members (Johansson et al. 2009; Raylu and Oei
2002). Although, only one gambler reported gambling for an extended or prolonged
period—in this case, more than 2 years.
Problem Gamblers
Risk Perception
All individuals meeting criteria for problem gambling described risk perception and
mediating/moderating vulnerability factors. Three of five individuals (Tim, 54, M; Gene,
59, M; Steven, 47, M) had engaged in cognitive behavioural therapy for gambling, leading
to recovery from symptoms. Treatment experienced individuals demonstrated similarities
distinguishing them from other problem gamblers: personally significant problems leading
to treatment seeking (e.g., suicidality, self-harm, relationship breakdown, large financial
debts); beliefs, prior to treatment, that were vague or erroneous, supporting overestimation
of positive outcomes, underestimation of negative outcomes, and overall excessive opti-
mism; and, with treatment, significantly reduced positive, and increased negative expec-
tations, decreased explicit valuation of gambling, and increased volitional control despite
residual urges:
Until [my therapist] explained it all, it was because everybody else was making a
noise. It was the expectation of winning, thinking, ‘oh well, everything’s going off’,
not knowing how they’re programmed, and how they work, and randomness, and
probability. So it’s strange, I could walk into a pub, or a club, or sit at a poker
machine by myself and just play away merrily. Tim (54, M)
Treatment inexperienced problem gamblers (Martin, 19, M; Lewis, 23, M) were com-
paratively younger, and less experienced than other group members. Similar to treated
gamblers, Martin described erroneous concepts of causality (overestimation of positive,
underestimation of negative outcomes) related to consequent high value attributed to
gambling, and risky strategising. However, Lewis, unlike other problem, and many
moderate gamblers, endorsed low expectation of winning or positive outcomes, and high
expectation of losing or negative outcomes.
Regardless of background and beliefs, all problem gambling group members reported
gambling to regulate emotions (stimulation, excitement, boredom relief) and to win money,
describing more intense motivation to play than other participants. Consequently, all
problem gamblers described using strategies aimed primarily at emotion regulation and
winning. Although, treatment experienced gamblers noted that they currently prioritised
risk management strategies developed during treatment. Only one recovered problem
gambler (Gene, 59, M) described attempting to use spending limits to reduce risk prior to
treatment. All treated gamblers were currently abstinent or gambling at a low level, sus-
tainable at their current income:
The attraction’s still there. It’s something that I’ve had there for a long time in my
life. I don’t take drugs or anything like that. I do smoke cigarettes. I don’t find myself
wanting to go and get that extra fifty and go back so much, if you understand what I
mean. The old [Gene] used to think of ways of going and getting some more money
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and returning straight away. I tend to go with what I’ve got and leave it at that. Gene
(59, M)
Mediating and Moderating Factors
Compared to low and moderate risk gamblers, problem gambling group members
described greater intensity, number and influence of vulnerability factors associated with
risk perception mediation/moderation. However, the relevance of particular factors varied
considerably among individuals. Overall, problem gamblers described similar types of
contextual influences as moderate risk gamblers (e.g., boredom, loneliness, alcohol, low
mood, game events, proximity of venues and peers) though with a greater likelihood and
intensity of arousing urges to gamble, and therefore with more powerful influence over
gambling decisions:
I do a lot of designated driving for my mates. If I’m there as well I might put on $10,
$20, just because I’m not drinking so I can afford it. I don’t sort of think in my head,
‘I don’t need to put it in, I can just save it’, I say, ‘I’ve got the money on me I may as
well spend it’. It sort of lures you in a little bit. It’s the way, this is the way I always
thought of it, because I always think of this when I’m at home when I’m bored. Like,
the way the machines are set up to look like they’re features, like a fun gaming
opportunity. It’s very sneaky. Martin (19, M)
When you drink it’s the worst. Alcohol just destroys your mind, you just, like, you
lose all your inhibitions. You’re like, ‘oh, what’s another $20?’ Martin (19, M)
All group members noted changes in gambling cognition and behaviour over time,
including: increasing exposure to reinforcement and negative consequences, more pow-
erful urges to play often competing with conscious motivation, and greater mood,
appraisal, and volitional fluctuation in response to contextual cues (e.g., intense feelings of
regret, shame, or suicidality after losing money). Group members described higher rates of
background risk factors (Johansson et al. 2009), often representative of more significant
life problems predisposing individuals to vulnerable risk perceptions (e.g., substantial
mental illness or trauma). Three of five group members also acknowledged that deception
or denial of problems had had a significant influence over risk perceptions (e.g., amplifying
positive, minimizing negative expectations), and decision-making:
I liked the encouraging aspect of the ‘random’ part. I’m not a great fan of the
‘probability’ part. So, I’ll sit there and accept the fact that I randomly I can walk into
a machine, put a dollar in, and just hit one go for one credit, and the big jackpot
would come up. The probability of it, being so remote, doesn’t occur to me, because I
see the randomness of it, so as far as you’re concerned, I can accidentally trip over
and just press a button that’s got two coins on it. So, I try to associate, or dis-
associate I suppose, the probability from the randomness. Tim (54, M)
Problem gambler Lewis presented a coherent, detailed narrative outlining his risk
perceptions and their relationship with problematic gambling, in a similar way to many of
the treated gamblers. Lewis reported that he had mostly negative memories and expecta-
tions of gambling. However, if enough time passed since his last gambling session, regret
and other attributions about losses would dissipate, leaving him vulnerable to particular
mental (boredom, being alone, perception of the close proximity of venues) and envi-
ronmental cues (seeing gambling images), triggering positive perceptions and fantasies,
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increasing motivation to gamble. Lewis noted that he would then attempt to rationalise
gambling, minimising negative, and amplifying positive expectations, thereby further
increasing his motivation, reducing volitional control, often leading to harmful gambling
sessions:
That idea of, ‘‘maybe you could win’’ comes back in. And the negative feeling,
maybe I push it down subconsciously, deliberately. I’m not sure. But those negative
feelings sort of dissipate… I usually try and rationalise, ‘it would be good to win this
money to do this’. I think I use that, more as an excuse too. But I think deep down,
it’s the idea of winning really big that’s exciting - getting the actual jackpot or
whatever… The temptation to keep playing and hopefully win just sort of wins in the
end. Lewis (23, M)
Discussion
The present study sought to obtain preliminary data on how gamblers perceive risk and the
role of risk perception in decision making. The aim was to build upon and extend an earlier
study applying MM and GT mapping out how experts evaluated these factors. Although as
a pilot study no definitive conclusions can be drawn given the diverse composition of the
sample, the findings provide an important conceptual basis for understanding risk per-
ception and the development of disordered gambling.
Positive Versus Negative Risk Perceptions
Perceptions of ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ consequences appear to convey distinct influence
on decision making and behaviour. Detailed, consistent, heightened expectation of nega-
tive outcomes (e.g., losing money), and consistent, low erudition, expectation, and
emphasis on positive outcomes (e.g., excitement, peer interaction), can be construed as
contributing independently to fewer gambling problems, while reciprocal, equivalent
expectations contributed to problematic gambling. Strength of convictions was associated
with level of problems, or lack thereof. A majority of gamblers outlined coherent narratives
outlining content and reciprocal causal influence between gambling risk perceptions,
mediating/moderating factors, decision-making, behaviour, and consequences.
Mental models and GT analysis identified important between individual, and between
group differences. Equivalent with the findings of this study, a number of drug and alcohol
studies support the independent influence of positive and negative outcome expectancies
and preferences in riskier behaviour and substance dependence, and in the reciprocal
influence of substance use experience on risk perception (Aarons et al. 2001; Leigh 1999;
Smith et al. 1995). Gambling risk perception research has been limited to date, though is
also broadly consistent with the current findings, and findings in related disciplines
(Derevensky et al. 2010; Inglin and Gmel 2011; Gillespie et al. 2007).
However, the current findings also suggest gamblers attribute meaning to risk percep-
tion in individually and contextually varied ways, incompatible with normative views of
rationality (Delfabbro 2004; Delfabbro and Winefield 1999). Gamblers across groups
described varied interpretations of behaviours, events, outcomes, causation, thought pro-
cesses and content-relating interpretations to context-dependent, personally meaningful,
short or long term goals. For example, Victoria (22, F, moderate risk gambler) described
risk under uncertainty as exciting and positively motivating, while another gambler, Tim
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(54, M, problem gambler), ashamed of earlier life events, described gambling losses and
problems as a means of deserved, self-inflicted punishment. Nevertheless, many gamblers
noted risk and loss as important disincentives justifying careful spending limits (e.g.,
Joslyn, 19, F, low risk gambler). Therefore, even ‘risk’ itself, or loss of money, was not
seen universally as an inherently ‘negative’ outcome. However, in the few gambling
studies investigating outcome expectancy (Wong and Tsang 2012), outcomes were typi-
cally pre-categorised, according to normative assumptions about motivational value, rather
than reflecting idiosyncratic interpretation (Mischel 2004; Moodie 2007). Here, findings
suggest that difficulties in predicting real world gambling behaviour according to current
gambling decision making theories (Fortune and Goodie 2011) may be due to unrealistic
reduction, or generalisation, or that it is incorrect to assume all disordered gamblers adhere
to a common set of irrational, biased or erroneous risk cognitions (Delfabbro 2004; Rachlin
1990).
Gamblers in the current study reported multiple, inconsistent perceptions and goals—
considered simultaneously—satisficing perceived negatives (e.g., loss, financial difficul-
ties, interpersonal conflict, guilt and shame) and perceived positives (e.g., excitement,
hope, stimulation, peer approval), to navigate multifaceted, subjective goals and scenarios.
However, while research agrees gamblers may have multiple motivations for gambling
(Binde 2009), the processes by which gamblers satisfice or negotiate multiple perceptions
has been largely neglected in the MM and gambling literature (Breakwell 2007). In con-
trast, here, gamblers presented coherent narratives to explain gambling behaviour under
competing constraints and conditions, or else provided data that compiled into plausible
formulations, even in the case of harmful or inconsistent choices, or decision making
confounded by perceptual suppression or bias. For, example, non-problem/low risk gam-
blers tended to explain limited gambling according to conscious prioritisation of risk
management over entertainment, social, winning or other goals, with the equivalent reverse
situation true for more disordered gamblers.
Idiosyncratic Gambler Profiling
Participants’ risk perception/decision making profiles were complex and idiosyncratic,
with differences, even within groups, in: risk beliefs, meanings and strategizing; predis-
posing, experiential, or contextual factors influencing the use of risk data; and patterns of
dominance among risk perception and mediating/moderating factors. Many moderate risk,
and some non-problem/low risk gamblers described milder problems, and less severe
vulnerabilities, while more problematic gamblers described more harmful patterns of
decision making according to a broader range of more powerfully influential vulnerability
factors.
Individuals’ motivations and behaviours also varied across contexts, and over the course
of gambling careers. For example, gamblers explained decision making variation based on
boredom, hope, guilt, uncontrollable urges, or alcohol consumption (e.g., Lewis, 23, M,
problem gambler; Tim, 54, M, problem gambler), while treatment experienced gamblers
reported shifts in estimation and consequent motivation, with downward spiral into
problem gambling, and with recovery.
Findings suggest different predisposing and experiential factors lead individuals to
make different decisions in different contexts—over time, or if gambling problems become
more severe, problematic decision making processes may multiply and merge, com-
pounding difficulties and making it difficult to tease apart cognitive processes responsible
for problematic gambling. Current findings are consistent with research showing
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substantial exposure to reinforcement or problems and harmful decision making processes
may interact, exacerbating and compounding problematic decision making over time, in
turn leading to more comprehensive, intense problematic cognitions (Holtgraves 2009).
Meanwhile, less severe gambling problems result from fewer, less intense, more diverse
risk perception vulnerabilities.
Individually varied and context dependent decision making observed here supports
research highlighting, both, multiple pathways in and out of problem gambling (LaPlante
et al. 2008; Milosevic and Ledgerwood 2010), as well as probable decision making dif-
ferences among disordered gamblers (Grant et al. 2010; Holtgraves 2009). The current
findings suggest that these two research areas may potentially be usefully linked in an
integrative understanding of gambling disorder: adding valuable decision making expla-
nation to subtyping models (Blaszczynski and Nower 2002), and helping to overcome the
theoretical limitations of biopsychological theories of gambling (e.g., low level gambling
problems without neurophysiological biases, or lack of gambling problems with biases)
(Moscrop 2011).
Limitations and Future Directions
Despite following evidence-based methodological principles (Chiovitti and Piran 2003;
Morgan et al. 2002; Strauss and Corbin 1998), it is difficult to generalise conclusions from
this study, due to inevitable bias in participant and researcher viewpoints. Sampling, for
example, was likely biased towards younger, university-educated, recreational gamblers,
and more gambling experienced, treatment experienced, older, male problem gamblers.
Analyses may also potentially over-explain uncertainty in the data (Burgess et al. 2013),
despite analysis following an evidence based theory of gambling risk perception (outlined
in detail in the previous study by Spurrier et al. Submitted) (Morgan et al. 2002). Gambler
explanations throughout the study related to decision-making relationships, without control
for combinatory effects among all relevant variables. Without psychometrically validated,
quantitative measurement, it is difficult to reasonably infer which variables influence each
another, or decisions, particularly when variables reportedly played different roles for
different gamblers. Future research is therefore clearly needed to validate and build upon
the preliminary factors outlined here. Specifically, larger samples and mixed qualitative–
quantitative data collection methods should be employed to further expand and test the
findings of this study.
Conclusion
This project represents early, exploratory research, limited by the available qualitative
methodology. The current study offers some preliminary data that suggests that the
development of disordered gambling may be heavily influenced by relative underestima-
tion of risk and overvaluation of gambling, based on explicit and implicit analysis, and
deliberate, innate, contextual, and learned processing evaluations and biases. Theoretical
models or corrective interventions addressing estimation, expectation and evaluation of
gambling may be beneficial, though should be mindful of factors impinging on gamblers’
capacities to accurately process risk, and explicitly control behaviour.
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APPENDIX D: 48-item Gambling Risk Decisions Questionnaire 
 
  
  
Gambling Risk Decisions Questionnaire 
 
 
Rate the LIKELIHOOD / PROBABILITY of the following potential OUTCOMES OF A GAMBLING 
SESSION... 
Please choose the appropriate response for each item: 
 
 Impossible Unlikely to 
happen 
Average Very Likely 
to happen 
Certain 
1. Relationship difficulties, losing 
respect or approval from 
others 
     
2. Financial, work, or legal 
problems 
     
3. Feeling guilt, shame, or bad 
about who I am 
     
4. Stress, depression, anxiety, or 
other bad feelings 
     
 
 
     
 
How IMMEDIATE OR LONG LASTING are the EFFECTS of each potential outcome...  
Please choose the appropriate response for each item: 
 
 No impact Immediate 
impact only 
Short term 
impact 
Long term 
impact 
Permanent 
5. Feeling excitement, feeling a 
'rush' 
     
6. Reducing boredom      
7. Gaining respect or approval 
from others 
     
8. Feeling powerful, proud, or 
confident 
     
      
 
  
  
Rate how TRUE / FALSE each of the following statements about gambling is. 
Please choose the appropriate response for each item: 
 
 Completely 
UNTRUE 
   Completely 
TRUE 
      
9. Gambling has predictable 
outcomes 
     
10. A gambler can win over the 
long term 
     
11. I can predict game outcomes 
when I am tuned in or 
observant 
     
12. I can control the outcome of 
games 
     
13. I am luckier than most people      
14. You usually need to invest a 
certain amount before you win 
     
15. Losing profit from gambling is 
not really losing money 
     
16. If you lose, you are more likely 
to win next time 
     
 
 
     
 Nil    Very strong 
17. Right at this moment, how 
strong is your urge to gamble 
     
18. Right at this moment, how 
strong is your intention to 
gamble 
     
 
 
     
 Very easy    Very difficult 
19. How difficult is it to follow 
your own rules or plans during 
gambling sessions? 
     
20. How difficult is it to ignore or 
dismiss thoughts about 
gambling? 
     
21. How difficult is it to resist the 
urge to gamble? 
     
  
  
 Very 
comfortable 
   Very 
uncomfortable 
22. How uncomfortable do you 
find competing goals during 
gambling sessions? 
     
      
Consider the following SITUATIONS and STATES OF MIND (items 23-30).  
Please choose the appropriate response for each item: 
 
 Unlikely to 
THINK 
about 
gambling 
   Likely to 
THINK about 
gambling 
23. you're alone at home      
24. you see an advertisement, or 
sign for gambling 
     
25. you had an argument with 
your partner, friend, or family 
member 
     
26. you’re at a casino, race track, 
or other gambling venue 
     
27. you feel low or depressed      
28. you’re at a sporting event, or a 
venue where gambling may 
available 
     
29. you feel anxious, stressed, or 
on edge 
     
30. you had a recent, large 
gambling win 
     
      
 No problem 
at all 
   Significant 
problems 
31. Please estimate, how 
significant your gambling-
related problems to be? 
     
 
32. In the PAST FORTNIGHT, approximately how much money (IN DOLLARS) did you spend on 
gambling?    
 
$_______________ 
 
33. In the NEXT TWO WEEKS, how much money (IN DOLLARS) do you plan to spend on gambling?    
 
$_______________ 
  
  
 
 
Much less 
than 
average 
Less than 
average 
Average More than 
average 
Much more 
than average 
34. Compared to others, how high 
do you consider your spending 
on gambling? 
     
 
 
Consider what you are most likely to do in the following GAMBLING SCENARIOS: 
You have been gambling for a while and... 
 
  stop 
gambling 
think 
carefully 
about 
what is 
going on 
continue 
gambling, 
but play 
more 
carefully 
continue 
gambling 
in the 
same way 
continue 
gambling, 
but take 
more risks 
allow 
myself to 
'switch 
off', 'get in 
the zone', 
or play by 
instinct 
35. you have a big win       
36. you have lost more than 
you planned to wager 
      
37. you reach your 
designated spending 
limit 
      
38. you reach your 
designated spending 
limit 
      
 
 
Approximately, how long would you spend gambling each time you gambled…  
 
 <5 minutes 5-30 minutes ½-2 hours 2-5 hours 5+ hours 
39. …in the last 2 months       
40. …since you began gambling      
 
 
Approximately how often have you gambled…  
 
 Less than 
monthly 
Monthly Weekly Daily More than 
daily 
41. …in the past 2 month      
42. …since you began gambling      
 
  
Demographics and experience (optional scales) 
 
43. Age 
Please write you answer here: ___________________ years old 
 
44. Gender Please choose only one of the following: 
 Male  
 Female  
 
45. Have you ever been diagnosed with, or treated for a drug, alcohol, relationship, or  
  mental health issue? (tick any that apply) 
 Yes I was diagnosed with an issue 
 Yes I attended therapy or a support group 
 No, none of the above 
 
46. Have you ever wagered or spent money on any form of gambling?  
  (e.g., horse racing, lotto, pokies, poker, etc.)  
Please choose only one of the following: 
Yes  
No  
 
If you answered YES to question 51, answer questions 52 and 53… 
 
47. Do you remember an important or big win or loss early in your gambling?  
Please choose only one of the following: 
Win  
Lose  
Neither a win nor loss  
 
48. At what age did you first start gambling with money? 
Please write you answer here: ___________________ years old 
 
 
  
  
APPENDIX E: Gambling risk decisions questionnaire scoring protocol 
  
  
 
Gambling Risk Decisions Questionnaire Scoring protocol 
 
Risk decision content  
Factors 1. Likelihood (negative outcomes) 
Items 1 – 4 
Likelihood (negative outcomes) assesses individuals’ estimation of the likelihood of negative gambling 
outcomes. Higher scores denote higher expectation of events to occur.  
Score each item 1-5 points, where ‘impossible’ = 1, ‘certain’ = 5  
Likelihood (negative outcomes) score = Sum of items numbered 1 to 4 
 
Factors 2. Immediacy (positive outcomes)  
Items 5 – 8 
Immediacy (positive outcomes) assesses individuals’ perception of the immediate versus long term impact of 
potential positive outcomes. Higher scores denote expectation that outcomes will have longer lasting impacts. 
Lower scores denote expectation that outcomes will have only immediate or short term impacts.  
Score each item 1-5, where ‘no impact’= 1, ‘permanent’ = 5  
Immediacy (positive outcomes) score = Sum of items numbered 5 to 8 
 
Factor 3. Belief in luck 
Items 9-16 
Belief in luck assesses the extent to which individuals report confidence in the predictability of games and 
personal luck. Higher scores denote greater confidence in luck.  
Score each item 1-5, where ‘completely untrue’ = 1, ‘completely true’ = 5  
Belief in luck score = Sum items numbered 9 to 16 
 
 
Risk decision processes 
Factor 4. Motivation  
Items 17-18 
Motivation scale items measure the extent to which individuals are motivated to gamble. Higher scores 
denote greater motivation to gamble. 
Score each item 1-5, where ‘nil’ = 1, ‘very strong’ = 5  
Motivation score = Sum items numbered 17 and 18 
 
  
  
Factor 5. Lack of control  
Items 19-22 
Lack of control scale items assess the difficulty and discomfort individuals experience in controlling gambling 
related urges or thoughts. Higher scores denote poorer control.  
Score each item 1-5 points, where ‘very easy’ / ‘very comfortable’ = 1, ‘very difficult’ / ‘very uncomfortable’ = 5  
Lack of control score = Sum items numbered 19 to 22 
 
Factor 6 & 7. Cue sensitivity (emotional) & Cue sensitivity (venue) 
Items 23-30 
Cue scales assess the extent to which individuals are vulnerable to particular mental states and contextual 
cues. Higher emotional cue scores denote greater perceived sensitivity to negative emotional mental states. 
Higher venue cue scores denote greater perceived sensitivity to environmental cues associated with gambling 
venues and advertising.  
Score each item 1-5 points, where ‘Unlikely to think about gambling’ = 1, ‘likely to think about gambling’ = 5  
Emotional cues score = Sum of odd numbered items 
Venue cues score = Sum of even numbered items 
 
Factor 8. Self-monitoring deficit (problems) 
Item 33* 
Self-monitoring deficit (problems) assesses level of inaccuracy in individuals’ self-evaluations of problems. 
Magnitude of score denotes the level of discrepancy between reported problems and perception of how 
problems compare to other gamblers. Zero denotes accurate perception of problems. Scores above zero 
denote higher problems compared to individuals’ perception of problems. Scores below zero denote higher 
perceived problems compared to reported problems.  
Self-monitoring accuracy (problems) = Z score (problems) – Z score (perception of problems) 
Self-monitoring accuracy (problems) = A - B + 0.79 
A = Estimate of gambling related problems ranging from 1 to 4 points.  
Where, ‘no problems’, or never gambled  = 1 
‘low risk gambling’    = 2 
‘moderate risk gambling’    = 3 
‘problem gambling’    = 4  
*N.B. Gambling related problems are not directly measured by the GRDQ. Instead, during development of the 
GRDQ participants’ negative gambling consequences were estimated using the Problem Gambling Severity 
Index (PGSI; Ferris & Wynne, 2001). Normative data for the GRDQ therefore makes use of participant PGSI 
scores. Based on participants’ PGSI scores and group membership, individuals should be allocated a score for 
“A” equivalent to their group membership score (as described above).  
E.g., If an individual’s PGSI score was 14, this would represent ‘problem gambling’, such that A = 4 (PGSI; Ferris 
& Wynne, 2001) 
B = perception of problems score = score for item 31, ranging from 1 to 5 points, from ‘No problem at all’ = 1, 
to ‘Significant problems’ = 5 
 
  
  
Factor 9. Self-monitoring deficit (spending) 
Self-monitoring accuracy (spending) = Z score (reported spending) – Z score (perception of spending) 
Self-monitoring scores measure the accuracy of individuals’ self-evaluations. Magnitude of score denotes the 
level of discrepancy between reported spending and perception of how spending compares to other gamblers. 
Zero denotes accurate perception of spending. Scores above zero denote higher actual spend compared to 
perception of relative spend. Scores below zero denote higher perceived spend compared to reported spend.  
Self-monitoring accuracy (spending) = C - D + 1.58 
Where, C = mean of scores for items 32 and 33, i.e.  =   item 32 + item 33 
     2  
= (number of dollars spent on gambling over past two weeks, estimated in Australian dollars)  
+ (expected number of dollars spend on gambling in next two weeks, estimated in Australian dollars) /2 
Where, D = score for item 34, ranging from 1 to 5 points, from ‘Much less than average’ = 1, to ‘Much more 
than average’ = 5 
 
Risk decision stability 
Factor 10. Variance across contexts  
Items 35-38 
Variance across contexts measures variance in individuals’ responses to different scenarios described in items 
35 to 38. Higher scores denote greater reported variance across difference gambling scenarios.  
Instability = s2 = Variance of items 35 to 38  = (item 35 – X)2 + (item 36 – X)2 + (item 37 – X)2 + (item 38 – X)2 
                     3 
Where, ‘stop gambling’    = 1 
‘think carefully…’    = 2  
‘continue gambling but play more carefully’  = 3 
‘continue gambling in the same way’  = 4 
‘continue gambling, but take more risks’  = 5 
‘allow myself to switch off…’   = 6 
Where, X = Mean of scores for items 35 to 38 =  item 35 + item 36 + item 37 + item 38 
        4 
 
Gambling behaviour 
Factor 11. Gambling involvement (current) 
Items 39 & 41 
Gambling involvement (current) measures individuals’ estimated frequency and length of gambling sessions 
over the past 2 months. Higher scores denote more gambling involvement through more frequent and/or 
longer gambling sessions. 
Score each item 1-5 points, where ‘less than monthly’ / ‘<5 minutes’ = 1, ‘more than daily’ / ‘5+ hours’ = 5  
Gambling involvement score =  items 39 + item 41 
     2    
  
  
Demographic and experiential background factors (optional scales)  
 
Demographic / Individual differences 
Background Factor 1: Gender  
Item 44 
Score 1 point for ‘female’,  
Score 2 point for ‘male’ 
A higher score denotes higher risk. 
 
Background Factor 2: Mental health issues 
Item 45 
Score 1 point for each ‘Yes’, up to a maximum of 2 points.  
Score 0 points for a no response.  
A higher score denotes higher risk. 
 
Gambling experience and exposure 
Background Factor 3: Experience of early wins/losses 
Item 47 
Score 1 point for either a win or a loss 
Score 0 points for neither a win nor a loss 
A higher score denotes higher risk 
 
Background factor 4. Gambling involvement (long term) 
Items 40 & 42 
Score each item 1-5 points, where ‘less than monthly’ / ‘<5 minutes’ = 1, ‘more than daily’ / ‘5+ hours’ = 5  
Gambling involvement score =  items 40 + item 42 
     2    
A higher score denote higher risk  
 
Background Factor 5: Gambling career length 
Item 43 & 48 
Gambling career length = Item 43 (age in years) - Item 48 (years spent gambling) 
A higher score denotes higher risk 
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2 8627 8177 (Facsimile) or ro.humanethics@sydney.edu.au (Email). 
 
5. Copies of all signed Consent Forms must be retained and made available to the HREC on 
request. 
 
6. It is your responsibility to provide a copy of this letter to any internal/external granting 
agencies if requested. 
 
7. The HREC approval is valid for four (4) years from the Approval Period stated in this letter. 
Investigators are requested to submit a progress report annually.  
 
8. A report and a copy of any published material should be provided at the completion of the 
Project. 
 
Please do not hesitate to contact the Human Ethics Office should you require further information or 
clarification. 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
Associate Professor Philip Beale 
Chair 
Human Research Ethics Committee 
 
Copy: Mr Michael Spurrier mikes@psych.usyd.edu.au 
 
Approved Documents: 
 
Cards for Participants 
Advertising Flyer 
Participant Information Statement (interview) 
Participant Information Statement (questionnaire and interview) 
Participant Information Statement (two questionnaires) 
Advertising Flyer 
Interview Questions 
Letter of invitation to participate 
Canadian Problem Gambling Index 
Participant Consent Form 
Handout 
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Are you interested in taking part in a brief survey about gambling cognition and 
behaviour? If so, follow the link below to an online version of the survey: 
 
<link to online questionnaire - to be generated upon approval of questionnaire> 
 
Alternatively, please contact me for further details to arrange receipt of the 
questionnaire via post or email. You can reach me at 02 90367263 and 
mspu1648@uni.sydney.edu.au 
 
All participants will go into a draw to receive one of five grocery vouchers. 
 
Please feel free to forward this email to anybody you may think may be interested in 
taking part in this study. 
 
Experience with gambling may be useful, but is not essential. The survey is part of a 
project being conducted by a team of researchers from the Department of Psychology, 
University of Sydney. This project has Human Research Ethics Committee approval. 
 
Yours Sincerely,  
Michael Spurrier & Alex Blaszczynski 
Study Name Mental Models of Risk in Problem/Pathological Gambling 
Abstract 
This project examines the way that gamblers perceive and 
manage risk. 
Description 
This study involves completing a single, brief questionnaire 
about your beliefs, experience, and behaviour related to 
gambling. No experience in gambling is necessary to 
complete this study. THIS STUDY MAY BE COMPLETED 
ONLINE: (1.) Select “[View Study Website]” below; (2.) Follow 
instructions at the end of the questionnaire to claim credit for 
your participation. ALTERNATIVELY, you may SIGN-
UP/ATTEND one of the timeslots allocated below. 
Website 
[View Study Website] 
https://www.psych.usyd.edu.au/limesurvey187/index.php?sid
=42644&newtest=Y&lang=en 
Prescreen Restrictions No Restrictions -[View/Modify Restrictions]  
Duration 60 minutes  
Credits 1 Credits  
Researcher 
Michael Spurrier 
Office: STUDENT, Ph.D, ph 65008  
Email: mspu1648@uni.sydney.edu.au 
Participant Sign-Up 
Deadline 
24 hours before the study is to occur 
Study Status 
Not visible to participants (not approved) -- [Send a Request] 
to have this study approved 
Active study (does not appear on list of available studies -- 
must also be approved) 
Automatic Credit Granting 
Credit will be automatically granted for timeslots where no 
action was taken, that are more than 48 hours old. Automatic 
credit grant is done once per day. 
Human Res Ethics Com 
Approval Code 
12367 
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School of Psychology 
Faculty of Science 
  
  ABN 15 211 513 464 
 
 ALEX BLASZCZYNSKI 
PROFESSOR IN CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 
School of Psychology (A18) 
Faculty of Science 
The University of Sydney  
NSW 2006 AUSTRALIA 
Telephone:   +61 2 9036 7227 
Facsimile:  +61 2 9351 7328 
Email: alexb@psych.usyd.edu.au 
Web: http://www.usyd.edu.au/ 
 
 
  
 
 
PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM 
 
I, .............................................................................[PRINT NAME], give consent to my 
participation in the research project 
 
TITLE:   
 
In giving my consent I acknowledge that: 
 
1. The procedures required for the project and the time involved have been 
explained to me, and any questions I have about the project have been 
answered to my satisfaction. 
 
 
2. I have read the Participant Information Statement and have been given the 
opportunity to discuss the information and my involvement in the project with the 
researcher/s. 
 
 
3. I understand that I can withdraw from the study at any time, without affecting my 
relationship with the researcher(s) or the University of Sydney now or in the 
future. 
 
 
4. I understand that my involvement is strictly confidential and no information about 
me will be used in any way that reveals my identity. 
 
 
5. I understand that being in this study is completely voluntary – I am not under any 
obligation to consent. 
 
 
6. I understand that I can stop the interview at any time if I do not wish to continue, 
the audio/video recording will be erased and the information provided will not be 
included in the study. 
 
7. I consent to:  
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i) Audio-taping YES  NO  
ii) Receiving Feedback YES  NO  
If you answered YES to the “Receiving Feedback Question (iii)”, please 
provide your details i.e. mailing address, email address. 
 
Feedback Option 
 
Address:  _______________________________________________________ 
 
_______________________________________________________ 
 
Email: _______________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
Signed:  ............................................................................................................................... 
 
Name:   ............................................................................................................................... 
 
Date:   ............................................................................................................................... 
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explained to me, and any questions I have about the project have been 
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relationship with the researcher(s) or the University of Sydney now or in the 
future. 
 
 
4. I understand that my involvement is strictly confidential and no information about 
me will be used in any way that reveals my identity. 
 
 
5. I understand that being in this study is completely voluntary – I am not under any 
obligation to consent. 
 
 
6. I understand that I can stop the interview at any time if I do not wish to continue, 
the audio/video recording will be erased and the information provided will not be 
included in the study. 
 
7. I consent to:  
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i) Audio-taping YES  NO  
ii) Receiving Feedback YES  NO  
If you answered YES to the “Receiving Feedback Question (iii)”, please 
provide your details i.e. mailing address, email address. 
 
Feedback Option 
 
Address:  _______________________________________________________ 
 
_______________________________________________________ 
 
Email: _______________________________________________________ 
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Name:   ............................................................................................................................... 
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opportunity to discuss the information and my involvement in the project with the 
researcher/s. 
 
 
3. I understand that I can withdraw from the study at any time, without affecting my 
relationship with the researcher(s) or the University of Sydney now or in the 
future. 
 
 
4. I understand that my involvement is strictly confidential and no information about 
me will be used in any way that reveals my identity. 
 
 
5. I understand that being in this study is completely voluntary – I am not under any 
obligation to consent. 
 
 
6. I understand that I can stop the interview at any time if I do not wish to continue, 
the audio/video recording will be erased and the information provided will not be 
included in the study. 
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7. I consent to:  
 
i) Receiving Feedback YES  NO  
If you answered YES to the “Receiving Feedback Question (iii)”, please 
provide your details i.e. mailing address, email address. 
 
Feedback Option 
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Signed:  ............................................................................................................................... 
 
Name:   ............................................................................................................................... 
 
Date:   ............................................................................................................................... 
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PARTICIPANT INFORMATION STATEMENT 
 
(1) What is the study about? 
 
You are invited to take part in a research study into mental models of risk in problem/pathological 
gambling. The object is to investigate the perceptions and beliefs regular gamblers hold about 
gambling and risk.  
 
(2) Who is carrying out the study? 
 
The study is being conducted by Prof. Alex Blaszczynski, Michael Spurrier and Dr. Paul Rhodes. This 
will form the basis for the degree of Master of Science at the University of Sydney for Michael Spurrier 
under the supervision of Prof. Alex Blaszczynski and Dr. Paul Rhodes. 
 
(3) What does the study involve? 
 
If you agree to participate in this study, you will be asked to complete a short questionnaire and 
interview (which will be audio recorded). These measures will involve answering a series of questions 
about your perceptions and experiences of gambling and risk. 
 
The interview and questionnaire will be completed at the Psychology Clinic, University of Sydney, 
Camperdown campus. Alternatively interviews may be completed via Skype, with questionnaires and 
signed consent forms to be returned via the self-addressed envelope provided. Completion of 
interviews and questionnaires will occur at a mutually convenient time. If you would like to complete the 
interview via Skype please provide Michael Spurrier with a Skype address where he may contact you. 
 
(4) How much time will the study take? 
 
The study will take approximately 45 minutes. 
 
(5) Can I withdraw from the study? 
 
Participation in this study is entirely voluntary: you are not obliged to participate and - if you do 
participate - you can withdraw at any time. Whatever your decision, it will not affect your relationship 
with the research staff. 
 
You may stop the interview at any time if you do not wish to continue, the audio recording will be 
erased and the information provided will not be included in the study. 
 
Being in this study is completely voluntary and you are not under any obligation to consent to complete 
the questionnaire. Submitting a completed questionnaire is an indication of your consent to participate 
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in the study. You can withdraw any time prior to submitting your completed questionnaire. Once you 
have submitted your questionnaire/survey anonymously, your responses cannot be withdrawn. 
 
(6) Will anyone else know the results? 
 
All aspects of the study, including results, will be strictly confidential and only the researchers will have 
access to information on participants. A report of the study may be submitted for publication, but 
individual participants will not be identifiable in such a report. 
 
(7) Will the study benefit me? 
 
The aim of this study is to gather information that may guide development of effective communication to 
gamblers about the risks of gambling, as well as to provide a tool to be used in clinical assessment and 
treatment of Pathological Gambling. 
 
Identifying differences in the beliefs of different gambler subgroups is likely to yield useful information 
about what specific beliefs are associated with the negative consequences experienced by Pathological 
Gamblers. This information will be useful for creating corrective communication that directly targets the 
erroneous beliefs held by problem gamblers. This is an area of research not previously examined and 
one that is likely to support the responsible use of gambling services. In addition, a questionnaire will be 
developed from the results of the study that may become a useful tool for the clinical assessment of 
gambling beliefs, and as a guide to treatment for Pathological Gamblers. 
 
(8) Can I tell other people about the study? 
 
You are welcome to discuss the study with other people. 
 
(9) What if I require further information? 
 
When you have read this information, Michael Spurrier will discuss it with you further and answer any 
questions you may have. If you would like to know more at any stage, please feel free to contact the 
investigators at the contact details listed below: 
 
Prof. Alex Blaszczynski (02) 9036 7227 alexb@psych.usyd.edu.au 
Dr. Paul Rhodes  (02) 9251 6708 paulr@psych.usyd.edu.au 
Michael Spurrier  0433 010 640 mikes@psych.usyd.edu.au 
 
(10) What if I have a complaint or concerns? 
 
 
Any person with concerns or complaints about the conduct of a research study can contact the 
Deputy Manager, Human Ethics Administration, University of Sydney on +61 2 8627 8176 (Telephone); 
+61 2 8627 8177 (Facsimile) or ro.humanethics@sydney.edu.au (Email). 
 
This information sheet is for you to keep 
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PARTICIPANT INFORMATION STATEMENT 
 
(1) What is the study about? 
 
You are invited to take part in a research study into mental models of risk in problem/pathological 
gambling. The object is to investigate the perceptions and beliefs regular gamblers hold about 
gambling and risk.  
 
(2) Who is carrying out the study? 
 
The study is being conducted by Prof. Alex Blaszczynski, Michael Spurrier and Dr. Paul Rhodes. This 
will form the basis for the degree of Master of Science at the University of Sydney for Michael Spurrier 
under the supervision of Prof. Alex Blaszczynski and Dr. Paul Rhodes. 
 
(3) What does the study involve? 
 
If you agree to participate in this study, you will be asked to complete a short questionnaire and 
interview (which will be audio recorded). These measures will involve answering a series of questions 
about your perceptions and experiences of gambling and risk. 
 
The interview and questionnaire will be completed at the Psychology Clinic, University of Sydney, 
Camperdown campus. Alternatively interviews may be completed via Skype, with questionnaires and 
signed consent forms to be returned via the self-addressed envelope provided. Completion of 
interviews and questionnaires will occur at a mutually convenient time. If you would like to complete the 
interview via Skype please provide Michael Spurrier with a Skype address where he may contact you. 
 
(4) How much time will the study take? 
 
The study will take approximately 45 minutes. 
 
(5) Can I withdraw from the study? 
 
Participation in this study is entirely voluntary: you are not obliged to participate and - if you do 
participate - you can withdraw at any time. Whatever your decision, it will not affect your relationship 
with the research staff. 
  
You may stop the interview at any time if you do not wish to continue, the audio recording will be 
erased and the information provided will not be included in the study. 
 
Being in this study is completely voluntary and you are not under any obligation to consent to complete 
the questionnaire. Submitting a completed questionnaire is an indication of your consent to participate 
in the study. You can withdraw any time prior to submitting your completed questionnaire. Once you 
have submitted your questionnaire/survey anonymously, your responses cannot be withdrawn. 
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(6) Will anyone else know the results? 
 
All aspects of the study, including results, will be strictly confidential and only the researchers will have 
access to information on participants. A report of the study may be submitted for publication, but 
individual participants will not be identifiable in such a report. 
 
(7) Will the study benefit me? 
 
The aim of this study is to gather information that may guide development of effective communication to 
gamblers about the risks of gambling, as well as to provide a tool to be used in clinical assessment and 
treatment of Pathological Gambling. 
 
Identifying differences in the beliefs of different gambler subgroups is likely to yield useful information 
about what specific beliefs are associated with the negative consequences experienced by Pathological 
Gamblers. This information will be useful for creating corrective communication that directly targets the 
erroneous beliefs held by problem gamblers. This is an area of research not previously examined and 
one that is likely to support the responsible use of gambling services. In addition, a questionnaire will be 
developed from the results of the study that may become a useful tool for the clinical assessment of 
gambling beliefs, and as a guide to treatment for Pathological Gamblers. 
 
 (8) Can I tell other people about the study? 
 
You are welcome to discuss the study with other people. 
  
(9) What if I require further information? 
 
When you have read this information, Michael Spurrier will discuss it with you further and answer any 
questions you may have. If you would like to know more at any stage, please feel free to contact the 
investigators at the contact details listed below: 
 
Prof. Alex Blaszczynski (02) 9036 7227 alexb@psych.usyd.edu.au 
Dr. Paul Rhodes  (02) 9251 6708 paulr@psych.usyd.edu.au 
Michael Spurrier  0433 010 640 mikes@psych.usyd.edu.au 
 
(10) What if I have a complaint or concerns? 
 
 
Any person with concerns or complaints about the conduct of a research study can contact the 
Deputy Manager, Human Ethics Administration, University of Sydney on +61 2 8627 8176 (Telephone); 
+61 2 8627 8177 (Facsimile) or ro.humanethics@sydney.edu.au (Email). 
 
This information sheet is for you to keep 
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Mental models of risk in problem/pathological gambling 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION STATEMENT 
 
(1) What is the study about? 
 
You are invited to take part in a research study into mental models of risk in problem/pathological 
gambling. The object is to investigate the perceptions and beliefs regular gamblers hold about 
gambling and risk.  
 
(2) Who is carrying out the study? 
 
The study is being conducted by Prof. Alex Blaszczynski, Michael Spurrier and Dr. Paul Rhodes. This 
will form the basis for the degree of Master of Science at the University of Sydney for Michael Spurrier 
under the supervision of Prof. Alex Blaszczynski and Dr. Paul Rhodes. 
 
(3) What does the study involve? 
 
If you agree to participate in this study, you will be asked to complete two short questionnaire. These 
measures will involve answering a series of questions about your perceptions and experiences of 
gambling and risk.  
 
Questionnaires will be completed at the Psychology Clinic, University of Sydney, Camperdown 
campus. Upon completion questionnaires will be collected by Michael Spurrier. Alternatively, 
questionnaires and signed consent forms may be returned via the stamped self-addressed envelope 
provided. 
 
(4) How much time will the study take? 
 
The study will take approximately 30 minutes. 
 
(5) Can I withdraw from the study? 
 
Participation in this study is entirely voluntary: you are not obliged to participate and - if you do 
participate - you can withdraw at any time. Whatever your decision, it will not affect your relationship 
with the research staff. 
 
You may stop the interview at any time if you do not wish to continue, the audio recording will be 
erased and the information provided will not be included in the study. 
 
Being in this study is completely voluntary and you are not under any obligation to consent to complete 
the questionnaire. Submitting a completed questionnaire is an indication of your consent to participate 
in the study. You can withdraw any time prior to submitting your completed questionnaire. Once you 
have submitted your questionnaire/survey anonymously, your responses cannot be withdrawn. 
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(6) Will anyone else know the results? 
 
All aspects of the study, including results, will be strictly confidential and only the researchers will have 
access to information on participants. A report of the study may be submitted for publication, but 
individual participants will not be identifiable in such a report. 
 
(7) Will the study benefit me? 
 
The aim of this study is to gather information that may guide development of effective communication to 
gamblers about the risks of gambling, as well as to provide a tool to be used in clinical assessment and 
treatment of Pathological Gambling. 
 
Identifying differences in the beliefs of different gambler subgroups is likely to yield useful information 
about what specific beliefs are associated with the negative consequences experienced by Pathological 
Gamblers. This information will be useful for creating corrective communication that directly targets the 
erroneous beliefs held by problem gamblers. This is an area of research not previously examined and 
one that is likely to support the responsible use of gambling services. In addition, a questionnaire will be 
developed from the results of the study that may become a useful tool for the clinical assessment of 
gambling beliefs, and as a guide to treatment for Pathological Gamblers. 
 
(8) Can I tell other people about the study? 
 
There are no right or wrong answers to the questionnaires included in this study, however it is 
important that you do not discuss the content of the questionnaires with other people who may also 
participate in this study, as this may bias their responses to the questionnaire. 
 
(9) What if I require further information? 
 
When you have read this information, Michael Spurrier will discuss it with you further and answer any 
questions you may have. If you would like to know more at any stage, please feel free to contact the 
investigators at the contact details listed below: 
 
Prof. Alex Blaszczynski (02) 9036 7227 alexb@psych.usyd.edu.au 
Dr. Paul Rhodes  (02) 9251 6708 paulr@psych.usyd.edu.au 
Michael Spurrier  0433 010 640 mikes@psych.usyd.edu.au 
 
(10) What if I have a complaint or concerns? 
 
 
Any person with concerns or complaints about the conduct of a research study can contact the 
Deputy Manager, Human Ethics Administration, University of Sydney on +61 2 8627 8176 (Telephone); 
+61 2 8627 8177 (Facsimile) or ro.humanethics@sydney.edu.au (Email). 
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Subject Debrief 
 
Investigators: 
Names of experimenters: Michael Spurrier 
Phone: 9516 3945 
Email: mspu1648@uni.sydney.edu.au 
 
Name of primary supervisor: Prof. Alex Blaszczynski 
Phone: 9036 7227 
Email: alex.blaszczynski@uni.sydney.edu.au 
 
Name of secondary supervisor: Dr. Paul Rhodes 
Phone: 9351 6708 
Email: p.rhodes@uni.sydney.edu.au 
 
Gambling involves risk and the potential for significant negative impacts: 
Pathological gamblers suffer depression, substance abuse and attempted suicide; 
debts and relationship problems; and increased likelihood of criminal offence 
(Productivity Commission, 1999). Various studies have shown that 70% to 90% of 
adults gamble at sometime (Ladouceur, 1991; Productivity Commission, 1999) 
with 1% to 2% meeting current, and 0.1% and 5.1% lifetime, criteria for 
Pathological Gambling (Raylu & Oei, 2002). 
Evidence suggests that beliefs play a significant role in the development 
and maintenance of Pathological Gambling: Pathological Gamblers exhibit 
erroneous, biased or incomplete beliefs about gambling that help maintain 
gambling despite continuous losses (Reid, 1986). A limitation of these studies is 
that they do not present a complete or cohesive model of beliefs and theories 
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held by gamblers about gambling. Hence the context within which gambling-
related judgments are made remains largely unexplained. This is significant 
because decisions that people make when faced with a ‘hazard’ depends in part 
on knowledge held of potential risks and harm (Breakwell 2007). Nisbett and 
Ross (1980), for example, demonstrated that decision-making processes people 
apply in rapidly changing real-world scenarios depend more on pre-existing or 
learned stored beliefs and theories than on formal rational judgment procedures.  
The concept of ‘Mental Models’ has been applied to theoretical knowledge 
structures composed of, and integrating, beliefs and perceived risks (Breakwell, 
2007). Mental Models include information that is propositional (e.g., gambling is 
harder to control after consuming alcohol), or holistic/schematic (e.g., 
understanding the principles of gambling and concepts of ‘house-take’). Mental 
Models may be thought of as scripts describing various aspects and implications 
of a hazard, how it can be controlled, or factors impairing personal control. 
Mental Models need not be factually accurate to enable interaction with an 
individual’s environment, follow a standardized format, remain constant over 
the long-term, or be bounded by the specifics of a hazard; instead they remain 
free to evolve in response to particular needs and experiences of an individual in 
evaluating hazards (Breakwell, 2007).  
The growing appreciation for the role of Mental Models in decision-
making in risk has lead to research aimed at identifying and correcting 
components of Mental Models. Researchers have developed a methodology to 
assess a range of hazardous factors (e.g. radon gas or HIV exposure) (Morgan, 
Fischhoff, Bostrom & Atman, 2002) but to date Mental Models have not been 
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applied to gambling-related risks. The approach seeks to identify for a particular 
hazard both accurate and inaccurate beliefs held by a target population, and has 
a demonstrated application in the development of risk communication 
interventions (Morgan, et al., 2002). Data derived from this approach can be used 
as a basis for developing risk communication material to correct 
misunderstandings enabling more responsible, decision-making. This is achieved 
by: investigating Mental Models and vocabulary of lay and expert populations 
regarding a risk; identifying differences between lay and expert Mental Models; 
and determining how to bridge gaps between these models using language 
comprehensible to the target population (e.g., by correcting cognitive errors and 
concepts, strengthening correct beliefs, and minimizing peripheral concepts). 
This is particularly relevant within the domain of gambling risk because 
relatively clearly defined subgroups of gamblers experience either minimal or 
significant problems due to gambling, and gamblers with more severe problems 
demonstrate a higher rate of cognitive errors and biases in general (Raylu & Oei, 
2002; Ferris & Wynne, 2001). It is therefore likely that a number of critical 
differences between the Mental Models of these gambler subgroups may 
contribute significantly to the development and maintenance of gambling related 
problems and pathology.  
Gambling is associated with a significant negative impact on functioning 
and quality of life for some gamblers (Blaszczynski & Nower, 2002). 
Identification of the differences in beliefs about risk for different types of 
gamblers is likely to yield useful insights for creating communication directed at 
correcting erroneous beliefs. This is an area of research not previously examined.  
 The University of Sydney 
School of Psychology 
  
 
 
All aspects of the study including the results will be strictly confidential 
and only the investigators named above will have access to the information. You 
will not be identified in any publication arising from the study. 
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THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION 
This information sheet is for you to keep.  
 
Any persons with concerns or complaints about the conduct of a research study 
can contact the Manager of Ethics and Biosafety Administration, University of 
Sydney, on (02) 9351 4811. 
 
  
 
APPENDIX H: Experimental materials  
  
PROBLEM GAMBLING SEVERITY INDEX 
 
Thinking about the last 12 months...  
Please choose the appropriate response for each item: 
 
  Never Sometimes Most of the time Almost always 
Have you bet more 
than you could 
really afford to 
lose? 
    
Have you needed to 
gamble with larger 
amounts of money 
to get the same 
feeling of 
excitement? 
    
When you gambled, 
did you go back 
another day to try 
to win back the 
money you lost? 
    
Have you borrowed 
money or sold 
anything to get 
money to gamble? 
    
Have you felt that 
you might have a 
problem with 
gambling? 
    
Has gambling 
caused you any 
health problems, 
including stress and 
anxiety? 
    
Have people 
criticized your 
betting or told you 
that you had a 
gambling problem, 
regardless of 
whether or not you 
thought it was true? 
    
Has your gambling 
caused any financial 
problems for you or 
your household? 
    
Have you felt guilty 
about the way you 
gamble or what 
happens when you 
gamble? 
    
  
 
The following questionnaire will involve answering a series of questions about your perceptions and 
experiences of gambling.  
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION STATEMENT: 
 
THE FOLLOWING BRIEF QUESTIONNAIRE INVESTIGATES GAMBLING RELATED RISK 
PERCEPTION AND BEHAVIOUR. 
THE STUDY WILL TAKE APPROXIMATELY 10-20 MINUTES TO COMPLETE. 
UPON COMPLETION, PARTICIPANTS MAY ENTER A DRAW TO RECEIVE SHOPPING 
VOUCHERS. 
 
There are no right or wrong answers to the following questions. 
 
Participation in this study is entirely voluntary: you are not obliged to participate and - if you do participate 
- you can withdraw at any time. Whatever your decision, it will not affect your relationship with the research 
staff. Being in this study is completely voluntary and you are not under any obligation to consent to complete 
the questionnaire. Submitting a completed questionnaire is an indication of your consent to participate in the 
study. You can withdraw any time prior to submitting your completed questionnaire. Completed questionnaires 
will be collected by Michael Spurrier and stored under lock and key. 
 
All aspects of the study, including results, will be strictly confidential. Only the researchers will have access 
to information about participants. Participant contact details will be stored separately from questionnaire data. A 
report of the study may be submitted for publication, but individual participants will not be identifiable in such a 
report. The aim of this study is to gather information that may improve assessment and treatment of problem 
gambling. If you would like to know more at any stage, please feel free to contact the investigators at the contact 
details listed below: 
 
Michael Spurrier: 0433 010 640;  mspu1648@uni.sydney.edu.au 
Prof. Alex Blaszczynski: (02) 9036 7227; alex.blaszczynski@sydney.edu.au 
Dr. Paul Rhodes: (02) 9251 6708; p.rhodes@sydney.edu.au 
 
This questionnaire will form part of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of Sydney for 
Michael Spurrier under the supervision of Prof. Alex Blaszczynski and Dr. Paul Rhodes. Any person with 
concerns or complaints about the conduct of a research study can contact the Deputy Manager, Human Ethics 
Administration, University of Sydney on +61 2 8627 8176 (Telephone); +61 2 8627 8177 (Facsimile) or 
ro.humanethics@sydney.edu.au (Email). 
 
Please note: 
 You can withdraw from the study at any time prior to completion of the questionnaire without affecting 
my relationship with the researchers or the University of Sydney. The questionnaire will be destroyed, 
and the information provided will not be included in the study 
 Involvement is strictly confidential and no information about you will be used in any way that reveals 
my identity 
 This study is completely voluntary – you are not under any obligation to consent 
 Submission of a completed consent form along with your questionnaire indicates consent to be 
included in this study 
 
  
  
Gambling Risk Perception Questionnaire 
 
 
[1] Age  
Please write your answer here: ______________________ years old 
 
[2]Gender Please choose only one of the following: 
Male  
Female  
 
[3]What country do you live in? Please write your answer here: _____________________ 
 
[4]Ethnic background Please choose only one of the following: 
Australian  
New Zealander/Pacific Islander  
Asian  
North American  
South American  
European  
Middle Eastern  
African  
Other  
 
[5]Highest level of education Please choose only one of the following: 
Primary / Elementary School  
Secondary School  
TAFE / technical college  
Tertiary - Undergraduate  
Tertiary - Postgraduate  
 
[6]Current job status Please choose only one of the following: 
Unemployed  
Casual or part-time employment  
Full-time employment  
 
[7]Have you ever been diagnosed with one of the following conditions? (OPTIONAL)  
Please choose all that apply: 
Gambling difficulties  
Anxiety  
Depression  
Childhood behavioural disorder (e.g., ADHD)  
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder  
Relationship difficulties  
Life stresses  
Drug or alcohol issues  
Mania, Psychosis, or Bipolar Disorder  
  
[8]Have you attended a related support group or treatment program? (OPTIONAL)  
Please choose all that apply: 
Gambling difficulties  
Anxiety  
Depression  
Childhood behavioural disorder (e.g., ADHD)  
Post-traumatic Stress Disorder  
Relationship difficulties  
Life stresses  
Drug or alcohol issues  
Mania, psychosis, or bipolar disorder  
 
 
  
Gambling Experience 
The following questions address your gambling experiences and involvement.  
 
 
[9]Have you ever wagered or spent money on any form of gambling?  
(e.g., horse racing, lotto, pokies, poker, etc.)  
Please choose only one of the following: 
Yes  
No  
 
If you answered YES to question 9, please go to question 10, otherwise go to question 25 
 
[10]Since you first gambled, which of the following best describes your pattern of gambling?  
Please choose only one of the following: 
Increased  
Decreased  
Remained fairly consistent  
Came in clusters  
Binge episodes  
Fluctuated in intensity  
Limited to a few individual events, e.g., work sweepstakes  
I have not gambled  
 
[11]At what age did you first start gambling with money?  
Please write your answer here: _________________________years 
  
[12]Do you remember an important or big win or loss early in your gambling?  
Please choose only one of the following: 
Win  
Lose  
Neither a win nor loss  
 
[13]Right at this moment, how strong is your...  
 Nil    Very strong 
…urge to gamble 
     
…intention to gamble 
     
 
 
[14]Approximately how often have you gambled...  
  
Less than 
monthly 
Monthly Weekly Daily More than daily 
…Since you began 
gambling      
…In the past 2 
months      
 
 
  
[15]Approximately, how long would you spend gambling each time you gambled...  
  <5 minutes 5-30 minutes 1/2-2 hours 2-5 hours 5+ hours 
…Since you began gambling 
    
 
 
…In the last 2 months 
     
 
 
[16]In the PAST FORTNIGHT, approximately how much money did you spend on gambling?   
$__________ 
  
[17]In the NEXT TWO WEEKS, how much money do you plan to spend on gambling?  
$________________ 
  
[18]Have you ever tried to completely stop gambling?  
Yes  
No  
  
If you answered YES to question 18, please go to question 19, otherwise go to question 
21 
 
[19]Which of the following best describes your attempts to stop gambling?  
Please choose only one of the following: 
Stopped gambling, did not start again  
Mostly stopped gambling  
Periods of abstinence, followed by episodes or periods of heavy gambling  
Did not stop gambling  
 
[20]What motivated you to attempt to stop gambling?  
Please choose all that apply: 
I recognized my gambling was becoming a problem  
People around me were pressuring me to stop  
I experienced financial problems  
I no longer had access to money  
I lost interest in gambling, or became interested in other things  
It was recommended by a therapist, counselor or support group member  
Other  
 
  
[21]Since you began gambling, roughly what proportion of your gambling has involved the 
following? PROVIDE PERCENTAGES THAT ADD UP TO 100% 
e.g., 30% Internet poker, 70% Slot machines / Pokies  
Please write your answer(s) here: 
 Poker  
 Internet Poker  
 Other internet gambling  
 Slot machines / Pokies 
 Other electronic devices (keno, blackjack, quickdraw) 
 Horse, dog, other racing  
 Sports betting  
 Lottery, lotto  
 Casino / Table games (blackjack, baccarat, Caribbean stud)  
 Other  
  
[22]At present, what is your MAIN form of gambling?  
Please choose only one of the following: 
Poker  
Internet poker  
Other internet gambling  
Slot machines / Pokies  
Other electronic devices (keno, blackjack, quickdraw)  
Horse, dog, other racing  
Sports betting  
Lottery, lotto  
Casino / Table games (blackjack, baccarat, Caribbean stud)  
Other  
 
[23]To what extent do you use the following rules when gambling to protect yourself against bad 
outcomes? * 
Please choose the appropriate response for each item: 
  
Not at 
all 
   
All the 
time 
Leaving credit cards at home 
     
Setting an overall spending limit for each gambling 
session      
Setting bet limits, e.g., making small bets 
     
Thinking strategies, e.g., reminding myself I can't win 
     
Self-exclusion from venues 
     
Avoiding particular places, e.g., clubs 
     
Avoiding particular triggers, e.g., drinking alcohol 
     
Other rules 
     
  
THE FOLLOWING NINE ITEMS MAKE UP THE PGSI  
 
[24]Thinking about the last 12 months...  
Please choose the appropriate response for each item: 
 
  Never Sometimes Most of the time Almost always 
Have you bet more 
than you could really 
afford to lose? 
    
Have you needed to 
gamble with larger 
amounts of money to 
get the same feeling 
of excitement? 
    
When you gambled, 
did you go back 
another day to try to 
win back the money 
you lost? 
    
Have you borrowed 
money or sold 
anything to get 
money to gamble? 
    
Have you felt that 
you might have a 
problem with 
gambling? 
    
Has gambling caused 
you any health 
problems, including 
stress and anxiety? 
    
Have people 
criticized your 
betting or told you 
that you had a 
gambling problem, 
regardless of whether 
or not you thought it 
was true? 
    
Has your gambling 
caused any financial 
problems for you or 
your household? 
    
Have you felt guilty 
about the way you 
gamble or what 
happens when you 
gamble? 
    
 
  
  
Outcome expectations  
This section asks questions about your expectations and motivations for gambling.  
 
 
[25]Rate the LIKELIHOOD / PROBABILITY of the following potential OUTCOMES OF A 
GAMBLING SESSION...  
Please choose the appropriate response for each item: 
  Impossible 
Unlikely to 
happen 
Average 
Very Likely to 
happen 
Certain 
Having fun, 
socializing      
Winning money 
     
Losing money 
     
Feeling excitement, 
feeling a 'rush'      
Switching off, 
escaping, avoiding 
stress or bad feelings 
     
Relationship 
difficulties, losing 
respect or approval 
from others 
     
Reducing boredom 
     
Feeling powerful, 
proud, or confident      
Losing control  
     
Gaining respect or 
approval from others      
Financial, work, or 
legal problems      
Feeling guilt, shame, 
or bad about who I 
am 
     
Stress, depression, 
anxiety, or other bad 
feelings 
     
 
 
  
[26]How much does each potential outcome INFLUENCE YOUR CURRENT GAMBLING CHOICES... 
Please choose the appropriate response for each item: 
  
Highly 
undesirable, 
unwanted 
 
Neutral, not 
motivating either 
way 
 
Very important, 
desirable, 
significant to me 
Having fun, socializing 
     
Winning money 
     
Losing money 
     
Feeling excitement, feeling a 'rush' 
     
Switching off, escaping, avoiding stress or bad 
feelings      
Relationship difficulties, losing respect or 
approval from others      
Reducing boredom 
     
Feeling powerful, proud, or confident 
     
Losing control  
     
Gaining respect or approval from others 
     
Financial, work, or legal problems 
     
Feeling guilt, shame, or bad about who I am 
     
Stress, depression, anxiety, or other bad feelings 
     
      
 
 
 
  
[27]Is this MORE, LESS or THE SAME INFLUENCE compared to when you started gambling?  
Please choose the appropriate response for each item: 
  
Much less 
motivating/ 
important 
 
About the 
same 
 
Much more 
motivating/
important 
Having fun, socializing 
     
Winning money 
     
Losing money 
     
Feeling excitement, feeling a 'rush' 
     
Switching off, escaping, avoiding stress or 
bad feelings      
Relationship difficulties, losing respect or 
approval from others      
Reducing boredom 
     
Feeling powerful, proud, or confident 
     
Losing control  
     
Gaining respect or approval from others 
     
Financial, work, or legal problems 
     
Feeling guilt, shame, or bad about who I am 
     
Stress, depression, anxiety, or other bad 
feelings      
 
 
  
[28]How IMMEDIATE OR LONG LASTING are the EFFECTS of each potential outcome...  
Please choose the appropriate response for each item: 
 
  No impact 
Immediate 
impact only 
Short term 
impact 
Long term 
impact 
Permanent 
Having fun, 
socializing      
Winning money 
     
Losing money 
     
Feeling excitement, 
feeling a 'rush'      
Switching off, 
escaping, avoiding 
stress or bad feelings 
     
Relationship 
difficulties, losing 
respect or approval 
from others 
     
Reducing boredom 
     
Feeling powerful, 
proud, or confident      
Losing control  
     
Gaining respect or 
approval from others      
Financial, work, or 
legal problems      
Feeling guilt, shame, 
or bad about who I 
am 
     
Stress, depression, 
anxiety, or other bad 
feelings 
     
 
 
  
Gambling beliefs 
The following section investigates your beliefs and attitudes towards gambling.  
 
 
[29]Rate how TRUE / FALSE each of the following statements about gambling is.  
Please choose the appropriate response for each item: 
  
Completely 
UNTRUE 
 
Completely 
TRUE 
gambling has predictable outcomes 
     
a gambler can win over the long term 
     
correct strategies will make someone win 
     
I know the correct strategies to win 
     
I can predict game outcomes when I am tuned in or observant 
     
I can control the outcome of games 
     
I am a skilled gambler 
     
most gambling is designed so that the punter loses 
     
I win more than I lose 
     
I lose more than I win 
     
I am luckier than most people 
     
you usually need to invest a certain amount before you win 
     
losing profit from gambling is not really losing money 
     
I look for patterns among gambling outcomes 
     
I apply different strategies depending on my instincts, or my gut 
feeling      
my strategies for winning have changed a lot since I began 
gambling       
I follow rules or strategies to win 
     
I follow rules or set limits to avoid losing too much 
     
I follow my instincts and gut feelings to make gambling 
decisions      
if you lose, you are more likely to win next time 
     
 
  
[30] What proportion of what you know about gambling comes from the following sources? 
PROVIDE PERCENTAGES ADDING UP TO 100% 
  0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
Family, friends or 
colleagues who gamble            
Family, friends or 
colleagues who don't 
gamble 
           
Government, non-profit 
organizations            
Counselors, psychologists, 
support group members            
Advertisements, the 
gambling industry            
Gambling experience 
           
Other 
           
 
 
[31]How often do you have thoughts about gambling without any prompting?  
Please choose only one of the following: 
Never  
Several times a year  
once a week  
daily  
Several times a day  
 
 
  
Gambling situations 
The following section investigates your experiences in different situations and states of mind.  
 
 
[32]Consider the following SITUATIONS and STATES OF MIND.  
Please choose the appropriate response for each item: 
  
Unlikely to 
THINK about 
gambling 
 
Likely to 
THINK about 
gambling 
you see an advertisement, or sign for gambling 
     
you're socializing with friends 
     
you're at a casino, race track, or other gambling venue 
     
you're at a sporting event, or a venue where gambling may be 
available      
you're alone at home 
     
you're drinking alcohol or using drugs (if applicable) 
     
you had an argument with your partner, friend, or family 
member      
you had a recent, large gambling loss 
     
you had a recent, large gambling win 
     
you feel low or depressed 
     
you feel anxious, stressed, or on edge 
     
you feel bored 
     
you feel excited 
     
you feel content and happy 
     
 
 
 
  
[33]Consider the following SITUATIONS and STATES OF MIND.  
Please choose the appropriate response for each item: 
  
Unlikely to 
FEEL THE 
URGE to 
gamble 
 
Likely to 
FEEL THE 
URGE to 
gamble 
you see an advertisement, or sign for gambling      
you're socializing with friends      
you're at a casino, race track, or other gambling venue      
you're at a sporting event, or a venue where gambling may be 
available 
     
you're alone at home      
you're drinking alcohol or using drugs (if applicable)      
you had an argument with your partner, friend, or family 
member 
     
you had a recent, large gambling loss      
you had a recent, large gambling win      
you feel low or depressed      
you feel anxious, stressed, or on edge      
you feel bored      
you feel excited      
you feel content and happy      
 
 
  
[34]Consider the following SITUATIONS and STATES OF MIND.  
Please choose the appropriate response for each item: 
 
  
Unlikely to 
TRIGGER ME 
TO GAMBLE 
 
Likely to 
TRIGGER ME 
TO GAMBLE 
you see an advertisement, or sign for gambling      
you're socializing with friends      
you're at a casino, race track, or other gambling venue      
you're at a sporting event, or a venue where gambling may be 
available 
     
you're alone at home      
you're drinking alcohol or using drugs (if applicable)      
you had an argument with your partner, friend, or family 
member 
     
you had a recent, large gambling loss      
you had a recent, large gambling win      
you feel low or depressed      
you feel anxious, stressed, or on edge      
you feel bored      
you feel excited      
you feel content and happy      
 
 
  
[35]Consider what you are most likely to do in the following GAMBLING SCENARIOS: 
  
You have been gambling for a while and...  
  
stop 
gambling 
think 
carefully 
about what is 
going on 
continue 
gambling, 
but play 
more 
carefully 
continue 
gambling in 
the same 
way 
continue 
gambling, 
but take 
more risks 
allow myself 
to 'switch 
off', 'get in 
the zone', or 
play by 
instinct 
you have a big win 
      
you have lost more than 
you planned to wager       
you reach your 
designated spending limit       
you are breaking even 
      
 
 
 
 
[36] How carefully do you think about each step or stage during each gambling session? 
  Not at all    Very much 
 
     
 
 
  Never    
All the 
time 
[37]How much time each week do you think or fantasize 
about good gambling outcomes?      
      
[38]How much of your spare time do you spend gambling? 
     
      
 
 
 
[39]Which of the following are more important to you when gambling?  
 
Believing you 
can win 
   
Hoping you can 
win 
 
     
 
 
[40]Which of the following are more important to you when gambling? * 
  
Switching off, 
escaping 
   
Feeling 
excitement, or 
the 'rush' 
  
     
 
 
  
[41]How often do you...  
  Never    
Very 
often 
Think about negative effects of gambling on your life? 
     
Have competing urges or goals related to gambling? 
     
Focus on the good things about gambling? 
     
Focus on the bad aspects of gambling?  
     
Try to forget about the good aspects of gambling?  
     
Try to forget about the bad aspects of gambling?  
     
 
 
 
[42]How difficult is it to...  
  
Very 
easy 
   
Very 
difficult 
follow your own rules or plans during gambling sessions?      
ignore or dismiss thoughts about gambling?      
resist the urge to gamble?      
 
 
[43] How uncomfortable do you find conflict between goals related to gambling? 
  
Very 
comfortable 
   
Very 
uncomfortable 
 
     
 
 
[44] Please estimate, how significant your gambling-related problems to be? 
 
No problem at 
all 
   
Significant 
problems 
 
     
 
 
[45] Compared to others, how high do you consider your spending on gambling? 
Much less than 
average 
Less than 
average 
Average 
More than 
average 
Much more than 
average 
     
 
 
  
[46]Rate how true each of the following statements are: 
  
If I WIN at gambling, it is due to…  
 
Completely 
Untrue 
 Very true 
the laws of probability  
     
the house advantage, or book-keeper’s profit margin  
     
my luck  
     
my skill at gambling  
     
knowing/following the right strategy or set of rules  
     
factors not related to myself  
     
factors related to myself  
     
 
 
[47]Rate how TRUE / FALSE each of the following statements are: 
  
If I LOSE at gambling, it is due to…  
  
Completely 
Untrue 
 Very true 
the laws of probability  
     
the house advantage, or book-keeper’s profit margin  
     
my luck  
     
my skill at gambling  
     
knowing/following the right strategy or set of rules  
     
factors not related to myself  
     
factors related to myself  
     
 
 
 
  
[48]Roughly how many times have you used illicit drugs in the last month?  
Please write your answer here:_________________ 
  
[49]Roughly how much alcohol do you drink on average in a typical week? (standard drinks)  
Please write your answer here:________________________ 
  
[50]Have you ever been charged with a criminal offence?  
Please choose only one of the following: 
Yes  
No  
 
[51]What is your annual income?  
Please choose only one of the following: 
Disability pension/government allowance  
up to $20,000  
$20,001-$40,000  
$40,001-$70,000  
$70,001+  
 
  
Thank you for participating.  
 
 
